

Tribunal Arbitral du Sport
Court of Arbitration for Sport

CAS 2017/A/4968 Mr Alexander Legkov v. International Ski Federation (FIS)

ARBITRAL AWARD

delivered by the

COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT

sitting in the following composition:

President: Prof. Jan Paulsson, Attorney-at-Law, Washington, D.C.
Arbitrators: Mr. Nicholas Stewart QC, Barrister, London
Hon. Michael J. Beloff QC, Barrister, London
Ad hoc Clerk: Mr. Philipp Kotlaba, Attorney-at-Law, Washington, D.C.

in the arbitration between

Mr ALEXANDER LEGKOV, Vorokhobino (Moscow Dist.), Russian Federation

Represented by Mr. Christoph Wieschemann, Wieschemann Rechtsanwälte, Bochum, Germany

- Appellant -

and

INTERNATIONAL SKI FEDERATION, Oberhofen / Thunersee, Switzerland

Represented by Dr. Stephan Netzle, Times Attorneys AG, Zurich, Switzerland

- Respondent -

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I. THE PARTIES

1. Mr. Alexander Legkov (the “Athlete” or the “Appellant”) is an international-level Russian cross-country skier.
2. The International Ski Federation (“FIS,” the “Federation,” or the “Respondent”) is the world governing body for skiing. Its registered seat is in Switzerland. For its part, the Cross Country Ski Federation of Russia is a member of the Russian Ski Federation (“RSF”), the national governing body for skiing in Russia. RSF is the relevant Member Federation of FIS, but is currently suspended from membership and is not a party to these proceedings. Its registered seat is in Moscow.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

3. The information detailed in this section is a summary of relevant facts as provided by the Parties in their written pleadings and factual and legal exhibits attached thereto. This section serves solely for the purpose of factual synopsis. To the extent they are necessary or relevant, additional facts may be set out below, in particular in the Analysis of the Merits. The present award only refers to such evidence and arguments to the extent necessary to explain its reasoning; the Panel has, however, considered all facts, claims, and legal arguments put before it.
4. The Athlete challenges an Optional Provisional Suspension, imposed on him by the Federation on 22 December 2016 and based on a potential finding of an anti-doping rule violation (“ADRV”) at the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games. That suspension was based on evidence made available to FIS by the International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) concerning alleged Russian State-sponsored doping practices described in a report by Professor Richard McLaren presented in two installments on 16 July and 9 December 2016 (the “McLaren Report”). The Athlete’s suspension prevents him from competing in FIS- or RSF-sanctioned cross-country skiing competitions pending the completion of an investigation by the IOC.
5. In light of the McLaren Report’s evident significance, the Panel considers it appropriate briefly to outline the history of its publication and the consequences of Professor McLaren’s research, including the suspension of the RSF and the imposition of provisional suspensions by FIS, including of the Appellant.
6. On 8 May 2016, the *60 Minutes* television program of the CBS (USA) aired allegations by the former director of the Moscow Doping Laboratory, Dr. Grigory Rodchenkov, relating to an elaborate doping scheme having allegedly been perpetrated from at least 2011 onward in Russia. On 12 May 2016, the *New York Times* ran an article, “Russian Insider Says State-Run Doping Fueled Olympic Gold,” revealing additional details relating to the scheme described by Dr. Rodchenkov.
7. On 19 May 2016, the World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”) appointed Professor Richard McLaren as an “Independent Person” instructed to investigate Dr. Rodchenkov’s

allegations. Professor McLaren's mandate included (paraphrasing from the explicit mandate given to Professor McLaren and reproduced in the introduction to his report):

1. Determining whether the doping control process during the Sochi Games was manipulated, including but not limited to acts of tampering with the samples within the Sochi Laboratory.
 2. Identifying the *modus operandi* and those involved in such manipulation.
 3. Identifying any athlete that might have benefited from those alleged manipulations to conceal positive doping tests.
 4. Identifying if this *modus operandi* was also happening within the Moscow Laboratory outside the period of the Sochi Games.
 5. Reviewing and assessing other evidence or information held by Grigory Rodchenkov.
8. On 16 July 2016, the first part of the McLaren Report was published. It concluded *inter alia* that the WADA-accredited Moscow Doping Laboratory ("Moscow Laboratory") operated, for the protection of doped Russian athletes, a State-sanctioned scheme of misreporting and concealment of test-positive urine sample results. In what Professor McLaren termed the "Disappearing Positive Methodology," positive test results were reported to the Ministry of Sport, which generally directed the Moscow Laboratory to report these as negative in the WADA Anti-Doping Administration and Management System ("ADAMS").
9. With respect to the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympic Games, Professor McLaren detailed the existence of an additional scheme whereby samples, belonging to doped Russian athletes but collected under the eye of international observers, were surreptitiously replaced with clean samples taken out-of-competition (McLaren Report, Part II, p. 97). The report alleged that the Ministry of Sport "directed, controlled and oversaw" the manipulation of protected athletes' samples with the active participation and assistance of the Russian Center of Sports Preparation ("CSP"), Federal Security Service ("FSB"), and the Moscow and Sochi Laboratories.
10. In an announcement dated 19 July 2016, the IOC stated that a disciplinary commission chaired by Professor Denis Oswald (the "Oswald Disciplinary Commission") would be established in order to conduct a full repeated analysis and inquiry into all Russian athletes having participated at the 2014 Sochi Games in addition to their coaches, officials, and support staff. The Oswald Disciplinary Commission's investigative work is currently ongoing.
11. Professor McLaren's original mandate required him to issue a report prior to the beginning of the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. On the basis of the report's publication, WADA extended Professor McLaren's mandate in order to fulfill the third task originally set out to him: "Identify any athlete that might have benefited from those alleged manipulations to conceal positive doping tests."

12. That report, termed McLaren Part II for clarity in the present award, was published on 9 December 2016. This Report recalled that it was possible to re-open a Berlinger BEREC-KIT® sample bottle without destroying the closing mechanism after the container had been sealed during doping control (McLaren Report, Part I, p. 12; Part II, p. 26). In response to Dr. Rodchenkov’s provision of documentary evidence suggesting that certain athletes had benefited from this process, as well as the provision of a limited number of urine samples, the report commissioned a forensic report by King’s College London in order to ascertain if certain allegations of Dr. Rodchenkov, including that specific athletes had benefited from the process of sample-swapping (the “King’s College Forensic Report”), could be corroborated. That report analyzed a number of sample bottles in WADA’s possession and found that two types of marks were present on the internal surface of sample bottle lids that “could not be reconciled with manufacturing.” It described the two marks in the following terms:

- *“The first type of mark (Type 1) was a horizontal long impact mark on the inside of the lid, usually below the level of the glass lip on the bottle. During research, these marks were reproduced and found to be present after screwing the lid on forcefully. They are suspected to have been caused by the metal ratchet ring vibrating and impacting against the inside of the lid. These marks were not reproduced when the lid was screwed on carefully. There were some similarities between these marks and marks reproduced when a flat strip of metal (inserted between the lid and the glass bottle) caused a ‘stab’ mark where it is forced over the lip and impacted with the lid. The marks on the sample bottles examined at Kings College could not be distinguished from the marks reproduced by screwing the lids on. Screwing the lids on again after they had been removed may result in multiple Type 1 marks not seen on lids that had only been screwed on once.*
- *The second type of mark (Type 2) was a series of vertical and often diagonal scratch marks observed on the internal surface of the lid. There were similarities between marks reproduced when a flat strip of metal was inserted between the lid and the bottle to manipulate the metal ring to open the lids. These marks vary in size and shape. None of these marks could be reproduced during research by screwing on any lids. Some of these marks were however reproduced when the metal ring was manipulated with the metal strips and scratched the inside of the lid.”¹*

13. In the course of assembling Part II of his report, Professor McLaren acquired numerous additional documentary exhibits, several of which have been placed on the record of this appeal by the Respondent and are described in the present award. In total, the McLaren Report relied on thousands of documents of which 1,166 are categorized and contained in the “Evidence Disclosure Package” (“EDP”) database, available online.

¹ King’s College Forensic Report, EDP0902, p. 12 (page numbers for this document refer to the digital file, since this document is not numbered internally).

14. Taken together, the McLaren Reports declared “beyond a reasonable doubt” that Russian national institutions planned and carried out a “carefully orchestrated conspiracy” aimed at permitting doped Russian athletes to compete dirty while evading the detection of national and international doping controls (McLaren Report, Part II, p. 95). Professor McLaren concluded that hundreds of athletes benefited, directly or indirectly, as “party to the manipulations” of doping controls described in the report’s first installment. Part II of the report additionally noted that Professor McLaren’s initial finding that 312 positive test reports had been misreported had increased, by December 2016, to 500 results.
15. Part II of the McLaren Report concluded, *inter alia*, the following:
- Manipulation of doping controls involved officials in the Russian Ministry of Sport, the CSP and FSB, the Moscow Laboratory, and the Russian Anti-Doping Agency (“RUSADA”), in addition to the Russian Olympic Committee and individual coaches.
 - 695 Russian athletes and 19 foreign athletes “can be identified as part” of the scheme outlined in Part I to conceal potentially positive doping control tests.
 - Analysis of 44 B-sample bottles from athletes at the 2014 Winter Olympic Games (“Sochi Games”) showed evidence of scratches and marks indicative of tampering. (McLaren Report, Part II, pp. 18-20.)
16. Names of individual athletes in the McLaren Report were encrypted by its author prior to publication. By confidential letter dated 9 December 2016, Professor McLaren stated to the Federation that one sample indicative of potential tampering matched the Athlete. Professor McLaren further confirmed that the Athlete appeared underneath the code A0467 in his report.
17. Acting on this information, on 22 December 2016, the Disciplinary Commission of the IOC notified FIS that it was opening an investigation against the Appellant. It noted that, of three urine samples and one blood sample collected and analyzed by the Sochi Laboratory, one of the Athlete’s B-samples contained marks indicative of tampering:

“Based on the information in our possession, the B-sample n° 2890803 notably appears to have been surreptitiously opened and the urine collected on 23 February 2014, replaced by a different urine (scratches and marks evidence indicates tampering).

At this stage, the alleged anti-doping rule violation is “tampering or attempted tampering with any part of the Doping Control” pursuant to Article 2 of The International Olympic Committee Anti-Doping Rules applicable to the XXII Olympic Games in Sochi, in 2014 (hereinafter: “IOC Anti-Doping Rules”). Further violations which might be brought to light in the course of further investigations are reserved.”

III. THE FIS PROCEEDINGS

18. On 22 December 2016, the Chairman of the FIS Doping Panel notified the Athlete, via the Cross Country Ski Federation of Russia, that he had been suspended with immediate effect, pending determination of whether or not he had committed an ADRV. The FIS explained the provisional suspension was imposed on the basis of allegations described by Professor McLaren concerning alleged Russian State-sponsored doping practices and the Athlete's suspected involvement in those practices.
19. The Athlete asked that the provisional suspension be revoked and further requested the Laboratory Documentation Package for his B-sample on 28 December 2016. He also requested permission to appear before the FIS Doping Panel in the event of an oral hearing.
20. On 30 December 2016, the FIS Doping Panel rejected the Athlete's request for revocation and provisionally upheld the suspension. It also, however, invited him to a personal hearing in respect of the matter.
21. The FIS Doping Panel held a hearing on 13 January 2017 by videoconference.
22. On 18 January 2017, the Athlete challenged his prohibition on training with the Russian national team. The Chairman of the FIS Doping Panel granted the Athlete permission to resume training with the Russian national team on the same date.
23. On 25 January 2017, the Athlete requested that the IOC notify him of (i) the concrete ADRV of which he was suspected and which fell within IOC jurisdiction; (ii) the factual basis therefor; and (iii) details as to additional or ongoing investigations in his case. The IOC's response, dated 26 January 2017, read in relevant part:

“At this stage, the IOC considers that the alleged anti-doping rule violation is, without limitation, “tampering or attempted tampering with any part of Doping Control” pursuant to Art. 2 of The International Olympic Committee Anti-Doping Rules applicable to the XXII Olympic Games in Sochi, in 2014 and the concerned samples have been collected in the context [of the] Olympic Games.”
24. On 25 January 2017, the FIS Doping Panel upheld the provisional suspension. The operative part of its decision states:

“[T]he opening of the formal investigation by the IOC based on credible prima facie evidence contained in the McLaren Report and the supporting documents (including the description of the systematic doping and covering up), and the protection of the other competitors, as well as the integrity of the sport competitions in having a reliable outcome without the risk of being changed because of a later disqualification of the Athlete, justify the provisional suspension of the Athlete at this point in time. Further investigation will either confirm the suspicion and the provisional suspension will be replaced by a sanction, or demonstrate that the allegations have been groundless.”

25. One member of the Panel dissented from the Doping Panel’s decision. The dissent is noted by the FIS Doping Panel majority in paragraph 27 of its decision and states:

“The evidence mentioned in the McLaren Report is not sufficiently convincing and does not support the conclusion that the IOC investigation or a later appeal before the CAS will confirm that the Athlete has committed an ADRV.

The requirements for a provisional suspension are not met in this case since there is no reasonable prospect that the allegation of an ADRV will be upheld. The Athlete has lived and trained outside of Russia. He bears no fault or negligence if his sample was manipulated without his knowledge or consent. The long list of negative tests of the Athlete by various laboratories in or around 2014 makes it unlikely that he committed an ADRV at the Sochi Games. Finally, it would be unfair to the Athlete, based on the facts known to date, to suspend him from competing, especially because of the lack of evidence.”

26. The decision was sent via e-mail to the Russian Ski Federation on the date of its dispatch. It forms the basis for the present appeal to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”).

IV. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE CAS

27. On 30 January 2017, the Appellant filed a Statement of Appeal to CAS in accordance with Article 13 of the FIS Anti-Doping Rules 2016 (the “FIS ADR”) and Article R47 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration (“CAS Code”). In it he nominated Mr. Nicholas Stewart QC as arbitrator.
28. The CAS Court Office confirmed receipt of the Statement of Appeal on 2 February 2017 and requested the Parties to indicate whether they wished to consolidate the present procedure with the case CAS 2017/A/4969, in accordance with Article R52 of the CAS Code. The CAS Court Office additionally took note of the Parties’ agreement to conduct the matter as an Article R52 expedited procedure.
29. On 31 January 2017, the Appellant filed his Appeal Brief.
30. On 3 February 2017, the Appellant objected to a consolidation of his case and offered certain information with regard to a potential expedited procedural calendar.
31. The Respondent welcomed the potential consolidation of this case with CAS 2017/A/4969 in a letter dated 7 February 2017 and suggested that the matters be further consolidated with four additional appeals then pending before CAS. It nominated the Hon. Michael J. Beloff QC as arbitrator.
32. By letter dated 15 February 2017, the Appellant challenged the nomination of Mr. Beloff in accordance with Article R34 of the CAS Code. In addition, the Appellant requested that the Optional Provisional Suspension be stayed pending a decision on the merits pursuant to Article R37 of the CAS Code (“Request for Provisional Measures”). Specifically, the Appellant requested that the CAS:

“provisional[ly] suspend the Decision of FDP of Respondent dated 22 December 2016 until the decision of the panel on the appeal.”

33. By letter dated 20 February 2017, the Respondent opposed the Appellant’s challenge.
34. Also on 20 February 2017, the CAS Court Office forwarded to the Parties comments by Mr. Beloff dated 16 February 2017 and requested the Appellant to indicate whether he wished to maintain his challenge.
35. On 21 February 2017, the Deputy President of the CAS Appeals Arbitration Division denied the Appellant’s Request for Provisional Measures. A copy of the operative part of the Deputy President’s order was communicated to the Parties on the same date. The reasoned order was subsequently communicated on 4 May 2017.
36. On 22 February 2017, the Appellant notified the CAS Court Office that he did not wish to maintain the challenge.
37. On 24 February 2017, the CAS Court Office transmitted to the Parties “Joint Comments” prepared by the Respondent with respect to the Appellant’s Request for Provisional Measures (having been transmitted to the CAS Court Office by the Respondent on 20 February 2017).
38. On 27 February 2017, the Respondent filed its Answer.
39. On 28 February 2017, the Appellant noted that he had not received a copy of the Respondent’s Answer and requested leave pursuant to Article R56 of the CAS Code to amend his arguments and produce additional evidence. The Appellant additionally requested a hearing.
40. On 1 March 2017, the Appellant acknowledged receipt of the Respondent’s Answer and reiterated his request for leave to file a supplemental pleading.
41. On 13 March 2017, the Panel was constituted as follows: Prof. Jan Paulsson, President; Mr. Nicholas Stewart QC; and Hon. Michael J. Beloff QC.
42. On 27 March 2017, the CAS Court Office informed the Appellant that he would be given the opportunity to amend his pleadings by 31 March 2017. The Appellant submitted his supplemental submission (“Supplemental Submission”) on 31 March 2017.
43. On 4 April 2017, the CAS Court Office confirmed receipt of the Supplemental Submission and further informed the parties of the Panel’s availability for a hearing on 30 May 2017.
44. On 24 April 2017, in response to further comments by the Parties, the CAS Court Office confirmed that the hearing would be held in Lausanne on 15 May 2017.
45. By letter dated 29 April 2017, the Respondent forwarded to the CAS Court Office an affidavit by Professor McLaren dated 26 April 2017 attesting to certain issues concerning his reports (“McLaren Affidavit”).

46. On 2 May 2017, the Appellant stated that the McLaren Affidavit had been submitted “in contradiction to” Article R56 of the CAS Code and was in his view inadmissible in these proceedings.
47. On 5 May 2017, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that Mr. Philipp Kotlaba, Attorney-at-Law in Washington, D.C., had been appointed as *ad hoc* clerk to the Panel.
48. On 10 May 2017, the CAS Court Office circulated to the Parties an Order of Procedure and requested that they return signed copies of the same by 12 May 2017.
49. The Respondent and the Appellant submitted skeleton arguments for use in the hearing on 10 and 11 May 2017, respectively. In connection with his skeleton arguments, the Appellant reiterated his objection to the admissibility of the McLaren Affidavit.
50. On 12 May 2017, the CAS Court Office circulated the Order of Procedure, duly signed by both Parties.
51. By a second communication dated 12 May 2017, the CAS Court Office informed the Parties that the Panel would benefit from particularly focused argument on a number of issues. In this connection, the CAS Court Office enclosed a list of questions prepared by the Panel for the Parties’ consideration at the hearing.
52. On 15 May 2017, a hearing was held at the Court of Arbitration for Sport in Lausanne, Switzerland. The following were in attendance:

Panel:

Prof. Jan Paulsson;
Hon. Michael J. Beloff QC;
Mr. Nicholas Stewart QC;
Mr. Philipp Kotlaba (*Ad hoc* clerk);

Appellant:

Mr. Alexander Legkov;
Mr. Christof Wieschemann;
Ms. Susanne Mantesberg-Wieschemann;
Mr. Evgeniy Belov;
Mr. Alexander Ponomarev (Interpreter);

Respondent:

Dr. Stephan Netzle;
Dr. Karsten Hofmann; and
Ms. Emile Merkt.

The Parties were given the opportunity to present their cases, to make their submissions and arguments, and to answer questions asked by the Panel. At the conclusion of the hearing the Parties confirmed that they had no complaint regarding the conduct of the proceedings.

53. On 29 May 2017, the Panel issued the operative part of its award. The present award reiterates the *dispositif* and sets forth the grounds for the Panel's decision.

V. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES

54. The following section is a summary of the Parties' positions. It serves the purpose of synopsis only and does not necessarily include every submission advanced by the Parties in their pleadings. The Panel has, however, considered all arguments advanced before it in deciding the present Award.

A. THE APPELLANT'S POSITION

55. The Appellant submits that the practices alleged in the McLaren Report do not suffice to demonstrate individual guilt adequate to justify his suspension by FIS. Both the Federation's internal rules and fundamental principles of Swiss and European law mandate, as a condition of any provisional suspension, that the Respondent adduce evidence that the Appellant himself committed an anti-doping rule violation. The McLaren Report's intended scope, moreover, was limited to examining high-level practices and not specific athletes' guilt; the Appellant accordingly submits that the Respondent falls short of its burden and that the Optional Provisional Suspension must be lifted.

1. The Applicable Standard

56. The Appellant submits, first, that the provisions applicable to assessing the validity of the Optional Provisional Suspension – consisting of the FIS ADR but also including principles of due process from Swiss and international law – impose on the Federation a burden which it fails to meet.
57. As a preliminary matter, the Appellant notes that the rules governing a possible ADRV at the Sochi Games fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the IOC. The Appellant observes that facts underlying non-Olympic ADRVs “could not be subject to investigations of [the] IOC,” since they lie outside of its exclusive jurisdiction. In other words, the Panel is precluded from considering any evidence other than that relating specifically to sample-swapping during the Olympic Games.
58. Turning to the application of the FIS ADR, the Appellant stresses the Panel's power to review the suspension *de novo*, i.e., without deference to Professor McLaren's conclusions or the EDP writ large. He invokes, in this regard, FIS ADR Articles 3.2.3 and 3.2.4, which appear within a provision titled “Methods of Establishing Facts and Presumptions.” In the Appellant's view, the Panel need not defer to the McLaren Report's factual assertions, as these have not been “established by a decision of a court or professional disciplinary

tribunal of competent jurisdiction which is not the subject of a pending appeal.” The available evidence “is not a full proof but stands to the full review” of the Panel.

59. The Appellant considers the FIS ADR to impose the following burdens of proof on the Federation to justify a provisional suspension:
- First, the Federation must establish a *prima facie* case that the Appellant has committed an ADRV. With regard to the particular standard of proof, the Appellant draws the Panel’s attention to FIS ADR Article 3.1, which requires assertions of an ADRV to be grounded “to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel,” and submits that this provision governs both Articles 7.9.2 and 7.9.3.2, the provisions applicable to provisional suspensions.
 - If (and only if) the Respondent meets its burden above, the burden of proof shifts onto the Appellant. In the event he must then adduce counterevidence sufficient to satisfy one of the three requirements under Article 7.9.3.2 for lifting a provisional suspension, such as demonstrating that there is “no reasonable prospect” of an ADRV being upheld in his case.
60. To meet its initial burden of a *prima facie* case, the Appellant submits, the Respondent must at minimum demonstrate that (i) the Appellant himself committed an ADRV and (ii) the Appellant’s “delinquen[cy] is convincingly probable.”
61. The Appellant adds that the legal framework applicable to assessing the provisional suspension includes principles anchored in international and Swiss law. Specifically, the Appellant contends that the presumption of innocence and the right to be informed “of the nature and cause of the accusation” against him, as well as the principle of no judgment without charge, comprise “part of the ‘Ordre Public’ which must be considered by CAS” pursuant to the Swiss Private International Law Statute and the Swiss Code of Criminal Procedure. The FIS ADR “must be interpreted and applied” consistent with these principles.
62. Accordingly, the FIS ADR cannot call for athletes to defend themselves against an unrecognizable charge. Whether on the basis of the FIS ADR or owing to principles such as the presumption of innocence and individualized guilt, a provisional suspension may be justified only by a showing that the Appellant himself committed an ADRV. The Respondent must therefore submit “concretized and substantiated” evidence, not empty assertions, before the burden of proof would shift to the Appellant under FIS ADR Article 7.9.3.2.

2. The Evidentiary Deficit

63. Having set forth the legal standard he deems applicable, the Appellant submits that the evidence on record is insufficient to uphold the provisional suspension. The McLaren Report, in particular, cannot demonstrate any of the conditions which the Appellant considers it to be the Federation’s obligation to satisfy. This section sets forth the Appellant’s position as to why the provisional suspension must fail, beginning first with

his characterization of the McLaren Report and continuing with an analysis of the individual documentary assertions on which the Federation purports to rely.

i. Limitations of the McLaren Report

64. Influential though Professor McLaren's report has been, the Appellant suggests that it does not link him personally to the commission of any ADRV and indeed expressly disavows any intention to do so. The McLaren Report was not intended to justify a provisional suspension under the FIS ADR, nor can it.
65. The Appellant notes first that Part I of the McLaren Report dealt solely with "systemic cover up and manipulation of the doping control process"; it did not "report on individual athletes." Professor McLaren did uncover evidence in respect of individual athletes in his second Report, but accompanied such evidence with the express reservation that it could not ground an ADRV as a matter of law:

"The IP [Independent Person] is not a Results Management Authority under the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC 2015 version). The mandate of the IP did not involve any authority to bring Anti-Doping Rule Violation ("ADRV") cases against individual athletes. . . . Accordingly, the IP has not assessed the sufficiency of the evidence to prove an ADRV by an individual athlete." (p. 18.)

Additionally, Professor McLaren states:

"There was a program of doping and doping cover up in Russia, which may have been engaged in to enhance the image of Russia through sport. That doping manipulation and cover up of doping control processes was institutionalised through government officials in the MofS, RUSADA, CSP, the Moscow Laboratory and FSB, as well as sports officials and coaches. It is unknown whether athletes knowingly or unknowingly participated in the processes involved." (pp. 46 et seqq.)

66. In the Appellant's view, the limited scope of the McLaren Report has also been recognized by the IOC. A letter dated 23 February 2017 from its Director General, for instance, informed the leadership of national Olympic committees and international federations as follows:

"The establishment of acceptable evidence is a significant challenge, as some [international federations] have already experienced; where in some cases they have had to lift provisional suspensions or were not able – at least at this stage – to begin disciplinary procedures due to a lack of consistent evidence."

67. The IOC's letter additionally quotes a statement published by WADA on its website on 25 February 2017, recalling that "in many cases the evidence provided may not be sufficient to bring successful cases." It follows in the Appellant's view that officials at the highest levels of sport were aware of the McLaren Report's limitations as a basis for ADRV prosecutions.

68. The Appellant concludes that the McLaren Report “never had the purpose [of finding] an individual guilty,” whether of committing an ADRV or even in demonstrating an athlete’s “benefit or knowledge.” That its publication has had broad effects on Russian and international sport should not detract from the express limitations on which the report is premised. This is reinforced, the Appellant suggests, by the fact that he has not been charged with “any specific doping offense” as a result of the report’s publication to date.
69. Finally, the Appellant notes that much of the evidence in the McLaren Report is founded on allegations by a character unworthy of trust, Dr. Rodchenkov. Witness testimony alleges *inter alia* that Dr. Rodchenkov accepted bribes from athletes in order to prevent certain samples from appearing positive in ADAMS. In his report, for example, Professor McLaren quotes the following statement which the Appellant considers to refer to Dr. Rodchenkov:

“They are working like a Swiss clock. Someone inside the lab is corrupt, not the DCOs. You just need to give (the) number of the athlete’s sample to make it negative.”

70. The EDP confirms Dr. Rodchenkov’s untrustworthiness in the Appellant’s view. E-mail correspondence at EDP1155 contains an exchange between Dr. Rodchenkov and Alexey Velikodniy, a liaison between the Moscow Laboratory and the Ministry of Sport, in which the two men discuss soliciting a bribe of RUB 181,224 (approximately USD 3,000).² The Appellant observes that media reports corroborate Dr. Rodchenkov’s solicitation of bribes and additionally implicate him in a Russian “secret criminal prosecution,” relating to transacting in performance-enhancing drugs, in 2011. The Appellant consequently considers that any elements of the McLaren Report dependent on Dr. Rodchenkov’s testimony, such as how he or Mr. Velikodniy facilitated sample-swapping at the Sochi Games, “may serve to conceal their involvement in criminal corruption.” He accordingly submits that the McLaren Report – reliant as it is on testimony of an individual who is neither available for questioning by the Panel nor trustworthy standing alone – does not establish a valid basis on which to conclude that the Appellant (may have) committed an ADRV.

ii. Individual Bases of Evidence

71. In the Appellant’s view, the McLaren Report’s limitations are apparent not only in the statements of its author and leading sponsors but also inhere in the documents on which the provisional suspension rests.
72. As a general matter, the Appellant argues, Professor McLaren’s EDP should be treated with caution. From a technical perspective, the EDP appears to have been serially amended without explanation or attribution throughout the proceedings, resulting in a record rife

² Professor McLaren’s English translation reads:

“Dear Alex, These fighters, beasts, we need to have 1 2 samples. On [sic] in competition control and 3 samples for GHRF. Sum total 181.224 rubles. No mercy. Thank you GMR.” The response reads: *“With this wrestler you don’t have to be polite. They do not pay, we can tell them [expletive].”*

with internal inconsistencies. Exacerbating this problem, the Appellant adds, the EDP is cumbersome, difficult to navigate, and occasionally offline – limiting his ability to mount an effective defense. The non-appearance of Professor McLaren at the hearing additionally removed the possibility of posing questions to the report’s chief architect. In consequence the Appellant characterizes the record as unreliable. He requests the Panel to exclude evidence sourced from Professor McLaren as inadmissible on due process grounds, and asks that the affidavit submitted by the Respondent in lieu of Professor McLaren’s appearance likewise be rejected.

73. The evidence’s unreliability is of sufficient severity, in the Appellant’s view, to implicate his fundamental due process rights under Swiss and international law (outlined at paragraph 61 above). The multitude, inconsistency, and unavailability of documents cumulatively deprive the Appellant of a chance to be informed “promptly and in detail of the nature and cause” of the accusations against him, while names of individual athletes and witnesses are blacked out in the EDP – making it impossible to test the EDP’s reliability or identify errors. In light of the evidentiary record’s opacity, the Appellant submits that the “general principle of equality of arms” is likewise unmet.
74. Having sought to establish the unreliability of the evidence by reference to technical deficiencies of the EDP, the Appellant next turns to the individual components informing the Federation’s imposition of his continued suspension, finding these insufficient.

Evidence of Urine Tampering

75. The McLaren Report’s revelations rest on a central assertion: through subterfuge at the highest levels of Russian sport, contaminated urine samples were exchanged with clean ones in an elaborate scheme enabling certain Russian athletes to avail themselves of prohibited substances undetected. The Appellant denies that he was one of these athletes.
76. The Appellant notes first that he has submitted to numerous doping tests during his career, without a single positive result for doping. For example, the Appellant was tested “at least 137 times” in the period between 2010 and 2014. During the Sochi Games, he provided four samples (one blood sample and three urine samples), each of which likewise tested negative. The Appellant accordingly considers that he has shown, *prima facie* and pursuant to Article 3.2.1 of the FIS ADR, that “the athlete was clean.”
77. The process by which urine was collected and subsequently analyzed, moreover, left the Appellant no opportunity to conceal or manipulate his sample. In this regard, the Appellant considers the procedure followed in relation to his urine sample of 23 February 2014 typically to describe the controlled conditions in which he provided samples during the Sochi Games:

“The athlete submitted his sample on 23.02.2014 properly closed, and it was sealed at 2:36 p.m. by Doping Control Officer Andrey Gavrilov. The correctness of the collection and sealing procedure, according to the present Doping Control Form, was confirmed by Doping Control Officer Andrey Gavrilov and Doping Control Officer Daria Curguzova. After the B sample submission, the bottle was outside the

athlete's reach. After handing it over to the Doping Control Officer, it would have been impossible for him to take the bottle back, open it and close it again."

78. With collection complete, the samples came under the control of the IOC, whose rules called for the samples' secure storage at the WADA-accredited Sochi Laboratory, a facility operating under IOC direction. Samples, once collected, therefore remained out of the Appellant's possession or control. To this the Appellant adds that he "never photographed the bottle containing the urine sample" submitted for analysis – undermining the suggestion that athletes (including presumably the Appellant) made their sample codes available to a third party. The Appellant accordingly submits that he had no opportunity to manipulate samples in the course of submitting to doping control.
79. To the extent any opportunity might have existed to tamper, moreover, the Appellant considers it precluded by virtue of his geographical isolation from Russia. The Appellant's trainings have taken place outside of Russia since 2011, under the supervision of non-Russian coaches and personnel. Similarly, the Appellant has "used exclusively medical services in Davos," Switzerland (stemming from an apparent disappointment with Russian doctors following a bout of exercise-induced asthma in 2008).
80. The Appellant accordingly objects to the Respondent's assertion that it is "not conceivable" he could have provided out-of-competition urine without a knowledge or awareness of the purpose for which such samples were sought; he submits this assertion is based on a faulty premise, since no such clean urine was ever proffered. Nor would there have been a need to do so: Mr. Legkov "never was part of the . . . chain of distribution," since the Duchess cocktail and other performance-enhancing drugs were distributed only to athletes directly or via (Russia-based) coaches.
81. The Appellant concludes that he did not and could not have manipulated samples provided in the course of the Sochi Games. To the extent that tampering occurred, the evidence demonstrates only that the Appellant was not immune from the general interventions of Russian sports officials recounted in the McLaren Report, Part I.
82. In any event, however, the Appellant does not consider the McLaren Report to demonstrate the manner by which sample-swapping at the Sochi Games took place and the means by which the Federation claims it can be identified in his case. Professor McLaren, on the basis of testimony provided to him by Dr. Rodchenkov, recounts at length how contaminated samples provided by doped athletes were swapped with clean urine. Whether clean samples were kept and if so, by whom, remains in the Appellant's view an open question, however. At the very least, such doubts undermine the Federation's ability to set out a *prima facie* case of the Appellant's personal involvement in tampering (if any).³

³ The Panel does not understand the Appellant to be making the positive assertion that no urine tampering occurred in Russia. Rather, it perceives the Appellant's submission to suggest that significant doubts exist as to how the system worked, and that in consequence of such doubts the Federation has not made a *prima facie* case that the Athlete's *specific* samples were tampered with, or that he participated in any such scheme (assuming tampering by some third party).

83. The Appellant’s criticisms are not limited to Professor McLaren’s conclusions regarding a clean urine bank or the Federation’s assertion that he was one of the system’s beneficiaries. In the notification letter precipitating the Appellant’s provisional suspension, the IOC specifically noted that “scratches and marks” had been detected on the inner lid of one of the Appellant’s BEREK-KIT® B-sample bottles. In the Appellant’s view, however, this evidence is insufficient to ground a *prima facie* case against him either.
84. First, the Appellant considers it unproven whether the sample belonged to him. He notes that the public versions of EDP documents submitted in this appeal rely on anonymous identification codes in lieu of athletes’ names, such that one cannot verify independently whether the Appellant’s sample corresponds to the code 2890803, identified by the IOC as indicative of an ADRV. The EDP document linking athletes’ anonymized codes to specific sample containers, moreover, is unmentioned in the McLaren Report and provided only in English. This suggests that the document amounts to little more than the “summary and conclusion of IP McLaren, but not a fact provided by a witness or a third person with privileged knowledge.”
85. Second, the Appellant asserts that scratches and marks are readily explicable by innocuous causes and therefore cannot be regarded as a necessary – or even probable – indication of tampering. In this regard, the Appellant also cites the King’s College Forensic Report, a project commissioned by Professor McLaren to verify Dr. Rodchenkov’s description of the methods by which Russian security services allegedly reverse-engineered sample bottles targeted for swapping. That forensic report, the Appellant notes, states that both types of marks (termed Type 1 and Type 2) could have been caused without any intentional manipulation; whereas Type 1 marks were consistent with simply “screwing the lid on forcefully,” Type 2 marks could be reproduced after any “manual manipulation” of the BEREK-KIT® metal ring prior to attachment. Accordingly, the Appellant’s B sample, assessed under the “comfortable satisfaction” test of FIS ADR Article 3.1, does not indicate an ADRV.

The Duchess List

86. The Duchess List purportedly derives its name from a popular Russian alcoholic beverage on the initiative of Irina Rodionova, a Russian official who allegedly facilitated collection of clean urine samples from athletes. According to the McLaren Report, these (along with samples’ identification numbers) were subsequently made available to the FSB for swapping at the Sochi Laboratory. Also according to the McLaren Report, appearance on the list indicated that an athlete had been authorized to consume the “Duchess cocktail,” a suite of performance-boosting chemicals allegedly developed by Dr. Rodchenkov. Whereas the Federation insists that the Appellant’s appearance in this list is an indication that he was a direct beneficiary of the system of sample-swapping described by Professor McLaren, the Appellant himself disputes the list’s relevance and considers the document inapposite to a potential ADRV allegation.
87. At the outset, the Appellant questions whether he appears in the Duchess List at all, since “the documents contain no names” and uncensored versions of the original list, if any, is

available only to WADA and the IOC. Even assuming his appearance in the Duchess List, however, the Appellant questions its origin and relevance.

88. First, in the Appellant's view, the McLaren Report's vague assertions clarify little regarding the list's origin or purpose. The Russian original and English translation do not correspond, compounding the Appellant's view as to the document's unreliability as a technical matter and diminishing its probative value.
89. Second, the Appellant notes that a comparison of the Duchess List (EDP0055) and the schedule of ADAMS test results (EDP1166) indicates that none of the athletes in the Duchess List tested positive at the Moscow Laboratory – including for any of the three ingredients known to comprise the Duchess cocktail. The Appellant considers this unsurprising, since he “prepared and was tested not under the [Disappearing Positive Methodology] system in Moscow but duly in European laboratories.” While pre-Sochi conduct, such as that relating to the Moscow-based “Disappearing Positive Methodology,” does not comprise part of the Oswald Disciplinary Commission's mandate, the observation remains relevant to the Appellant's claim that he has never tested positive for any of the Duchess cocktail's ingredients. Since the Duchess List fails to capture *any* names which (according to ADAMS) tested positive for those ingredients, the Appellant also considers the discrepancy to invalidate Professor McLaren's assertion that the list shows athletes authorized to use the cocktail.
90. Third, the Appellant considers his personal testing history logically to preclude the possibility that he doped during the period under IOC investigation. The Appellant provided at least thirteen samples between 1 January 2014 and 5 February 2014, the date of his arrival in Sochi; at least twelve of these tested clean by laboratories outside of Russia and “without any chance” to be manipulated. During the Olympic Games themselves, the Appellant adds, three urine samples were submitted, including one sample on 21 February 2014, i.e., a mere two days before the urine sample which according to the IOC exhibited signs of tampering and which triggered the provisional suspension. The Appellant accordingly considers it “evident that he did not use the cocktail prior to or within the Olympic Games.”
91. That the Duchess List does not carry the meaning ascribed to it by FIS is further bolstered, in the Appellant's view, by a careful reading of Professor McLaren's report:

“[A]ll of the individuals on the Sochi Duchess List were understood by the CSP, the FSB, and MofS to be on the doping program prior to and possibly during the Sochi Games.” (emphasis of the Appellant)
92. Professor McLaren's passage, the Appellant suggests, shows that “not even the author of the document . . . had concrete knowledge” of whether a listed athlete was using performance-enhancing drugs. Russian officials including Dr. Rodchenkov, Ms. Rodionova, and Mr. Velikodniy (the list's purported author), though “aware of systematic doping,” neither manufactured nor distributed the cocktail to athletes personally. The Appellant accordingly considers FIS's reliance on the Duchess List to be unfounded by

reference to the McLaren Report and, in any event, undermined by the EDP and the Appellant's personal testing history.

The Medals-by-Day List

93. The Appellant considers the Medals-by-Day List similarly unhelpful to the Federation's cause. The list, according to the McLaren Report, contained a daily competition schedule compiled and updated throughout the 2014 Sochi Games. Its purpose was to identify high-value athletes whose samples were not to test positive; all athletes appearing on the Duchess List were included in this document.
94. In the Appellant's view, the Medals-by-Day List raises more questions than it answers. Its origin is unclear, apart from the testimony of Dr. Rodchenkov. The Appellant additionally suggests that several, mutually inconsistent versions of the list exist in the EDP, and numerous athletes, including the Appellant, are listed under competitions in which they did not in fact participate. In particular, the Appellant's notes his appearance in the Medals-by-Day List and the Duchess List, as well as in EDP1162, in relation to competitions held on 14 and 23 February 2014 in which he either did not compete or achieved a result different from that recorded in these documents.
95. The Appellant concludes that the Federation cannot "deem a document as valid proof for the individual involvement of an athlete insofar as it compromises him" while deeming its faults "irrelevant insofar as it exculpates him." The Duchess and Medals-by-Day Lists, whether assessed individually or in combination, are incapable of indicating *prima facie* an ADRV.

E-mails

96. Finally, the Respondent has adduced two sets of emails citing the Appellant, one of which associates Mr. Legkov's name with an instruction to "warn . . . as soon as possible" and another in which Dr. Rodchenkov appears to describe the Appellant as an athlete subject to the instruction of "SAVE."
97. The Appellant contests both emails' relevance. The Appellant is associated with the word "SAVE," for instance, in the context of an apparent discussion between Dr. Rodchenkov and Mr. Velikodniy of a sample containing "budenoside," a glucocorticosteroid inhalant used to treat asthma. Deeming the Respondent to imply that budenoside was a prohibited substance, the Appellant takes the contrary position that the substance, for which he holds a therapeutic use exemption, is legal.
98. The e-mails' interpretation is further complicated in the Appellant's view by an apparent ignorance by Russian officials as to which substances were in fact prohibited. The Appellant notes, for example, a message submitted following his provision of a sample on 28 March 2014, which tested positive for budenoside:

"Be patient today the federation won[']t be informed until Friday evening [...] but this stupid [expletive] A0467 [Legkov] put on the bike

Let him be his own savior”

Dr. Rodchenkov later wrote in reply: “They rescued the goat Legkov.”

99. The Appellant considers the above exchange to indicate that Russian officials believed budenoside to be a prohibited substance requiring concealment, and that Dr. Rodchenkov helped to “save” a result that, in retrospect, did not require saving. The correspondence does not indicate an ADRV but the non-existence of one. That the e-mails’ own authors are unaware of the distinction, in the Appellant’s view, eliminates the EDP’s electronic archive as a basis for drawing inferences.
100. The Appellant also contests the internal reliability of e-mail exchanges in light of apparent inconsistencies between the English and Russian versions of electronic correspondence in the EDP. This includes, apparently, the outright substitution of Mr. Legkov’s surname for the word “passenger” in one of the message’s English translations. (Compare EDP0263 with EDP1155.) English-language EDP material, in other words, fails to reflect the substance of the alleged Russian original. In result, the Appellant argues that electronic correspondence on record lacks reliability regardless of the substantive assertion for which it is invoked.

Conclusions

101. In light of the record and considering the standard of proof set out in FIS ADR Article 3.1, the Appellant submits that “no evidence, standing alone or together,” has established an ADRV to the “comfortable satisfaction” of the Panel. Based exclusively on a report prepared subject to the reservation that it *not* serve as proof of individual athletes’ guilt, the provisional suspension falls well short of FIS’s burden of proof set out in FIS ADR Article 7.9.2.
102. The provisional suspension is, moreover, premised in reality on a theory of guilt by association, i.e., without a showing of individual wrongdoing. Even if the FIS ADR permitted an Optional Provisional Suspension in this case, therefore, the Appellant would deem it to contravene fundamental rights guaranteed under the Swiss Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights.
103. The Appellant concludes by drawing the Panel’s attention to the suspension’s severity of consequence. The suspension, effective since 22 December 2016, removed the Athlete from competition at the height of the 2016-2017 winter skiing season. Should the suspension remain in place, the next season may well also be out of reach – pending “further notice” as to the Oswald Disciplinary Commission’s investigative work. Nor is the concern merely temporal or defeasible; it is doubtful that the Oswald Commission is in a position to uncover additional evidence to demonstrate an ADRV on the merits.
104. The Optional Provisional Suspension, in sum, is based on defective evidence and is untenable under the FIS ADR. The Appellant accordingly requests the Panel:
 - (i) *to set aside the decision of the FIS doping panel of 25 January 2017;*

- (ii) *to set aside the provisional suspension of the athlete by the FIS Doping Panel on 22/12/2016.*
- (iii) *to condemn the respondent to pay compensation for the legal expen[s]es incurred by the appellant.*
- (iv) *to establish that the costs of this arbitration procedure will be born[e] by the respondent.*

B. THE RESPONDENT'S POSITION

105. The Federation maintains that its imposition of an Optional Provisional Suspension was necessary and legally justified. In its view, the FIS ADR require the Appellant – and not the Federation – to demonstrate certain criteria in order to lift a suspension, once one has been instituted. The Appellant in its view has failed to make out these criteria, least of all that an eventual ADRV charge has “no reasonable prospect” of being upheld. The provisional suspension therefore survives scrutiny.

1. The Applicable Standard

106. The Federation notes at the outset that the underlying context of this case derives from “systematic, state-organised doping in Russia.” The unprecedented level of interference in Russian sport, it concedes, goes far beyond the personal involvement of specific athletes. Yet upholding the provisional suspension does not require the Panel to be satisfied that an ADRV definitively took place on the evidence before it; rather, the question presented is merely whether evidence existed before the FIS Doping Panel to give rise to a legally cognizable suspicion under the FIS ADR.
107. The Federation accordingly disagrees with the Appellant’s framing of the Panel’s task in this appeal. The finding that an ADRV has been proven, as distinguished from a finding that a provisional suspension should be imposed, is subject to separate judicial processes under standards wholly distinct from the one embodied in FIS ADR Articles 7.9.2 and 7.9.3.2.
108. The Federation submits that the following legal framework applies to the Panel’s assessment of the provisional suspension under review:
- Article 7.9.2, governing the initial imposition of an Optional Provisional Suspension, grants the Federation a “margin of discretion” in determining whether a suspension is appropriate. This is confirmed by permissive language such as “may” and “optional” (“*FIS may impose a Provisional Suspension on the Athlete or other Person against whom the anti-doping rule violation is asserted*”). The Federation concedes that its margin of discretion is not unlimited; a “reasonable possibility” (rather than a bare possibility) that the suspended athlete committed an ADRV, however, suffices.

- Under Article 7.9.3.2, once FIS has imposed an Optional Provisional Suspension, the burden of proof shifts to the suspended athlete, who must demonstrate one of three criteria to lift the suspension. The Appellant may demonstrate that the “allegation of a possible ADRV which led to the opening of a formal investigation” has “no reasonable prospect of being upheld.” Alternatively, he may challenge the suspension on one of two remaining grounds – relating to no fault/negligence or other facts that make it “clearly unfair” to impose the suspension. Absent such showings, the suspension remains in place.

109. In this connection, the Federation distinguishes Article R57 of the CAS Code – which endows the Panel with *de novo* power of review – with what it deems the permissive language of Article 7.9.2 of the FIS ADR. In the Respondent’s view, the Panel “remains bound” by the FIS ADR, “including the margin of discretion provided [to FIS] by these rules.” It cannot, in other words, “simply replace the discretion of the prior instance” with its own discretion. The Respondent adds that Article 7.9.3.2, by shifting the burden onto the Appellant to set aside a suspension already imposed, buttresses the existence of a margin of discretion under the FIS ADR. In this connection, the Respondent denies the relevance of the Appellant’s reference to Article 3.1, which it considers material only to ADRVs, not provisional suspensions.

2. Sufficiency of the Evidence

110. The Federation submits that the McLaren Report, whether assessed holistically or by its individual exhibits, implicates the Appellant with sufficient confidence to justify his suspension. Professor McLaren’s work unveiled an enterprise whose operation could not have gone unnoticed by the Appellant or have proceeded without his participation, particularly in the provision of clean urine subject to illicit sample swaps. Second, the Appellant’s name appears in documents which the Federation suggests are strongly indicative of doping and subsequent cover-up. The Respondent therefore argues for the maintenance of the suspension.

i. The McLaren Report Is Reliable

111. The McLaren Report’s scope is necessarily broad in nature and transcends individual conduct. At the same time, Professor McLaren identified a system whose viability depended, in the Federation’s view, on the Appellant’s knowledge and participation.

112. The Federation notes that the McLaren Report draws upon thousands of documents in service of its main assertion: that athletes, with the assistance of Russian officials, systematically circumvented doping controls through false reporting of laboratory results and (during the Sochi Games) through the exchange of urine samples believed contaminated with clean ones procured out-of-competition. The Federation notes that Professor McLaren’s findings, combined with incriminating evidence in respect of individual athletes, gave immediate rise to suspicions against the Appellant individually, triggered an immediate IOC investigation into him, and led directly to FIS’s prompt institution of a provisional suspension pending institution of ADRV proceedings.

113. In this regard, the Respondent disagrees that correspondence by IOC or WADA sporting officials indicates a lack of faith in the McLaren Report or its capacity to justify a provisional suspension (and lead ultimately to ADRV findings). The IOC, for example, highlights that the McLaren Report precipitated further investigations of implicated athletes. Rather than suggesting that the report is “unreliable,” the correspondence serves in the Federation’s view as an endorsement of the McLaren Report’s probative value. Similarly, the FIS Doping Panel reasonably concluded that there was a “sufficient likelihood” that the IOC investigation would confirm the suspicions raised by Professor McLaren, resulting in an ADRV conviction.
114. The Respondent considers it possible and prudent to draw inferences regarding the Appellant on the basis of the McLaren Report’s general assertions, even without the assistance of individual documents naming him specifically. In its view, the steps outlined in the McLaren Report “would not have been possible” without the participation of the scheme’s principal beneficiaries: individual athletes.
115. This is particularly true, in the Federation’s view, with respect to a key component of the scheme detailed by Professor McLaren, namely the provision of clean urine samples transported to an FSB storage facility and subsequently exchanged with contaminated samples at the Sochi Laboratory. As clean urine could not be provided without the Appellant’s voluntary participation, FIS submits, it is inconceivable that he remained unaware of the scheme’s prohibited purpose. At minimum, a “reasonable possibility” of an ADRV exists by way of inference from Professor McLaren’s findings.
116. Finally, the Federation notes that other Russian athletes have been prevented from competition as a result of the findings of the McLaren Report even on a far more general basis than that contemplated by the provisional suspension under review. The Federation cites, in this regard, the International Paralympic Committee’s institution of a blanket competition ban applicable to all Russian athletes for the 2016 Paralympic Games in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. That decision, upheld on appeal (CAS 2016/A/4745 *Russian Paralympic Committee v. International Paralympic Committee*), was taken at a time when only Part I of the McLaren Report had been published – i.e., prior to Professor McLaren’s identification and implication of *any* individual athletes. That it survived scrutiny is a testament to the McLaren Report’s strength in justifying broad legal measures to contain doping’s effects.
117. The Respondent views its own stance, emphasized at the hearing, as having a stronger basis than that of the International Paralympic Committee because it has taken a more particularized approach, one attentive to individual circumstances. Only those athletes explicitly identified in Part II of the McLaren Report, it explains, were provisionally suspended by FIS. It follows, in the Respondent’s view, that the McLaren Report is a compelling basis for legal action.

ii. The EDP Supports the Suspension

118. The Federation's decision to suspend the Appellant relies additionally on documents enclosed with the McLaren Report, Part II. In the Respondent's view, the EDP supports a "reasonable possibility" that the Appellant committed an anti-doping rule violation and undermines his challenge under FIS ADR Article 7.9.3.2.

Urine Samples

119. The Respondent submits, first, that the McLaren Report convincingly demonstrates the existence of a urine sample-swapping scheme in which the Appellant was directly implicated.
120. As observed in the McLaren Report, the doping scheme in operation at the time of the Sochi Games relied on the manipulation of athletes' urine sample containers in order to exchange (supposedly contaminated) urine with clean samples collected outside of regular competition. Statements by Dr. Rodchenkov concerning the method by which FSB agents allegedly reverse-engineered Berlinger BEREK-KIT® sample bottles in order to enable such swaps suggested that manipulation of the bottles resulted discernable marks on the containers' internal surface.
121. The Appellant's sample, collected on 23 February 2014, shows both types of marks. The King's College Forensic Report records the following observations:
- 2890803 2 x Type 1 marks, 5 x Type 2 marks; fibres observed inside lid*
122. The "scratches and mark evidence" detected on one of Mr. Legkov's B-sample containers in 2014, according to the King's College Forensic Report and also the Respondent, "could have been made by tools during covert opening" consistent with Part I of the McLaren Report – whereby a Berlinger BEREK-KIT® sample bottle was allegedly opened without destroying the closing mechanism, swapped, and then re-sealed.
123. The Respondent concedes that Type 1 marks can derive from innocuous uses, appearing for instance where a container's lid is screwed on forcefully – as the Appellant alleges. FIS notes, however, that Type 2 marks cannot be readily explained outside the context of attempted tampering. Those marks – consisting of vertical and diagonal scratches – occurred in the forensic report only where manipulation with a metal strip was used to pry open a sealed bottle, in the same way as described by Dr. Rodchenkov and detailed in the McLaren Report. On this evidence, the Respondent submits that the Appellant's B-sample bottle shows evidence of tampering sufficient to ground a "reasonable likelihood" of an ADRV in which the Appellant was personally involved.
124. It is "not known to the Respondent" whether the Appellant personally supervised the tampering process itself. Considering Professor McLaren's evidence, however, the Respondent considers it impossible that the Appellant could have provided clean urine without being aware of its illicit purpose:

“Regarding the Appellants’ personal involvement it is simply not conceivable that they provided clean urine before the Olympic Games outside of regular doping controls without knowing why they had to provide such urine, namely for the purpose of manipulating the doping controls.”

125. Additional arguments adduced by the Appellant to provide alternative explanations for his conduct, in the Respondent’s view, are without merit. Evidence that the Appellant has submitted repeatedly to doping controls, for example, are no more convincing than his observations that an ADAMS analysis returns no positive test results. This evidence suggests not that no manipulation occurred, only that such manipulation evaded detection.
126. At the hearing, the Respondent similarly rejected the Appellant’s suggestion that clean urine might have been sourced without his knowledge during semiannual physical examinations. The Federation observed that collection of clean urine in hospital cups was inconsistent with the McLaren Report’s description of illicit urine collection using nonstandard containers such as Coca Cola bottles; in any event, FIS deemed the argument insufficiently substantiated.

Duchess List

127. The Federation argues that the Appellant’s appearance in the Duchess List provides an additional and compelling indication of his involvement in an ADRV. This document, according to Part II of the McLaren Report, was prepared “before Sochi” and included “athletes known to be taking” the Duchess cocktail, a performance-boosting concoction allegedly developed by Dr. Rodchenkov. Athletes consuming the cocktail were allegedly subject to out-of-competition urine collection in furtherance of the Russian Federation’s sample-swapping scheme. The Federation therefore submits that the Appellant’s inclusion leads directly to the conclusion that he benefited from and participated (albeit at an early stage of the process) in the concealment of test-positive urine samples.
128. Additionally, while the Respondent takes note of the Appellant’s claims that the origin and purpose of the Duchess List are not clear from the face of the EDP, it maintains that the document shares a sufficient nexus with Professor McLaren’s narrative of doping circumvention to be of value. The list’s relevance, FIS observes, cannot be severed from the testimony of Dr. Rodchenkov. Those statements attribute the list to CSP director Irina Rodionova and demonstrate its centrality to the Sochi scheme. Apart from Professor McLaren’s own assertions, the Federation considers the Duchess List has obvious relevance given that there could be “no need” to draw such a list, as the Federation puts it, “unless it was for a prohibited purpose.”
129. Accordingly, the Federation maintains that the Appellant’s appearance in the Duchess List implies consumption by him of performance-enhancing drugs necessarily consequent on or consistent with the tampering alleged by Professor McLaren and detected in the Appellant’s urine sample.

Medals-by-Day List

130. The Appellant’s appearance on the so-called Medals-by-Day List, the Respondent submits, also associates him with the pool of doped athletes flagged by Russian sporting authorities for protection. That list, according to FIS, was prepared in advance of individual events at the Sochi Games. It lists the names of Russian athletes “expected to compete in medal races” and whose samples “should therefore result in a negative finding if tested.”
131. The Respondent contests the Appellant’s criticisms of this exhibit’s relevance. As with its “Duchess” equivalent, the Medals-by-Day list is neither dubious in origin nor divorced from Professor McLaren’s conclusions. The list was prepared by Mr. Velikodniy’s staff. It was updated regularly throughout the Sochi Games. Team composition, moreover, is routinely amended and can be modified in close proximity to an event such as a relay race. For these reasons, the Federation suggests that the existence of inconsistent versions of the list or its failure to reflect perfectly final competition rosters does not undermine its probative value in linking the Appellant to an ADRV.

E-mails

132. Finally, the Federation cites to e-mail correspondence in the EDP to buttress its decision to provisionally suspend Mr. Legkov. The correspondence consists of several exchanges between Dr. Rodchenkov and Alexey Velikodniy.⁴
133. The first message, an e-mail from Dr. Rodchenkov to Mr. Velikodniy dated 10 January 2014, states: “[A0958] PERSONALLY warn as soon as possible,” referring to the code of another Russian athlete, and concludes: “and Legkov with Kryukov TOO” (EDP0263).
134. The second set of e-mails concerns events following the conclusion of the Sochi Games. It begins with a message from Dr. Rodchenkov to Mr. Velikodniy dated 2 April 2014 and states:

*“Someone here overdosed with inhalations, an incredible amount
Either he is sick (has permission ??), or is out of his mind⁵
Check who it is
2870442, M, ski races [...]
Budesonide (a metabolite of > 30), may have permission”*

135. Apparently in relation to Dr. Rodchenkov’s query as to whether Mr. Legkov had “permission,” presumably to use budesonide, a message dated 3 April 2014 from Mr. Velikodniy states: “He has it, for some reason he did not include it in the protocol.”

⁴ The Panel cites to the time-stamps apparent on the versions of e-mails made available by Professor McLaren. Since these messages are based on Eastern Daylight Time, the timestamps from within Russia may differ slightly.

⁵ The original Russian is idiomatic. In context, the sentence suggests: “He is sick or acting strangely.”

136. Finally, a reply dated 3 April 2014 from Dr. Rodchenkov notes: “They rescued the goat Legkov.”⁶
137. The Respondent does not appear to attribute particular meaning to these exhibits other than to indicate that the Appellant “was considered an athlete whose samples should be treated as ‘save.’” In other words the documents are offered as further evidence that the Appellant’s urine samples would have tested positive absent complicit intervention.

Conclusions

138. In light of the foregoing, the Respondent submits that it acted within its margin of discretion under FIS ADR Article 7.9.2 in imposing the provisional suspension. No individual piece of evidence alone suffices to ground an ADRV. Taken together, however, the documents demonstrate the Athlete’s involvement:

“the Russian Ministry of Sport (MoS), through the Center of Sports Preparation of National Teams of Russia and with the help of RUSADA and the laboratories of Moscow and Sochi installed a sophisticated system to protect certain Russian top athletes competing at the Olympic Games from being tested positive for prohibited substances. The Appellant was among these protected athletes.”

139. Both athlete-specific evidence and the “broader context” of systematic doping described in the McLaren Report establish a “reasonable possibility” of doping and/or tampering with doping controls. In the Federation’s view, the Appellant’s express identification in the McLaren Report as a beneficiary of the doping scheme comfortably situates the suspension within the Federation’s margin of discretion under the FIS ADR.
140. Having argued that the record justified its imposition of the suspension pursuant to Article 7.9.2, the Federation concludes that the Appellant falls short of his burden under Article 7.9.3.2 to warrant the setting aside of his provisional suspension. That article provides that an Optional Provisional Suspension “shall be imposed (or shall not be lifted) unless” one of three conditions is met. In the Federation’s view, the Appellant has failed to meet any one:
- (i) The FIS Doping Panel had “valid reasons to conclude” that the assertion of an ADRV would have a “reasonable prospect of being upheld after further investigation.” Indeed, in the Respondent’s view, it is “not conceivable” that the Athlete provided clean urine outside of regular doping controls without an awareness of why he was being asked to do so.
 - (ii) With respect to arguments based on an absence of fault, the Appellant cannot “simply deny any personal involvement,” particularly since the manipulations were dependent on the Athlete’s irregular provision of clean urine. There is only

⁶ Translations of the Panel.

a “very remote possibility” that such samples could have been procured without his knowledge.

- (iii) Finally, since inability to participate in competitions is expressly excluded under Article 7.9.3.2(c), the Appellant’s exclusion from the Russian championships or other sporting events falls short of circumstances making it “clearly unfair” for the suspension to remain in effect.

141. The Federation concludes by drawing the Panel’s attention to the context in which the McLaren Report was published. The IOC’s notification letter dated 22 December 2016 laid out compelling evidence that had been known to the Federation since at least 9 December 2016. The unprecedented scale of Professor McLaren’s allegations in combination with athlete-specific data in the EDP, FIS insists, required an immediate and resolute response.
142. The Federation disagrees that its provisional suspension was imposed disproportionately or at the cost of the Appellant’s due process rights, however. In its view, the Athlete was given a full and fair hearing at the FIS Doping Panel, before the Deputy President of the Appeals Arbitration Division of the CAS, and by this Panel throughout the proceedings on the merits.
143. FIS denies that the Appellant’s treatment contravenes fundamental rights under Swiss or international law. In its view, the Appellant’s submissions “miss the point.” There has for instance been no “conviction without charge” because no ADRV has formally been alleged, much less adjudicated. The FIS Doping Panel explicitly recognized that a provisional suspension neither proves nor presumes the Appellant’s ultimate guilt. On the other hand, the *potential* ADRV leading to the opening of an investigation against the Appellant and to his provisional suspension has from the outset been clear: “Tampering or Attempted Tampering with any part of the Doping Control,” an offense defined under Article 2.5 of the World Anti-Doping Code (“WADA Code”) and Article 2.5 of the FIS ADR. Accordingly, the Appellant has not been sanctioned without charge, presumed guilty, or deprived of any other fundamental rights.
144. The Appellant’s suspected involvement in an ADRV is the subject of further investigation by the Oswald Disciplinary Commission, and the Respondent admits that the ultimate success or failure of ADRV proceedings depend on that body’s findings. In contrast to the Appellant, however, FIS is optimistic that investigative work carries a healthy prospect of adducing new evidence. Further evidence might be adduced, for example, from (i) re-testing further samples collected from the Appellant before, at, and after the Sochi Games (if available); (ii) forensic analysis of all bottles used for sample collection; and (iii) examination of coaches and witnesses, including laboratory personnel such as Dr. Rodchenkov and persons of interest including Mr. Velikodniy and Natalia Zhelanova (Anti-Doping Advisor to the Russian Minister of Sport).
145. The balance of interests in maintaining the provisional suspension is in the Federation’s view, therefore, firmly in its favor. The evidence indicates strongly the Appellant’s involvement in an ADRV, even if the adjudication of an ADRV charge, once formally

alleged, must await the result of further investigations. In the meantime, the Respondent notes, the Appellant has been allowed to train with the Russian national team, an accommodation intended to allow him to maintain his competitiveness pending the resolution of his case. Though the Appellant understandably suffers harm from his inability to compete at present, FIS deems the provisional suspension proportionate and attentive to the Appellant's individual circumstances.

146. Finally, FIS adds that strong interests exist to keep the suspension in place. Maintaining the suspension mitigates the “serious further risk” of requiring retroactive disqualification of the Athlete (should he be found guilty of an ADRV). The potential need to revisit rankings, re-distribute medals, or otherwise modify competition results would “diminish the value” of the competition for participants, sponsors, and the viewing public. Indeed, in the Federation's view, continued participation of athletes suspected of ADRVs casts a shadow over all of Russian sport – including athletes not suspected of any misconduct. Seen in this light, FIS suggests, the Appellant's provisional suspension is not a “sanction but a safeguard,” one aimed at protecting integrity of sport generally and the interests of clean athletes particularly. The Federation deems its provisional suspension proportionate, taking into account its “strong signal effect” and legal endorsements of more severe measures – including blanket bans on all Russian athletes – in response to the McLaren Report.
147. The Respondent accordingly considers that the evidence on record adequately grounds and justifies the Optional Provisional Suspension. Its prayer for relief reads:
- (i) *The Appeal shall be dismissed.*
 - (ii) *The Decisions of the FIS Doping Panel dated 25 January 2017 shall be upheld and remain in force.*
 - (iii) *The Appellants shall pay the Respondent's costs and expenses related to the Appeals including the costs caused by the proceedings on provisional measures.*

VI. ANALYSIS

A. JURISDICTION

148. CAS jurisdiction in these proceedings results from Article 8.2.2 of the FIS ADR, which provides that decisions of the FIS Doping Panel “may be appealed to the CAS as provided in Article 13.” Article 13 states, in relevant part:

13.2 A decision [...] to impose a Provisional Suspension as a result of a Provisional Hearing [...] may be appealed exclusively as provided in Articles 13.2 – 13.7.

13.2.1 In cases arising from participation in an International Event or in cases involving International-Level Athletes, the decision may be appealed exclusively to CAS.

149. Neither Party disputes jurisdiction. The Panel is satisfied that Article 13 of the FIS ADR provides for appeal to CAS in cases, such as the present one, concerning the imposition of a provisional suspension on an athlete. Accordingly, the Panel deems that CAS has jurisdiction in this appeal, as confirmed by the Parties’ signature of the Order of Procedure.

B. ADMISSIBILITY

150. As an “appeal against the decision of a federation, association or sports-related body,” the present proceedings are governed by Article 13.7 of the FIS ADR and Articles R47 *et seqq.* of the CAS Code.
151. The Appellant’s Statement of Appeal complies with all procedural and substantive requirements of the CAS Code, including, as appears from paragraphs 27 to 38 above, timely filing. The Respondent does not dispute the admissibility of the Appellant’s claims. Accordingly, the Panel deems the appeal admissible.

C. APPLICABLE LAW

152. In their written submissions, the Parties disagreed as to whether the 2014 or the 2016 FIS ADR apply. At the hearing, however, the Parties ultimately (and in the Panel’s view, correctly) agreed on the application of the 2016 FIS ADR. The Panel accordingly refers to those Rules – whose effective date of 1 January 2015 precedes the appealed suspension – in the present award.
153. FIS ADR Article 7.9 sets out the applicable regime with regard to Optional Provisional Suspensions. It provides, in relevant part:

7.9.2 In case of an Adverse Analytical Finding for a Specified Substance, or in the case of any other anti-doping rule violations not covered by Article 7.9.1, FIS may impose a Provisional Suspension on the Athlete or other Person against whom the anti-doping rule violation is asserted at any time after the review and notification

described in Articles 7.2–7.7 and prior to the final hearing as described in Article 8.

[...]

7.9.3.2 The Provisional Suspension shall be imposed (or shall not be lifted) unless the Athlete or other Person establishes that: (a) the assertion of an anti-doping rule violation has no reasonable prospect of being upheld, e.g., because of a patent flaw in the case against the Athlete or other Person; or (b) the Athlete or other Person has a strong arguable case that he/she bears No Fault or Negligence for the anti-doping rule violation(s) asserted, so that any period of Ineligibility that might otherwise be imposed for such a violation is likely to be completely eliminated by application of Article 10.4; or (c) some other facts exist that make it clearly unfair, in all of the circumstances, to impose a Provisional Suspension prior to a final hearing in accordance with Article 8. This ground is to be construed narrowly, and applied only in truly exceptional circumstances. For example, the fact that the Provisional Suspension would prevent the Athlete or other Person participating in a particular Competition or Event shall not qualify as exceptional circumstances for these purposes.

154. FIS ADR Article 7.7 governs the “assertion” of an ADRV as cross-referenced in Article 7.9.2. It states:

7.7 FIS shall conduct any follow-up investigation required into a possible anti-doping rule violation not covered by Articles 7.2-7.6. At such time as FIS is satisfied that an anti-doping rule violation has occurred, it shall promptly give the Athlete or other Person (and simultaneously the Athlete’s or other Person’s National Anti-Doping Organisation, the Athlete’s or other Person’s National Ski Association and WADA) notice of the anti-doping rule violation asserted and the basis of that assertion.

D. LEGAL ANALYSIS

155. The Panel first examines the legal framework applicable to its analysis of the Optional Provisional Suspension as set out in the FIS ADR.
156. The Appellant appears to rely upon Article 3.1 of the FIS ADR as imposing a burden of proof on the Respondent to prove an ADRV to the “comfortable satisfaction” of the Panel – a burden which the FIS in his view has failed to satisfy. That provision reads:

Article 3 PROOF OF DOPING

3.1 Burdens and Standards of Proof

FIS and its National Ski Associations shall have the burden of establishing that an anti-doping rule violation has occurred. The standard of proof shall be whether FIS or its National Ski Association

has established an anti-doping rule violation to the comfortable satisfaction of the hearing panel The standard of proof in all cases is greater than a mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Arguing in reliance on the above provision, the Appellant accordingly considers that the FIS must at least demonstrate that his guilt is “convincingly probable.”

157. The question presented in this appeal, however, is not whether the Federation has demonstrated that the Appellant committed an ADRV. The FIS Doping Panel recognized that an ultimate determination of the Athlete’s guilt which would engage that very question remains contingent on further investigation. The Respondent, too, has repeatedly noted that no ADRV has yet been charged. The provisional suspension occupies a space in which an ADRV is asserted, but not yet proven.
158. Provisional suspensions have a necessarily preliminary character. The burden of proof and legal thresholds applicable in this appeal must reflect the appealed suspension’s provisional nature and track the rules specific to its imposition. It follows that an Optional Provisional Suspension imposed pursuant to FIS ADR Article 7.9.2 is not subject to the strictures of Article 3.1, relating solely to adjudication of an ADRV.
159. For its part, the Respondent considers that a low legal threshold should apply to its imposition of a provisional suspension. In support of that proposition, it cites a decision by the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) purportedly imposing a blanket ban on Russian athletes on the basis of McLaren Report, Part I. The decision, in the Federation’s view, represents a considerably more severe outcome reached on the basis of evidence more limited than that available in this case; that the Paralympic ban passed legal muster supports an equally permissive interpretation of the FIS ADR. The Appellant, too, cites the IPC decision, though for the opposite conclusion: the IPC in his view “chose to take actions upon the Report for what it was,” i.e., a description of high-level practices, and not “from the perspective of individual competitors.”
160. The Panel does not consider the Paralympic precedent, which was based on rules substantially different from the FIS ADR, avail to determine the burden of proof applicable under FIS ADR Article 7.9. In that case, the IPC suspended the Russian Paralympic Committee; since Article 9.6 of the IPC Constitution precludes any suspended member federation from sending *any* athletes to IPC-sanctioned competitions, Russia was unable to enter its nationals into competitions. While some international federations⁷ have similar provisions in their constitutional or regulatory frameworks, FIS does not. The Panel accordingly does not consider that the IPC case provides a basis for interpreting the FIS ADR analogously.

⁷ The International Association of Athletics Federations, for instance, provide that “[a]ny athlete, athlete support personnel or other person [...] whose National Federation is currently suspended” is ineligible to compete. IAAF Rules, Art. 22(1)(a) (2016-2017 ed.).

161. Accordingly, the Panel deems the precedents cited by both Parties inapplicable to the present appeal. It proceeds to interpret the FIS ADR in exercise of its plenary review power.

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162. FIS ADR Articles 7.7 and 7.9 each inform the imposition of a provisional suspension by FIS. The Panel's first task therefore consists of determining to the extent possible the hierarchy among them. In particular, the Panel considers whether Article 7.7, which regulates the assertion of ADRVs writ large but is also incorporated specifically into Article 7.9.2, sets forth a substantive threshold before the latter provision can be set in motion.
163. One reading of the rules is to consider Article 7.7 the first step for the imposition of an Optional Provisional Suspension. That article can be read as starting a process which may or may not end with a finding of an ADRV; pending the final resolution of the charge, there may be a provisional suspension under Article 7.9. In other words, the reference in Article 7.7 to FIS being "satisfied that an anti-doping violation has occurred" can only sensibly require FIS to be satisfied to a level sufficient for it honestly and reasonably to make an assertion of an ADRV as that article contemplates.
164. Under this interpretation, there would be no need to consider the plethora of formulations used by the Parties to describe the threshold which must be met under the FIS ADR by use of the McLaren Report and other evidence. Once the Article 7.7 requirements are met, so that the assertion has been "notified," it is Articles 7.9.2 and 7.9.3.2 which then regulate Optional Provisional Suspensions. That power has to be exercised proportionately within the bounds of reasonable discretion, but there is no further threshold beyond what is required to comply with Article 7.7: namely reasonable grounds for the ADRV's assertion, and whose basis is sufficiently clear for the athlete (or other violator) to understand.
165. It is no less possible, in the Panel's view, to consider Article 7.7 the *last* step in the provisional suspension context, imposing only procedural requirements for notification of an ADRV rather than setting forth a burden of proof. In this case the substantive threshold inheres exclusively in Article 7.9.2.
166. Though both options have merit, ambiguous drafting frustrates attempts at a definitive interpretation of the FIS Rules' intended order of precedence. Especially unclear is the relationship between a suspension on the one hand (7.9) and the "assertion" of an ADRV on the other (7.7). Article 7.7, for example, requires that FIS be "satisfied" that an ADRV has occurred before "asserting" it. The wording might imply the existence of a threshold higher than suspicion, i.e., a violation that has been *established* with some satisfaction. In contrast, Article 7.9.2 refers to an ADRV being "asserted," and incorporates Article 7.7, but proceeds to characterize that provision as nothing more than a "review and notification" requirement. Since notification alone cannot ground any burden of proof, Article 7.7 in this context serves only a procedural function, becoming relevant only after the substantive threshold (located elsewhere) is met. That reading is itself unsettled by Article 7.9.3.2, which states that a suspension must be lifted if the "assertion" of an ADRV has no prospect

of being “upheld.” Here, an assertion is more than notice. Indeed it is a final decision (capable of being “upheld” or struck down).

167. A literal focus on the word “assertion” may therefore prove elusive. The drafters’ intent finds no expression in a uniform, *literal* construction of Articles 7.7 and 7.9. The more satisfactory approach, in the Panel’s view, examines the FIS ADR through the prism of how CAS exercises its jurisdictional *function* once one is established.
168. FIS is an institution comprised of discrete organs serving different functions. In either context, where FIS “asserts” an ADRV it exercises a prosecutorial function. A different organ evaluates that assertion in two possible ways: provisional or final. In either case, an appeal is possible. The question that then arises in each case is the standard of proof with respect to appeals of one or the other kind. In *this* appeal, a provisional decision is overturned if it has “no reasonable prospect of being upheld.” It is this explicit and undisputed standard which the Panel faces on appeal and which it must apply, independent of the precise confluence of Articles 7.7 and 7.9.2 that led FIS to impose a suspension in the first place.
169. Articles 7.9.2 and 7.9.3.2 regulate Optional Provisional Suspensions proper. The former states when and how a provisional suspension may be imposed. The latter sets out circumstances in which a suspension instituted pursuant to the preceding subparagraph may be challenged.
170. There is a clear difference between the permissive language of Article 7.9.2 and the mandatory nature of its successor, Article 7.9.3.2. The first of these permits (“*may*”) the Federation to impose an optional provisional suspension wherever an anti-doping rule violation is “asserted.” The second lays bare a shift of burdens; absent the Appellant’s satisfaction of certain conditions, the suspension “*shall not be lifted*.”
171. The Parties have adopted a multitude of formulations to describe the threshold under the FIS ADR which the McLaren Report and the material contained or referred to therein do or must meet: “strong suspicion,” “reasonable likelihood,” “convincingly probable,” “not conceivable.” Behind the variations in phrasing lie two sharply divergent views. The Appellant considers the Respondent responsible for showing the existence of *an ADRV*. The Federation considers its burden limited to demonstrating that an ADRV was *possible* – whereupon the burden is assumed by the Appellant to demonstrate the opposite at a higher threshold (no “reasonable prospect”).
172. Articles 7.9.2 and 7.9.3.2, read in conjunction, establish a two-step framework that endows the Federation with broad authority provisionally to suspend athletes who it has reasonable cause to believe committed an ADRV. Pursuant to Article 7.9.2, *any* ADRV suspected of an athlete can serve as cause for a provisional suspension against him or her, should the Federation so decide. From that moment onward, a provisional suspension is subject to challenge only by reference to the enumerated criteria in Article 7.9.3.2, whose satisfaction it is the Appellant’s burden to establish.

173. The Federation’s burden under Article 7.9.2 is a limited one, but certainly not devoid of content. In the Panel’s view, no plausible interpretation of Article 7.9.2 can require an athlete to disprove unsubstantiated assertions.
174. This conclusion is also warranted by a structural comparison of Articles 7.9.2 and 7.9.3.2. The introductory clause of Article 7.9.3.2 has been designed, or so one must infer from the precision of its drafting, to relate not only to lifting a suspension but also to its initial imposition (“*shall be imposed (or shall not be lifted) unless*”). The Parties have not addressed why language relating to *imposition* appears in a provision otherwise concerning challenges against suspensions previously asserted; nor why, whereas Article 7.9.2 says that FIS “*may*” impose a provisional suspension (without specifying the standards for imposition), Article 7.9.3.2 says that a provisional suspension “*shall*” be imposed unless the Athlete can establish one or more of the factors set out in (a), (b), or (c) (the current language is imperfect and may justify revisiting by the rule-maker). One possible reconciliation of the apparent tension between the two articles is to construe Article 7.9.2 as identifying the existence of the power provisionally to suspend, and Article 7.9.3.2 as identifying the criteria for its exercise or non-exercise. Another possible reconciliation is to acknowledge that Article 7.9.2 (either independently or, as noted above, together with Article 7.7) confers a broad discretion, but Article 7.9.3.2 effectively acts as a cap on such discretion by *precluding* a suspension where the grounds for successful challenge as set out in (a), (b), or (c) are clearly present at the outset and where a suspension is being contemplated, but has not yet been imposed (the “Preclusion”). The Panel prefers the latter analysis as more respectful of the text, structure, context, and perceptible purpose of the FIS ADR. It does not consider that the words which give rise to the problems of interpretation, i.e., “*shall be imposed (or [...])*” can simply be ignored or read out as superfluous given the precision of the parenthesis.
175. The Panel accordingly so holds, subject always but only to the Preclusion, that the imposition of a provisional suspension requires a “reasonable possibility” that the suspended athlete has engaged in an ADRV. The drafting of the FIS ADR leaves the relationship between Articles 7.7 and 7.9 open to question and the Panel accordingly declines to pronounce upon it, not least because the same question arises under the WADA Code 2015, the template for other, including FIS, anti-doping rules. The jurisdictional function of CAS upon referral of an appeal against a suspension imposed, however, is clear: the Panel assesses *inter alia* whether the assertion has “no reasonable prospect” of being upheld. A “reasonable possibility” anticipates the rejoinder that an assertion has “no reasonable prospects” and is the Federation’s burden to bear in the first instance.
176. A reasonable possibility is more than a *fanciful* one; it requires evidence giving rise to individualized suspicion. This standard, however, is necessarily weaker than the test of “comfortable satisfaction” set forth in Article 3.1. Accordingly, a reasonable possibility

may exist even if the Federation is unable to show that the balance of probabilities clearly indicates an ADRV on the evidence available.⁸

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177. Once a suspension has been put in place and is challenged, Article 7.9.3.2 imposes three, independently sufficient criteria for lifting the suspension: a demonstrable lack of “fault” or “negligence” on the athlete’s part, “no reasonable prospect” of the assertion of an ADRV succeeding on the merits, or the presence of “other facts” making it “clearly unfair” to leave the suspension in place. “Reasonable possibility” is at the other end of the spectrum from “no reasonable prospects,” although of course it demands less of the proponent.
178. Article 7.9.3.2 thus plainly imposes a higher threshold to lift a suspension than the FIS ADR require to impose one in the first place. Since additional evidence can be adduced in the period between a suspension’s imposition and ADRV proceedings, moreover, the rule does not require that “prospects” be assessed by reference to currently available evidence *in isolation*. The provision would permit, for example, a conclusion that “reasonable prospects of success” exist where documents are insufficient (individually or collectively) to ground an ADRV but nonetheless indicate misconduct for which further investigations hold out the prospect of more and better proof. Demonstrating the negative proposition, of *no* reasonable prospects, therefore requires more than an assertion as to shortcomings with current evidence, such as a patent flaw in the case against the Athlete.

E. ANALYSIS OF THE MERITS

179. Having set forth the standard applicable under the FIS ADR to this appeal, the Panel turns to assessing the provisional suspension against the evidence proffered in its support. Accordingly, the Panel asks whether the Federation has demonstrated that, based on the evidence before it, a “reasonable possibility” existed that the Appellant committed an ADRV. It does so *de novo* in light of Articles 13.1.1 and 13.1.2 of the FIS ADR.
180. As explained below, the Panel concludes that the evidence establishes a “reasonable possibility” of an ADRV in the Appellant’s case. It further considers that the Appellant has not demonstrated with satisfaction the fulfillment of criteria necessary to lift the suspension, though the Panel has decided that it should be modified.

1. Preliminary Observations regarding the Record

181. The evidence in this appeal derives from one source: the McLaren Report and associated documents from the EDP. The McLaren Report itself, as stated, consists of two installments. Part I was published on 16 July 2016 and considered “manipulation of the doping control process during the Sochi Games, including . . . acts of tampering with the

⁸ Specific ADRV charges may follow the Oswald Disciplinary Commission’s investigations; any charges will fall under the jurisdiction of the IOC (with respect to the period of the Sochi Games) and are otherwise reserved for subsequent FIS proceedings.

samples within the Sochi Laboratory.” It concluded that doped Russian athletes were protected from at least 2011 through false reporting of positive test results by the Moscow Laboratory. During the Sochi Games, manipulation of urine samples at the Sochi Laboratory allegedly allowed Russian athletes to continue to dope undetected, even in the presence of international monitors.

182. Part II focused on the as-yet-unfulfilled third prong of Professor McLaren’s task: identification of “any athlete that might have benefited from those alleged manipulations to conceal positive doping tests.” Published on 9 December 2016, it made good on that promise. The document draws from thousands of exhibits and names hundreds of Russian athletes.
183. The Parties have addressed extensively the intended scope of Professor McLaren’s investigative work, the quality of his conclusions, and the degree of confidence with which these touch upon the Appellant individually. From these arguments emerges an overarching concern, asserted vigorously by the Appellant and denied by the Federation, implicating his rights to due process. He submits *inter alia* that he (i) has never been accused of an ADRV; (ii) is unaware what ADRV might potentially be charged; and (iii) is forced to defend himself against assumptions, not evidence.
184. The Panel accordingly turns to the Appellant’s invocation of principles with which he considers the suspension to be in tension, particularly the presumption of innocence and his right to know the nature and cause of the charge against him. The Appellant’s submissions invoke the Swiss Federal Constitution, its Code of Criminal Procedure, public policy, and European and international human rights law.
185. In identifying the specific principles applicable to this arbitration under Swiss law, it is pertinent to consider as one element the criteria for challenging an international arbitral award. The Swiss Private International Law Statute (“PILS”), as the Appellant notes, provides in Article 190(2) an exhaustive list of grounds under which an award may be annulled; by negative implication, these identify mandatory principles that arbitrators must consider. Of relevance here, subparagraph (d) of the article requires “the principle of equal treatment of the parties” and “the right of the parties to be heard,” while subparagraph (e) allows the nullification of awards “incompatible with public policy.” The first of these clarifies at least the Panel’s responsibility to guarantee equality of arms and the Appellant’s right to fair trial in the most general sense,⁹ and is understood by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in essence to correspond to the requirements of due process under Article 29 of the Civil Code (Judgment of 10 September 2001, i.S. X. GmbH v. Y. SA, BGE 127 III 576, 578). Corollaries include in adversarial proceedings the Appellant’s right to understand,

⁹ THOMAS HÜGI, SPORTRECHT 167, paras. 32-36 (citing *inter alia* the principles of legality, fair trial, equal treatment in accordance with law, equality of arms, the right to be heard, the presumption of innocence, and *in dubio pro reo*; the latter two are limited in the context of doping-related proceedings internal to a sport federation); SCHERRER/LUDWIG, SPORTRECHT: EINE BEGRIFFSERLÄUTERUNG 304 (2d ed. 2010) (adding the principles of *ne bis idem* and that no sanction may violate good morals (*gute Sitten*, or ‘*les bonnes mœurs*’ in French)). Cf. European Convention on Human Rights, Arts. 6.1, 6.3.

confront, and refute the evidence against him (i.e., protection from having to disprove unsubstantiated assertions).

186. In alleging the provisional suspension's incompatibility with Swiss fundamental rights, the Appellant's submissions also evoke PILS Article 190(2)(e). Substantive public policy, or *ordre public matériel* in French, is understood by Swiss jurisprudence to embody fundamental principles which should comprise part of any legal order. This appeal, no less than the proceedings before the FIS Doping Panel, is bound to observe it. Even so, successful invocations of the public policy exception are rare. Even "the manifestly wrong application of a rule of law or the obviously incorrect finding of a point of fact is still not sufficient to justify revocation for breach of public policy of an award made in international arbitration proceedings" (CAS 2014/A/3803 *Emmanuel Eboué v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA)*, para. 82). Only a *result* contradicting public policy may be grounds to annul. Considering that part of Swiss public policy is precisely to encourage expeditious resolution of international and especially sporting disputes, it is perhaps unsurprising that only two international arbitral awards (both of the CAS) have ever been set aside in these circumstances.¹⁰
187. The question under Swiss law, moreover, is not whether the Appellant enjoys certain protections but rather to which degree they find expression vis-à-vis competing notions of associational autonomy. An athlete subject to sanctions proceedings internal to an association does not "require protection in the same measure as, for example, the accused in a criminal proceeding."¹¹ That sentiment applies all the more forcefully since the present appeal concerns not a disciplinary sanction *per se* but rather a provisional measure. Swiss law accepts that the predicates of a fair proceeding differ across types of procedures (civil, criminal, administrative, and disciplinary); it stands similarly to reason, in the Panel's view, that a provisional suspension – a non-punitive and interim measure – operates under a standard of scrutiny less exacting than that over ADRV proceedings.
188. The Panel accepts that principles guaranteeing a fair hearing, protecting against judgment without charge, and providing a right to be heard inhere in Swiss law. It does not consider that they have been infringed. As recognized by the FIS Doping Panel, there is neither "conviction" nor yet a formal "charge" of an ADRV. The *suspected* ADRV informing the Appellant's suspension is clear: tampering or attempted tampering with doping controls by

¹⁰ Neither case is relevant to this appeal. The first case, concerning a procedural public policy violation, found that a CAS tribunal improperly failed to observe the *res judicata* effect of a Zurich court judgment. Judgment 4A_490/2009 of 13 April 2010, Club Atlético de Madrid SAD v. Sport Lisboa E Benfica - Futebol SAD, BGE 136 III 345. The other, concerning a substantive public policy violation, related to an indefinite (and potentially lifetime) occupational ban found to violate the athlete's freedom of profession (Swiss Federal Constitution, Art. 27(2)) and rights of personal freedom (Swiss Civil Code Art. 27(2)). Judgment 4A_558/2011 dated 27 March 2012, Francelino da Silva Matuzalem v. Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), BGE 138 III 322.

¹¹ SCHERRER/BRAGGER, SATZUNGS- UND GESETZESKONFORMITÄT VON VEREINSSTRAFVERFAHREN AM BEISPIEL DES FIFA-ETHIKVERFAHRENS, SJZ 111/2015, p. 469, 474-475. The original German reads: "Der von einem vereinsinternen Sanktionsverfahren Betroffene ist klarerweise auch nicht im gleichen Mass schutzbedürftig wie beispielsweise ein Beschuldigter in einem Strafverfahren."

virtue of his purported benefit from and participation in the sample-swapping scheme detailed by Professor McLaren. As a matter of procedural due process, moreover, the Panel considers the Parties' equality of arms and the Appellant's rights to a fair hearing and opportunity to present his case (*Anspruch auf rechtliches Gehör*) satisfied at the first instance and on appeal.

189. In contrast, the Panel does not consider the Appellant's reference to a presumption of innocence to be availing in the context of this appeal. The Panel has held that a provisional suspension must be substantiated by more than speculation alone; yet a "reasonable possibility" that the Appellant committed an ADRV in its view is all that is required. In any event, Swiss "fundamental principles" including those relating to proof of guilt vary on a spectrum depending on the type of proceeding and cannot simply be transposed from criminal to private law.¹² CAS sanctions result in a period of ineligibility to compete and forfeiture of prizes, not deprivation of liberty; what is more, this appeal concerns provisional measures, not a final sanction. Since there is no finding of guilt, the Panel does not consider a provisional suspension to implicate, still less violate, a presumption of innocence.
190. Against this background, the Panel does not consider that any of the Appellant's applicable rights are infringed so as to constitute a violation either of the *ordre public* or of Swiss substantive law.
191. Nevertheless, the Panel is sensitive to the Appellant's concern. His guilt or innocence, though beyond the scope of this appeal, inevitably informs the application of FIS ADR Article 7.9. The two issues – the likelihood of an ADRV and the validity of provisional measures – are clearly intertwined. The success of any ADRV charge will depend by the Federation's own admission on further investigations, the outcome of which is at present unknown, indeed unknowable. This tension, in the Panel's view, makes it all the more imperative that Article 7.9 be applied strictly to require evidence demonstrating at least a reasonable possibility of an ADRV.
192. The Panel accordingly turns to whether the McLaren Report offers such evidence. The McLaren Report, in the Appellant's submission, is decidedly general in nature. Its scope indicts an entire system, rather than individual athletes. The Panel agrees that, on balance, individual athletes play but an auxiliary role in Professor McLaren's work, though a large number of them are identified in Part II. Professor McLaren has also stated repeatedly that he did not assess "the sufficiency of the evidence to prove an ADRV." It would however

¹² Judgment 4A_178/2014 of 11 June 2014, A. v. Nationale Anti-Doping Agentur Deutschland, para. 5.2 ("Ausserdem lassen sich die beweisrechtlichen Grundsätze im Anwendungsbereich des Privatrechts – auch wenn Disziplinarmaßnahmen privater Sportverbände zu beurteilen sind – nicht unter dem Blickwinkel strafrechtlicher Begriffe wie der Unschuldsvermutung . . . bestimmen," that is, "Beyond this, evidentiary principles cannot be identified within the scope of private law – including when assessing disciplinary measures of private sporting associations – from the perspective of criminal law concepts such as the presumption of guilt"); Judgment of 15 March 1993, Gundel v. Fédération Equestre Internationale, BGE 119 II 271 (*in dubio pro reo* and analogous guarantees of the European Convention on Human Rights are likewise inapposite).

necessarily follow from the report's findings as to the corruption of an entire system, devised to favor selected athletes, that some individual athletes must have benefited. It could not sensibly be concluded that whereas the system was corrupt in the manner identified nonetheless no athlete drew advantage.

193. Legal sufficiency, in any event, must be distinguished from factual plausibility. The McLaren Report, broad though its mandate is, captures a wealth of evidence that at least purports to implicate specific athletes. While it does not claim to ground an ADRV as a matter of law, the report does aim to provide *evidence* of an ADRV. In line with its mandate, Part II of the McLaren Report amassed a vast archive in service of identifying “any athlete that might have benefited” from the manipulations disclosed in Part I. Professor McLaren’s decision to forward, on the basis of his findings, information concerning specific athletes to international sports federations can only be understood as an indication that he considered that evidence to establish a *plausible claim*, if not legal guarantee, of an ADRV. That federations subsequently imposed provisional suspensions in respect of such athletes indicates that they shared Professor McLaren’s sentiment. The IOC’s selection of the individuals identified, including the Appellant, for in-depth investigation follows the same logic.
194. There is in the McLaren Report indication, or at least purported indication, of ADRVs. The Panel accordingly reviews it pursuant to the “reasonable possibility” standard under the FIS ADR provisional suspension regime.
195. The Panel’s analytical process, the Appellant urges, must be an individualized one. The Panel agrees. For this same reason, however, the Appellant’s references to IOC and WADA correspondence – expressing doubts as to the consistency of data or the McLaren Report’s capacity to demonstrate ADRVs for “some of the individual athletes identified” – are unavailing. Though some prosecutions may fail, the Panel’s inquiry focuses on the strength of the Federation’s case against the Appellant only. The ultimate failure of an ADRV allegation in this case would not and could not retrospectively invalidate the provisional suspension. Rather, a reasonable possibility alone is sufficient to justify a provisional suspension.

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196. The Panel addresses finally the Appellant’s concern that the McLaren Report be viewed critically and without undue deference to its conclusions. The Appellant considers this concern particularly acute in light of Professor McLaren’s non-appearance at the hearing.
197. From its perspective, the Panel regrets Professor McLaren’s absence and unavailability for questioning. At the hearing, the Panel inquired of FIS as to the reasons for Professor McLaren’s non-appearance. The response offered suggests that Professor McLaren chose not to make himself available, either as part of a principled objection to appearing in CAS proceedings or as an accommodation to IOC leadership pending the completion of the Oswald Disciplinary Commission’s work. In any event, neither the Appellant nor the Panel has been able to pose questions to the person under whose supervision and control the

evidence that fundamentally informs the suspension under appeal was gathered and analyzed.

198. In these circumstances, the Panel neither accepts nor rejects Professor McLaren's declaration that the conclusions of his report have been established "beyond a reasonable doubt" insofar as that statement might suggest that the Appellant's implication in that system is so established. Rather, it assesses independently the evidence on which the provisional suspension is based against the relevant standard under the applicable law.
199. The Panel notes additionally that the Respondent has submitted an affidavit by Professor McLaren concerning certain issues in dispute between the Parties. The document, intended to substitute for Professor McLaren's hearing testimony, was tendered after the exchange of the Parties' main written pleadings. Pursuant to Article R56 of the CAS Code, parties may not "specify further evidence on which they intend to rely after the submission of the appeal brief and of the answer." The Panel retains the authority to order otherwise on the basis of "exceptional circumstances." In light of Professor McLaren's non-appearance, the Panel has not accepted the McLaren Affidavit into the record and so gives it no independent weight.

2. Application of Evidence to the Appellant

200. The Parties contest at length the McLaren Report's capacity to demonstrate involvement by the Appellant in an ADRV. The Appellant disputes the evidence along multiple dimensions. For the sake of conceptual clarity, the Panel classifies the Appellant's challenges to the evidentiary record as follows:
- Factual challenges: does the Appellant appear in the documents?
 - Relevance challenges: if he appears, is the documents' relevance to an ADRV evident or explained?
 - Credibility challenges: if the McLaren Report explains the relevance of the Appellant's appearance in a document, is this explanation compelling?
201. In assessing whether the provisional suspension meets legal thresholds required under the FIS ADR, the Panel considers each type of challenge underlying the Appellant's submissions. The Panel accordingly considers factual points in contention and draws links, if any, between the relevance of each document to potential misconduct. The Panel's assessment of the documents' individual and collective value informs its conclusion that the Federation has demonstrated a "reasonable possibility" of an ADRV in satisfaction of FIS ADR Article 7.9.2.
- i. Evidence of Tampering*
202. Professor McLaren describes a scheme in which athletes, protected by their Russian handlers, benefited from an exchange of presumably dirty urine samples in the Sochi Laboratory with clean ones. Clean urine was collected, transported, and stored by third

parties on their behalf, kept under the control of the FSB, and later used to replace test-positive samples under cover of night. Upon substitution, re-opened bottles were once more sealed, with such samples eventually tested and reported as negative.

203. The Appellant's criticisms against FIS's allegation that he participated in this vast enterprise are legion. He challenges the existence of key elements of the sample-swapping scheme; he questions the Federation's reliance on forensic evidence of his urine samples; he deems Dr. Rodchenkov untrustworthy. The Panel addresses each objection in turn.
204. On its face, the EDP appears not to contain documents implicating the Athlete specifically in the creation of a "catalogued bank of clean urine." This assertion alone, however, does not defeat a reasonable possibility of the Appellant's implication in the manipulation of urine samples generally. In the Panel's view, the McLaren Report's description of a clean urine bank is but one element in a sophisticated system. Dr. Rodchenkov's testimony described a process comprising the following elements: (i) the provision of clean urine by protected athletes; (ii) collection of the samples by Irina Rodionova; (iii) transportation to and storage in an FSB-operated facility; and (iv) transfer to the Sochi Laboratory, where FSB personnel matched the clean samples' identification codes with a roster provided to them by the CSP. The Panel therefore assesses whether the evidence suggests the Appellant is implicated in any of these elements.
205. In light of the apparent destruction of large swathes of dirty urine samples and the unsurprising lack of cooperation by Russian officials in opening to Professor McLaren FSB-operated storage facilities, the process outlined above is necessarily presented in general terms. The Panel therefore considers that the provision of clean urine samples by specific athletes is evident, if at all, on an inferential basis and by indirect reference to other documents, such as the Duchess List, discussed below. This is consistent with the manner in which the Federation has framed its case and with the limitations that the Panel faces in this appeal more generally.
206. As a result *inter alia* of these limitations, questions as to the relevance, reliability, or credibility of many of Professor McLaren's assertions are answered by reference to the testimony of a third party, Dr. Rodchenkov, whose character and credibility the Appellant strenuously criticizes. Nevertheless, to the extent required by FIS ADR Article 7.9.2, the Panel is satisfied that the McLaren Report adduces sufficient evidence as to the existence of a clean urine bank and the Appellant's implication in it.
207. In his defense, the Appellant has noted he provided urine samples in the course of medical examinations in Moscow. From this the Appellant concludes that Russian officials could have obtained clean urine samples without his knowledge. The point was considered at length during the hearing. As noted by Professor McLaren, however, clean urine was collected "in baby bottles, Coke bottles or similar containers" – i.e., non-medical, non-standard containers. It follows in the Panel's view that any clean urine used to circumvent doping controls would have been procured outside of the context of medical examination, in a context in which the relevant athlete could not escape suspicion. Conversely, in light of his obligation to travel regularly to Russia for such examinations, the Appellant's

assertion that he has lived and trained in Europe since 2011 does not introduce a significant element of doubt into the Federation's case regarding the provision of clean urine. While Mr. Legkov's geographical distance might complicate day-to-day participation in the "chain of distribution" of performance-enhancing drugs prior to Sochi, it does little to quell the reasonable suspicion arising from his appearance on lists relating specifically to the Olympics.

208. Considering the system as a whole, the Panel sees no reason not to credit the general testimony of Dr. Rodchenkov. Professor McLaren describes convincingly his ability independently to verify the method by which Russian agents allegedly re-opened and secretly re-sealed Berlinger BEREK-KIT® sample containers, which theretofore had been considered immune from manipulation. With the assistance of a forensic expert, Professor McLaren corroborated Dr. Rodchenkov's identification of 12 sample bottles removed from the Moscow Laboratory and allegedly belonging to doped athletes. As described in the first Report, 13 samples (twelve having allegedly been opened and re-sealed, the remaining sample an unopened dummy for control purposes) were submitted to microscopic examination. The forensic expert accurately identified those twelve which had been tampered with according to Dr. Rodchenkov; except for the dummy, each exhibited scratches and marks consistent with manipulation. DNA analysis lent Dr. Rodchenkov's statements further weight (McLaren Report, Part I, pp. 46-48).
209. The Appellant's B-sample bottle shows similar signs of tampering. As noted by the IOC and described in the King's College Forensic Report, the Appellant's sample containers contain marks consistent with "inserting a metal strip to disengage a metal ring which was intended to prevent re-opening." That Type 1 marks might also be caused by innocuous handling does not undermine the forensic report's conclusion that both types observed were consistent with manipulation; as noted above, such marks correlated with high statistical confidence to all bottles identified as suspect by Dr. Rodchenkov. In contrast, the relevance of fibers detected in Mr. Legkov's container is less clear; the forensic report notes them without comment, the Appellant does not address them, and the Respondent merely speculates that fibers might derive from a cloth to wipe away foreign cleaning fluid. Taken as a whole, however, the evidence is adequate, in the Panel's view, to establish a reasonable possibility – if not a "conclusive"¹³ one – of tampering.

ii. E-mails

210. The Appellant is additionally implicated in several sets of electronic correspondence. The Federation offers these exhibits as evidence of his benefitting from the protective systems put in place for Russian athletes before and during the Sochi Games. The Appellant, for his part, considers the messages innocuous in content and in any event technically unreliable.

¹³ Decision of the FIS Doping Panel, para. 23 (noting "conclusive evidence for the opening and closing of a B-sample of the Athlete after he won the Olympic Gold Medal in Sochi, as well as references to the Athlete in lists and emails").

211. The first set of messages to which the Federation refers contains an apparent directive from Dr. Rodchenkov to Mr. Velikodniy to “PERSONALLY warn as soon as possible” Mr. Legkov, along with two other Russian athletes.
212. The language in the first set appears to match a pattern described by Professor McLaren: provided with names of athletes having tested positive, the Russian sports ministry, often through Mr. Velikodniy, would instruct the Moscow Laboratory to falsely report the athlete’s result as negative. (McLaren Report, Part I, pp. 11, 32-34, noting use of the words “save” [сохранить] or “quarantine” [карантин].) The Respondent considers the exchange to indicate that the Appellant “was considered an athlete whose samples should be treated as ‘save’,” though no explicit instruction to “save” accompanies the exhibit and such an instruction would in any event refer to the pre-Sochi “Disappearing Positive Methodology,” not the Sochi sample-swapping scheme under consideration. The Panel draws no inferences from this message, whose potential probative value is undermined by a lack of context and vagueness.
213. The Federation does not address in its submissions the probative value of the second message, an exchange that appears to discuss the Appellant’s use of budenoside. The Panel notes, in any event, that budenoside remains a non-prohibited substance, one for which the Appellant has obtained a therapeutic use exemption.
214. Quite apart from the content of any individual message, the Appellant’s overarching objection to the e-mail correspondence on file concerns its technical unreliability, principally on the basis of shoddy translation. The Appellant notes in particular the inexplicable substitution in one message’s translation of Mr. Legkov’s surname, anonymized as A0467, with the English word “passenger.” The Appellant concludes that an unexplained substitution of this magnitude diminishes the technical reliability of the EDP and makes it impossible for electronic correspondence contained in the database to be accepted at face value. The Panel is not in a position to verify why the word “passenger” appears without the testimony of Professor McLaren or his translators. On this point the Panel has consulted the Russian-language originals of e-mail correspondence (albeit with anonymized codes superimposed over athletes’ names) and agrees that this error and others like it tend to call into question the trustworthiness of the EDP’s English translations. Russian officials’ possible confusion over which substances were in fact prohibited under the WADA International List casts an additional shadow over the use of electronic correspondence for drawing inferences as to the Appellant’s involvement in an ADRV.
215. Both sets of e-mails, in any event, are presented as single pages largely devoid of context and comprising only the briefest of exchanges. The Panel is accordingly unwilling to give them weight for the purpose of assessing whether the evidence contributes to a reasonable possibility of an ADRV.

iii. Duchess and Medals-by-Day Lists

216. Two additional documents are proffered in support of the Appellant’s provisional suspension. The Duchess List contains names of athletes purportedly authorized to take the

“Duchess cocktail.” For its part, the Medals-by-Day List lists athletes, including but not limited to those named in the Duchess List, scheduled to start in medal races and who likewise enjoyed “protected” status under Russia’s doping scheme. The list essentially serves an identical and supplementary role to the Duchess List, with similar implications and drawbacks. Both include the Appellant’s athlete code.

217. The Panel turns first to the Duchess List. As a preliminary matter, the Appellant submits that it is impossible to verify whether he appears in the document because the EDP’s public iterations substitute anonymized codes for athletes’ names. The Panel recalls that the introduction of anonymized codes was a product of Professor McLaren himself, who superimposed them over individual athletes’ names in attempt to protect their privacy. That Professor McLaren included the Appellant in the list of suspected athletes forwarded to FIS for potential disciplinary action, the Panel considers, is vindication enough of the Appellant’s appearance-in-fact on the documents relevant in this appeal, at least for the purpose of demonstrating a “reasonable possibility” of an ADRV under FIS ADR Article 7.9.2.
218. The Panel similarly disagrees with the Appellant’s suggestion that Professor McLaren nowhere connects the Duchess List with the “cocktail” allegedly administered to doped Russian athletes. Part I of the McLaren Report recounts in clear terms Dr. Rodchenko’s role in designing the cocktail as well as Irina Rodionova’s influence in matters of nomenclature. File metadata suggest that the Duchess List was authored by Ms. Rodionova’s deputy, Mr. Velikodniy (McLaren Report, Part I, pp. 50, 66).
219. In contrast to the Appellant’s assertions, moreover, it is well established that both Mr. Velikodniy and Ms. Rodionova were “in direct contact to those athletes” who used the cocktail. According to the McLaren Report, doped athletes transmitted, via text message, their sample container numbers to Ms. Rodionova, who passed this information to the FSB (McLaren Report, Part I, pp. 66, 68). This staggered flow of information, from athlete to Russian handlers, enabled dirty samples to be identified and swapped in the Sochi Laboratory. Similarly, “either Rodionova or Velikodniy” was responsible for physically transporting clean urine samples from the athletes to the Moscow Laboratory prior to their delivery to the FSB’s secure storage facility (McLaren Report, Part II, p. 97). These officials, in short, were familiar both with the Duchess cocktail and, on a personal level, with those athletes selected for protection by the Sochi sample-swapping methodology. Their involvement provides, in the Panel’s view, an adequate nexus between the Duchess List and the implication of athletes in an ADRV.
220. The Appellant argues that vital connections between inclusion in the list and other elements – the Appellant’s receipt of “protected” status from the Russian Ministry of Sport and his consumption of the Duchess cocktail, for example – fail because these rely on the testimony of Dr. Rodchenkov, who lacks credibility. In the Appellant’s view, the Duchess List also fails to reflect any names for whom the cocktail’s ingredients were noted elsewhere in the EDP.

221. The Appellant correctly notes that the Duchess List does not correspond to the Moscow Laboratory's ADAMS test results. His assertion that *no* athletes testing positive for the cocktail's ingredients are reflected in the Duchess List, however, goes too far. In fact, the version of the Duchess List cited by the Appellant includes at least one athlete who also appears in the Moscow Laboratory's ADAMS test results, alongside an entry noting the presence of oxandrolone.¹⁴ In any event, the Panel considers it difficult to draw a conclusion from an athlete's appearance in or absence from ADAMS, given Professor McLaren's indication that the Moscow Laboratory routinely manipulated and concealed test results. The provisional suspension, moreover, was imposed on the basis of a suspected ADRV stemming from the Sochi Games, not the manipulation of results at the Moscow Laboratory. Those events, which preceded the Sochi Games, have limited value in assessing the weight of the Federation's arguments.
222. The question of Dr. Rodchenkov's character, for its part, is not a question that can be resolved by the Panel on a technical level. Although not with respect to allegations as to the Duchess List specifically, Professor McLaren suggests that several of Dr. Rodchenkov's statements have been independently corroborated. Such corroborations led him to deem Dr. Rodchenkov a credible witness. The Panel, having considered especially Dr. Rodchenkov's identification of tampered samples and description (subsequently vindicated) of the manner in which such manipulation proceeded, is similarly persuaded.
223. Perhaps the most fundamental objection of all is the Appellant's assertion that his testing history immediately prior to and during the Sochi Games mathematically precludes the possibility that he doped. The ingredients of the Duchess cocktail have shorter wash-out periods than other prohibited substances, but nevertheless retain a "detection window." According to Professor McLaren, for example, the first version of the cocktail had a detection window of "3-5 days" (McLaren Report, Part I, p. 50), although the Appellant disputes this figure.¹⁵ The Appellant suggests, in essence, that it was impossible for him to have used the Duchess cocktail during his time at Sochi, given the number of clean (and unimpeachable) test results from that period – analyzed largely by laboratories outside of Russia.
224. In facing the same argument, the FIS Doping Panel noted that "no allegation that the Athlete committed a further ADRV" existed beyond a single sample, sample no. 2890803, collected on 23 February 2014. From this it concluded that the "the large number of [other] negative doping tests" collected from the Appellant were irrelevant to the Federation's well-founded suspicion of this (one) ADRV. The Panel does not join this reasoning. Suspicions relating to the Appellant's sample of 23 February 2014, in the FIS Doping Panel's own words, flow directly from the belief that marks on the sample bottle "*cannot*

¹⁴ Compare EDP0055 with EDP1166. The code A0920 (bobsleigh, oxandrolone), appears in both documents. EDP1166, moreover, stops abruptly at code A0603, whereas EDP0055 continues through the A1200s.

¹⁵ The Appellant considers the McLaren Report's stated wash-out period to be "neither evaluated nor proved." He notes that the wash-out period for oxandrolone, one of the ingredients in both versions of the Duchess cocktail, is "up to 20 days" according to footage broadcast by German television network ARD on 3 December 2014.

be explained otherwise than that his sample was opened and sealed again for the purpose described in the McLaren Report” (emphasis added). In the Panel’s view, the “purpose” of any such intervention, i.e., to swap samples, must be considered in context: manipulation was necessary only because original samples, if tested, would test positive. Athletes authorized to take the Duchess cocktail were those who required the benefit of sample-swapping at Sochi. It follows that, to the extent the Appellant can show he *could not have* taken the Duchess cocktail during this time, the Federation’s case against him must fail. It would have “no reasonable prospect” of being upheld, since logically the Appellant could not have doped regardless of the circumstantial evidence against him.

225. Having reviewed carefully the Appellant’s evidence in this regard, the Panel concludes that the Appellant’s testing history may add doubts as to his implication in an ADRV, but does not negate a “reasonable possibility” of a violation at Sochi. In particular, the Panel does not consider this evidence conclusively to eliminate, or render fanciful, the possibility that the Appellant consumed the Duchess cocktail. In the Appellant’s words, “all athletes on the Duchess list were allowed to . . . compete during the Olympic Games using the cocktail (the *whole time*).” But the Panel does not read Professor McLaren as suggesting that the Duchess cocktail necessarily featured in athletes’ diets without pause. Indeed, intermittent consumption aimed at exploiting the cocktail’s short wash-out periods is entirely possible and, potentially in the Appellant’s case, desirable (given strict controls faced in Europe prior to his arrival in Sochi). It is hardly unusual for doped athletes to start and stop the consumption of performance-boosting substances abruptly, evading detection. Over time, new diagnostic tools have been developed to detect and deter precisely such practices, with the Athlete Biological Passport’s emergence in 2009 a particularly notable example. In short, given the Duchess cocktail’s short wash-out periods, the Appellant could have returned clean urine samples in January 2014 and nevertheless been authorized to dope during the Olympic Games proper.
226. Urine samples collected at Sochi, in turn, are three in number (ADAMS Sample Collection Report, listing samples dated 13, 21, and 23 February 2014). A blood sample also appears to have been provided. In the absence of detailed pleadings by either Party, the Panel restricts itself to observing that sufficient time (nine days) lapsed between the first and latter two samples for traces of the Duchess cocktail to dissipate; similarly, to the extent the Appellant may have waited until shortly before his Gold medal-winning event to begin taking the cocktail, the two-day period separating his second (clean) and third (suspected) urine samples does not lift the cloud of suspicion established by his inclusion in the Duchess List and related documents. Stated differently, though evidence of the Appellant’s testing history strengthens his claim to innocence, it is not inconsistent with a “reasonable possibility” that the Federation will prevail.
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227. Similar arguments have been advanced in respect of the so-called Medals-by-Day List, so termed because it is described in the McLaren Report as a running tally of Russian athletes slated to take part in Olympic medal races at Sochi. The Appellant argues that the list is

irrelevant, without attribution, and available in a dizzying array of versions – inconsistent both with each other and with respect to athletes’ final orders of appearance at Sochi.

228. Several versions of this list do not track Russian athletes’ final starting positions at Sochi. As explained, however, by the Respondent, events such as relay races allow for last-minute substitutions. It is true that the lists fail to correspond precisely to actual participants in all respects, but in the Panel’s view this does not weaken the conclusions that Professor McLaren drew from the document.¹⁶ A similar consideration applies in the Panel’s view to the Appellant’s remaining technical arguments, such as its observations regarding the files’ metadata. The Panel considers it well established that the EDP suffers from numerous technical oddities, something which perhaps is reflective of the unforgiving time constraints under which Professor McLaren operated and the adverse conditions in Russia in which he attempted to amass evidence. These flaws imbue the Federation’s contemplations of an ADRV with a degree of doubt but they cannot be characterized as decisive for the present purposes of determining whether the suspension should be lifted.
229. Finally, as recalled above, the Panel considers that Article 7.9.2 of the FIS ADR, while requiring sufficient indication of individual guilt to conclude that there is a reasonable possibility of an ADRV, can and sometimes must be satisfied by reference to inferential reasoning. This is appropriate, in the Panel’s view, considering that a provisional suspension is often necessary precisely in situations where misconduct is reasonably possible, even probable, but is not yet proven. In such cases, a suspension serves the interests articulated by FIS in its comments to the Appellant’s Application for Provisional Measures: safeguarding the integrity of competitions and protecting the interests of third-party athletes.
230. The Panel considers the Duchess List and the Medals-by-Day List to be particularly suitable sources on which inferences should be drawn in the Federation’s favor. By reference to possible manipulation of the Appellant’s B-sample bottle as noted in the King’s College Forensic Report, it is already established in the Panel’s view that a reasonable possibility exists of tampering. The two lists lend a reason for this apparent manipulation. Indeed, despite the documents’ numerous ambiguities and questions as to their precise origin, the Panel considers it difficult to imagine any reason why the lists under consideration would have been compiled, *but for* an illicit purpose connected with the cascade of subterfuge revealed by Professor McLaren.
231. Accordingly, the Panel concludes that the Duchess and Medals-by-Day Lists, particularly when assessed collectively with evidence of tampering with the Appellant’s sample bottle, indicate a reasonable possibility of an ADRV. The evidence suffices for the limited purpose of Article 7.9.2 of the FIS ADR.

¹⁶ The Appellant, in any event, is correctly listed in the Duchess List as having started in the 50K competition held on 23 February 2014 (Decision of the FIS Doping Panel, para. 22; EDP0055).

3. Concluding Considerations

232. For some athletes, the McLaren Report unveiled a relatively comprehensive suite of documentary evidence linking them to the Russian Federation's circumvention of doping controls. In these appeals, the Panel is asked to draw inferences based on a small combination of evidence – particularly symptoms of tampering observed on the Athlete's urine samples with his appearance in the Duchess List, which purports to explain why such tampering was necessary – and to determine whether such inferences meet the legal standards contemplated by the FIS ADR.
233. The Appellant's counsel has eloquently insisted that the factual record is tenuous when it comes to identifying specific evidence of wrong-doing by the Appellant as an individual actor.
234. The Panel cannot, however, decide this case in isolation from the dramatic context in which it has arisen. The McLaren Reports have found "beyond a reasonable doubt" that Russian national institutions carried out a comprehensive scheme designed to avoid all possibility of detecting (potential) doping offences committed by their favored athletes. A staggering number of 695 Russian athletes, according to Professor McLaren, "can be identified as party to the manipulations to conceal potentially positive doping control tests."¹⁷ His second Report indicated that his initial finding of 312 positive reports having been misreported as negative increased to 500 as a result of his work during the period between the conclusion of his first Report and that of the second.
235. Although the Appellant has strongly challenged the credibility of Dr. Rodchenkov, the Panel observes first of all that the testimony of persons guilty of wrongdoing themselves can be decisive in establishing the guilt of others, and that the extent of their own culpability may even add to their value, since it is likely to be the result of their extensive involvement, at high levels, in the unlawfulness being examined. Secondly, the Panel notes that Professor McLaren, after intensive inquiries, including an experimental verification that a previously unheard-of method of manipulation described by Dr. Rodchenkov was indeed feasible, came to the conclusion that he was a credible witness.
236. It may be that an examination of individual cases, such as the present ones, will lean to exoneration of the Appellant on the grounds that, irrespective of this troubling background, the evidence ultimately uncovered does not meet the standard of proof that is necessary for sanctions to be pronounced (i.e., that irrespective of the proof of *systemic* wrongdoing, *individual* guilt in particular cases is not established to that standard). But at this stage, the context just described leads the Panel to the conclusion that individual connecting factors and inferences which might emerge meet the test of "reasonable possibility" of success, and therefore justify the provisional suspension.

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¹⁷ The Panel notes that the word "potentially" qualifies the words "positive [...] tests," not the word "manipulations."

237. A provisional suspension is based necessarily on provisional evidence which may or may not ultimately establish an ADRV. Demonstration by an athlete that a claim has “no reasonable prospect” of eventual success can however prevail where no further evidence reasonably can be expected to arise, an argument which the Panel understands the Appellant to make in respect of the Oswald Disciplinary Commission. The Appellant’s belief that the Commission cannot unearth evidence more favorable to the Federation than that which is on record currently is however in the Panel’s view no less gratuitous an argument than the Respondent’s purported inability to conceive the Appellant as innocent. To the extent they are available, samples from 2008, 2010, and 2012 Olympic Games past will be tested; those already in WADA’s possession will be subjected to re-testing; coaches and laboratory personnel may be interviewed for the first time. Olympic re-testing from London alone has previously resulted in medal withdrawals and sanctions against 20 Russian athletes. Whether the investigative process incriminates or exonerates the Appellant is open to question but his present inability to satisfy the conditions in Article 7.9.3.2 is not.
238. The Appellant has not shown cause to lift the suspension. At the same time the Panel is sensitive to the concern of the Appellant who stands under the shadow of a suspension undefined in length (which must be balanced, *inter alia*, against the legitimate interest of other athletes not to find themselves competing against athletes who may well be cheaters). Competitions cannot be repeated; the form and motivation of athletes wax and wane. Occupying in principle the space between suspicion and conviction, suspensions gradually lose their essential interim character with the passage of time. What conclusions the Oswald Disciplinary Commission may draw is necessarily open to question but the Panel believes it must and will one way or the other draw such conclusions. The Federation estimated a completion to Mr. Oswald’s work by the upcoming winter skiing season (the IOC has also since publicly announced that the report is expected to be delivered in October 2017) and its counsel explicitly accepted the Panel’s ability to introduce a temporal condition to the appealed suspension’s maintenance. The Panel appreciates the unusual magnitude and complexity of cases awaiting Mr. Oswald’s attention. It cannot however endorse an indefinite and indeterminable suspension as proportionate. Noting the Appellant’s reasonable entitlement to legal certainty, the Panel accordingly deems it appropriate and just that the current provisional suspension expire after 31 October 2017, at which time it will be for FIS to consider whether or not to seek a further suspension justified by new developments and within the framework of the FIS ADR. This approach is entirely in accord with Article 7.9.3.2, particularly point (c), as in the Panel’s view to impose a longer suspension in all the present circumstances would be clearly unfair.

VII. COSTS

239. Article R65.3 of the CAS Code provides in relevant part:

Each party shall pay for the costs of its own witnesses, experts and interpreters. In the arbitral award, the Panel has discretion to grant the prevailing party a contribution towards its legal fees and other expenses incurred in connection with the proceedings and, in particular, the costs of witnesses and interpreters. When granting such contribution, the Panel shall take into account the complexity and the outcome of the proceedings, as well as the conduct and financial resources of the parties.

240. Additionally, Article R65.2 provides as follows:

Subject to Articles R65.2, para. 2 and R65.4, the proceedings shall be free. The fees and costs of the arbitrators, calculated in accordance with the CAS fee scale, together with the costs of CAS are borne by CAS.

241. FIS requested that the Appellant pay its costs and expenses related to this appeal, including costs incurred in relation to his request for interim measures before CAS. The Appellant requested that FIS pay his costs and expenses.

242. This award is rendered without costs, except for the CAS Court Office fee of CHF 1,000, which was paid by the Appellant and is retained by the CAS. Pursuant to Article 64.5 of the CAS Code and taking into account the outcome of the arbitration, the complexity of the issues raised on appeal, and the other factors identified in Article R64.5, the Panel determines that the Parties shall bear their own costs.

AWARD

The Court of Arbitration for Sport rules that:


1. The appeal filed on 30 January 2017 against the Decision of the FIS Doping Panel regarding Provisional Measures in the matter of Mr. Alexander Legkov, dated 25 January 2017, is partially upheld.
2. The Decision of the FIS Doping Panel dated 25 January 2017 is amended as follows:
The Optional Provisional Suspension is maintained until 31 October 2017, after which such suspension shall lapse and Mr. Alexander Legkov shall, in the absence of any anti-doping rule violation sanction having been assessed against him, be restored to the *status quo ante* prevailing at the time of the suspension's imposition.
3. All other elements of the Decision of the FIS Doping Panel dated 25 January 2017 are confirmed.
4. The International Ski Federation may, on or after 1 November 2017, re-impose an Optional Provisional Suspension in accordance with the FIS Anti-Doping Rules if the facts and circumstances so merit. Such suspension shall be subject to appeal in accordance with Article 13.7.1 of the FIS Anti-Doping Rules.
5. This award is rendered without costs, except for the CAS Court Office fee of CHF 1,000, which was paid by Mr. Alexander Legkov and is retained by the CAS.
6. Each party shall bear its own costs and other expenses incurred in connection with this arbitration.
7. All other motions or prayers for relief are dismissed.

Seat of arbitration: Lausanne, Switzerland

Date of operative part: 29 May 2017

Date of reasoned award: 31 August 2017

THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT



Jan Paulsson
President of the Panel