CAS 2002/A/396, Baxter / International Ski Federation (FIS)

• Alpine skiing
• Inadvertent doping
• Calculation of the suspension
• Interpretation of regulations

1. Suspensions based on Section D, Rule 2, art. 1.2.1 of the FIS Medical Guide, which provides the following sanction for inadvertent doping : « Suspension from participation in all international ski competitions for three months for the first offence (during a fixed period within the actual or next competition season) », should
a) begin to run on the day the sample was taken until the end of the competition season underway,
b) be interrupted between competition seasons (in order to be effective) and
c) resume during the next competition season(s), either Northern or Southern Hemisphere season, until the suspension period has entirely run.
The exact starting and ending date of each competition season (Northern and Southern Hemispheres) to be accounted for when calculating the period of suspension should be the most up-to-date FIS Calendar at the time the decision to sanction is made by the FIS.

2. The Panel considers that “all” international ski competitions must mean all the competitions classified as such by the FIS in its International Ski Competition Rules (“ICR”) and listed by it in the FIS Calendar. Thus, the current wording of the regulations does not allow calculating a suspension period in such fashion that only certain competitions on the FIS Calendar are selectively covered by the suspension.

Mr. Alain Baxter is a British Athlete competing in the men’s alpine slalom event at the Salt Lake City 2002 Olympic Winter Games.

On 11 June 2002 the International Ski Federation (FIS) decided to impose a 3 month period of ineligibility on the Athlete after his A and B samples, provided in February 2002 at the Olympic Winter Games, tested positive for the prohibited substance methamphetamine.

After deliberations between FIS, the British Ski & Snowboard Federation (BSSF) and the Athlete about the calculation of the suspension the Athlete appealed the FIS decision of 11 June 2002 with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The Athlete argued that the FIS violated the applicable regulations by incorrectly accounting several factors when deciding the 3 month period of ineligibility.

Following assessment of the case the Panel deems that FIS' decision to sanction the Athlete with a three-month suspension period did not observe the applicable regulations insofar as the calculation of the suspension period is concerned.

The Panel understands FIS' desire to seek effectiveness in its sanctions. However, since such effectiveness must be sought while observing the regulations in force, the FIS would need to modify its regulations if it wished to have the right to distinguish certain categories of competitions and/or the two competition seasons when calculating a suspension period for certain categories of racers or all racers.

That said, such distinctions are not easy to make because they involve speculating on the relative effectiveness of a sanction for given individuals (this being illustrated by the precedents listed by FIS in relation to prior sanctions for inadvertent doping offences). Also, the goal of achieving effective sanctions must be appropriately balanced with the need for the FIS to decide upon and notify sanctions rapidly (in order to account for the competitors’ need for planning).

The Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 30 September 2002 that:

1.) The appeal filed by Alain Baxter on 24 June 2002 is upheld.

2.)This decision made by the International Ski Federation (FIS), notified to the Appellant on 11 June 2002 is modified as follows:

The three-months suspension is fixed between 23 February and 30 April 2002 (Northern-Hemisphere competition season) and between 25 July and 18 August 2002 (Southern-Hemisphere competition season).

3.) (…)

CAS 2002/A/376 Baxter / International Olympic Committee (IOC)

• Alpine skiing / Olympic Games
• Doping (methamphetamine)
• Strict liability
• Irrelevance of any fault or of any enhancing effect
• Disqualification and exclusion from the Olympic Games

1. Consistent CAS case law has held that athletes are strictly responsible for substances they place in their body and that for purposes of disqualification (as opposed to suspension), neither intent nor negligence needs to be proven by the sanctioning body. Article 2.2 of Chapter II of the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code (OMAC) states that doping is the “presence in the body of a prohibited substance”, whether or not intentional or negligent, can affect the results of the event so that the presence of the substance is sufficient to find a doping violation.

2. Appendix A (I) to the OMAC lists among the classes of prohibited substances “amphetamines”. Thus, any form of amphetamines is covered by this listing, and there can be no doubt that both isomers of methamphetamine, including levmetamfetamine, are amphetamines within the meaning of that term. The IOC has not established any threshold level for methamphetamine. As a result, any level of methamphetamine constitutes a doping violation.

3. Disqualification is the minimum sanction that automatically follows a doping offence, in accordance with Article 3.3 of the OMAC. It is reasonable for the IOC to have determined that it may not always be possible to prove or disprove fault or performance-enhancing effect, but that in order to ensure the integrity of results the mere presence of a prohibited substance requires disqualification and invalidation of the result obtained.

Mr. Alain Baxter competed for the British team in the men's alpine skiing slalom event on 23 February 2002 at the Salt Lake City 2002 Olympic Winter Gamesy. He finished third and was awarded a bronze medal in the event.

On 21 March 2002, the IOC Executive Board decided for disqualifying Mr. Baxter and removing his bronze medal and diploma after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance Levmetamfetamine and Methamphetamine.

As a consequence of the positive urine test, the Fédération Internationale de Ski (“FIS”) suspended the Athlete from competition for three months. Mr. Baxter did not challenge the suspension or the length of the suspension.

Yet, in a separate CAS proceeding the Athlete appealed the manner of calculating the three-month period. Another CAS panel upheld the appeal and re-calculated the effective dates of the three-month suspension.

The issue of any suspension is therefore not before this Panel, which is only asked to determine the appropriateness of the disqualification of Mr. Baxter‟s Olympic results.

The Panel is not without sympathy for the Athlete, who appears to be a sincere and honest man who did not intend to obtain a competitive advantage in the race. It is unfortunate that, for whatever reason, he did not see the term levmetamfetamine on the package he bought or did not understand its import, and that he did not consult with his team doctor before taking the medication.

Nevertheless, because Mr. Baxter took the medication, at the time of his slalom race his body contained a prohibited substance. The consequence for this doping violation must be a disqualification and the loss of his bronze medal.

On 15 October 2002 the Court of Arbitration for Sport:

1.) Denies the appeal filed by Mr. Baxter and upholds the ruling of the IOC Executive Board disqualifying Alain Baxter from the men‟s alpine skiing slalom event at the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics, withdrawing his Bronze medal and diploma, and excluding him from the XIX Olympic Winter Games, Salt Lake City 2002;

2.) (…).

CAS 2000/A/310 L. / International Olympic Committee (IOC)

Related case:

CAS 2000_A_312 L. vs FILA
October 22, 2001

• Wrestling/Olympic Games
• Doping (nandrolone)
• Use of nutritional supplements
• Strict Liability Rule
• Validity of the testing procedure

1. The express terms of Chapter II, Article 2.2 of the Olympic Movement Antidoping Code (OMAC) clearly provide for the application of the principle of strict liability in regard to the offence of doping. The IOC has the initial burden of proving the presence of a prohibited substance in the body of the athlete that is the objective elements of the offence of doping. If the IOC meets its initial burden of proof, the principle of strict liability creates a presumption that a doping offence has been committed. The burden of proof then shifts to the athlete who may rebut the presumption.

2. From a purely scientific perspective, there may always exist a possibility that concentrations of 19-norandrosterone above 2 ng/ml could occur endogenously. It may well be that further indeed better studies should be undertaken. However, absent expert evidence to the contrary, the CAS has no basis for questioning the reliability of the studies conducted by experts in this field or the experience of the IOC-accredited laboratories.

3. In the present case, the athlete has failed to rebut the resulting presumption of a doping offence:
(i) failure to prove any discrepancies in the volume of urine recorded on the doping control documents,
(ii) failure to prove a broken chain of custody,
(iii) failure to prove any procedural irregularity in regard to the opening and analysis of the B sample. Any minor irregularity cannot be considered to have affected the results of an otherwise valid test.

The German Athlete L. competed at the freestyle wrestling event at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

In September 2000 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete L. after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance 19-norandrosterone (Nandrolone).

On 23 October 2000 the IOC Executive Board decided for the disqualification of the Athlete, withdrawal of medal and exclusion from the Syndney 2000 Olympic Games.

Hereafter in November 2000 the Athlete appealed the IOC decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).
The Athlete disputed the validity of the testing results and requested the Panel to set aside the IOC decision.

The Panel dismisses the Athletes arguments and concludes that the Athlete committed a doping offence under the IOC Rules during the freestyle wrestling competiotion held at the Olympic Games in Sydney.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 22 October 2000:

1.) The appeal filed by L. on 7 November 2000 against the decision made by the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee dated 23 October 2000 is dismissed.

2.) (...).

As a consequence of the Athlete's anti-doping violation at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games the International Federation of Associated Wrestling Styles (FILA) decided on 24 October 2000 to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete L. which was revised by the Court of Arbitratrion for Sport (CAS) on 22 October 2001 to a 1 year period of ineligibility (CAS 2001/A/312).

CAS 2002/A/395 UCI vs D.& Federazione Ciclistica Italiana

TAS 2002/A/395 UCI / D. et Federazione Ciclistica Italiana (FCI)

• Cycling
• Doping
• Possession of prohibited substances
• Representation before CAS
• Calculation of the suspension: taking into account the period of inactivity of the cyclist

The UCI Rules provide, in the matter of a first infraction for possession of doping substances, a fine of CHF 3.000,- and a 6 month period of effective suspension. According to the same Rules, the principle of compensation for a period of inactivity prior to the decision can possibly be allowed when this period of inactivity is imposed by the employer of the cyclist’s team. However the suspension must be effective and must therefore not coincide with a period of regulatory inactivity of cyclists.

In June 2001 the Italian police conducted anti-drugs raids on the hotels of the cycling teams in San Remo during the Giro d’Italia 2001. Police officers searched the rooms of the riders from all 20 teams, confiscating prohibited sustances. The organizers decided to cancel the 18th stage after the Italian cyclist D. was suspended by his cycling team after prohibited substances were found in his room.

On 7 May 2002 the Disciplinary Commission of the Italian Cycling Fedeation (FCI) decided to impose a 6 month period of ineligibility on the Athlete for the possession of a syringe containing traces of insulin.
In a seperate disciplinary proceeding the Athlete was also sanctioned on 16 October 2001 with a 3 month period of ineligibility for the possession of substances containing caffeine but this appealed decision was annulled on 11 February 2002.

Hereafter in June 2002 the International Cycling Union (UCI) appealed the FCI decision of 7 May 2002 with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The UCI requested the Panel to impose a more severe suspension and a higher fine in accordance with the UCI Anti-Doping Rules. The UCI contended that the Athlete’s possession of a flask IGF1 was excluded in the proceedings against the Athlete.

The Panel finds that the Athlete’s possession of the syringe with traces of insulin has been established and agrees that the flask IGF1 in the possession of the Athlete is also a anti-doping violation under de UCI Rules.

Therefore on 19 November 2002 the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) decides to impose a CHF 3.000,- fine and a 6 month period of ineligibility on the Athlete, starting on 1 October 2002 and regarding the time already served.

CAS 2002/A/370 Lazutina v/ IOC
CAS 2002/A/370 L. / International Olympic Committee (IOC)

Related cases:

• IOC 2002 IOC vs Larissa Lazutina
  February 24, 2002
• IOC 2002 IOC vs Olga Danilova
  February 24, 2002
• Swiss Federal Court 4P.267_2002 Larissa Lazutina & Olga Danilova vs IOC and FIS
• Swiss Federal Court 4P.268_2002 Larissa Lazutina & Olga Danilova vs IOC and FIS
• Swiss Federal Court 4P.269_2002 Larissa Lazutina & Olga Danilova vs IOC and FIS
• Swiss Federal Court 4P.270_2002 Larissa Lazutina & Olga Danilova vs IOC and FIS
  May 27, 2003

• Cross Country Skiing/Olympic Games
• Doping (darbepoetin)
• Reliability of the testing method

1. Although darbepoetin is not specifically listed as a prohibited substance in the Olympic Movement Anti-Doping Code (“OMAC”), it is an analogue or mimetic of erythropoietin which is recombinant EPO in that it is an artificial substance which is not naturally produced by the human body unlike natural EPO. Therefore it is a prohibited substance. In accordance with the OMAC, its use is permitted only to treat insulin-dependent diabetes and even then, only if written notification has been given prior to the particular competition by an endocrinologist or the team physician. In the present case no written notification has been given.

2. Contrary to the allegation that the methodology of testing for darbepoetin is experimental and not legally nor scientifically accepted, evidence was given as to the methodology and reliability of the combined blood and urine test. The existing test for EPO whether natural or recombinant can be used without modification to detect darbepoetin. On the basis of the existing evidence, the CAS considers that the methodology of testing for erythropoietin and darbepoetin is scientifically sound, and that the results produced by the tests are reliable.

Ms. Larissa Lazutina is a Russian Athlete competing in the 4x5 kilometer women’s relay cross-country skiing race ath the Salt Lake City 2002 Olympic Games.

In February 2002 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete after her A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance Darbepoetin (dEPO)

The IOC Disciplinary Commission concluded that the Athlete had committed a doping offence. On the 24 February 2002 the IOC Executive Board accepted the conclusions and recommendations of the Disciplinary Commission. The Disciplinary commission disqualified the Athlete from the women’s 30 kilometre classical cross-country skiing race, ordered the withdrawal of her medal and diploma and ordered her exclusion from the Olympic Winter Games 2002.

As a result of the Athlete's violation the FIS decided on 3 June 2002 to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete.

Hereafter the Athlete filed several appeals against the imposed sanctions with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS 2002/A/371 [IOC] and CAS 2002/A/398 [FIS]).

The issue in this appeal can be shortly stated. The Athlete  contends that the methodology of testing for darbepoeitin is experimental, and is neither legally nor scientifically accepted. In particular, she contends that it is not permissible to use the method of testing for erythropoietin in order to test for darbepoetin.

Furthermore, she contends that the test on the B sample was improperly carried out as the urine sample was poured from the sample bottle into a dirty, non-sterile container. There was, therefore, she submits, a danger of contamination.

Considering the evidence, the Panel has no hesitation in finding that the methodology of testing for erythropoietin and darbepoetin is scientifically sound, and that the results produced by the tests are reliable.

The Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 29 November that:

1.) The appeal filed by Larissa Lazutina on 13th March 2002 is dismissed.

2.) The decision of the IOC Executive Board of 24th February 2002 is confirmed.

3. (...).

CAS 2002/O/401 IAAF vs USATF

CAS 2002/O/401 International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) / USA Track & Field (USATF)

• Athletics
• Interpretation of the IAAF rules
• Obligation for USATF to furnish the results of positive tests to the IAAF
• Validity of the USATF confidentiality regulation

1. The IAAF Rules are to be read as resolutions adopted by and binding upon all Members, including USATF. Where the rules and regulations of a Member do not conform with or are wider than those of the IAAF, it is the latter which prevail. The IAAF Rules during the relevant period did require that USATF provide the IAAF with the results of positive tests and copies of decisions of domestic panels exonerating athletes of doping offences, as well as related material.

2. The Panel finds that there are valid reasons why the information which the IAAF seeks in relation to the thirteen athletes concerned with this arbitration need not be disclosed to it by USATF. Although the meaning of the IAAF Rules remains relevant, the Panel‟s answer turns on the facts and circumstances. A very telling circumstance is the IAAF‟s persistent inability, or simple failure, or, indeed, refusal, throughout the period 1996 to 2000 to identify the particular IAAF Rules allegedly violated by USATF‟s confidentiality policy, to articulate clearly a position concerning the supposed illegitimacy of that confidentiality policy or to take some positive action against USATF to compel disclosure. It allowed the issue to drag on for years leading USATF to believe that it had discretion to make contractual promises of confidentiality to those athletes it tested domestically.

3. Support for USATF‟s position can be found in various CAS decisions, including the AEK Athens case, in which it is enunciated that “Where the conduct of one party has led to legitimate expectations on the part of a second party, the first party is estopped from changing its course of action to the detriment of the second party”. The concept of legitimate expectations – more particularly, the concept of protecting athletes‟ legitimate expectations – has repeatedly been recognized by the CAS, for example, in the USA Shooting, Watt and Prusis. Underlying all these decisions lies the notion of fairness.

4. The unique facts and circumstances of this case constitute a valid and compelling reason why USATF should not be required to disclose the information in question to the IAAF, notwithstanding the proper interpretation of the relevant IAAF Rules.

On 29 September 2000, further to allegations made during the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, Australia, that USATF "had concealed information about US athletes who may have tested positive for the use of performance enhancing drugs," USATF appointed an Independent Review Commission, chaired by Professor Richard McLaren (the "McLaren Commission") which issued its report on 11 July 2001.

The second circumstance to be noted concerns the transfer by USATF of all responsibility for doping control and related disciplinary proceedings to the independent United Sates Anti-Doping Agency ("USADA") in October 2000. Since that time, it is USADA, not USATF, which tests athletes both in and out-of-competition, analyses the results, notifies athletes of positive tests and adjudicates such disputes as may arise; and unlike the USATF regulation previously in force, USADA's Protocol for Olympic Movement Testing provides for disclosure of domestic drug tests to the IAAF during the adjudicative process.

(A) The IAAF are in dispute with USATF over the obligation of USATF under IAAF Rules to disclose to the IAAF the results of "positive tests" conducted by or on behalf of USATF; to disclose the determinations of Hearing Panels convened by USATF in cases where athletes have been exonerated of a Doping Offence; and to disclose the material underlying such positive results and/or determinations of
USATF Hearing Panels.

(B) The IAAF contends that it requires such information in order to decide whether or not to exercise its power under IAAF Rule 21.3(ii) to refer such cases for review by its Arbitration Panel (or CAS), where the IAAF believes in the conduct or conclusions of such a hearing the relevant tribunal of the Member has misdirected itself or otherwise reached an erroneous conclusion.

(C) USATF contends that disclosure of domestic doping control results is not required by IAAF Rules or any other legal constraints, and is neither required nor permitted by the US laws, rules, regulations and agreements to which USATF is subject. USATF also contends that in any event the information requested by the IAAF cannot be disclosed because it would violate the legal and personal rights of the athlete. USATF further contends that the IAAF has no authority to review such domestic doping control cases.

(D) The dispute relates to a failure by USATF to disclose the information in (A) above during the period 1 October 1996 to a date to be determined by mutual agreement of the parties.

(E) The facts will be set out in the Statements of Case to be filed by the parties to the dispute.

In the opinion of the CAS Panel, based on its appreciation of the evidence as a whole, the unique facts and circumstances of this case constitute a valid and compelling reason why USATF should not be required to disclose the information in question to the IAAF, notwithstanding the proper interpretation of the relevant IAAF Rules. In the circumstances, and as requested by USATF, the Panel explicitly refrains from applying the relevant IAAF Rules, as interpreted, to the thirteen cases at issue in these proceedings.

Therefore on 10 January 2003 the Panel decides and orders as follows, unanimously with respect to the first question and by majority with respect to the second question and the issue of costs:

1. QUESTION (i) set out in paragraph 1.1 of the Arbitration Agreement dated 10 July 2002 is answered in the affirmative;

2. QUESTION (ii) set out in paragraph 1.1 of the Arbitration Agreement dated 10 July 2002 is also answered in the affirmative;

3. The costs of the arbitration up to the date of the present award, which will be calculated later by the CAS Court Office, shall be shared equally by the parties.

4. Each party shall bear all of its own legal and other costs incurred in connection with this arbitration.

The issues to be resolved between IAAF and USATF by the CAS Panel are simply stated in the Arbitration Agreement:

1.1 The IAAF and USATF agree to submit to arbitration the following issues:

(i) properly construed, at all material times did IAAF Rules provide that USATF was obliged:

(a) to furnish the results of positive tests to the IAAF;

(b) to provide the IAAF with copies of decisions of USATF Hearing Panels exonerating athletes of Doping Offences, and

(c) to provide the IAAF with the material it needs to decide whether or not to seek to have a Hearing Panel's decision reviewed by its own Arbitration Panel or CAS?

(ii) if IAAF Rules did so provide, is there any valid reason why USATF should not be required to comply with these Rules?

CAS 2002/A/385 T. / International Gymnastics Federation (FIG)

• Gymnastics
• Doping (furosemide)
• Nutritional supplement
• Strict liability
• Failure to invite the athlete for the B-test
• Mitigating circumstances

1. The failure to provide the athlete with an opportunity to be present or be represented at the opening and analysis of the B-sample constitutes a procedural error compromising the limited rights of an athlete to such an extent that the results of the analysis of the B-sample and thus the entire urine test should be disregarded.

2. It is not a positive urine test but the presence of a prohibited substance in an athlete’s body which constitutes a doping offence. While the appellant in this case denies ever having taken Furosemide, the CAS Panel is of the view that there is overwhelming proof that she in fact did. The Appellant admitted having taken a version of “Hyper” (a nutritional supplement) which had not been previously tested and later turned out to contain a forbidden substance. The fact that the Appellant may not have been aware of the existence of Furosemide is of no relevance in respect of the objective elements of this case.

3. It has been a known and widely publicised fact for several years that food supplements can be – and sometimes intentionally are – contaminated with products which are prohibited in sports. An athlete who ignores this fact, does so at his/her own risk. It would be all too simple and would frustrate all the efforts being made in the fight against doping to allow athletes the defence that they took whatever the team doctor gave them, thus attempting to shift the responsibility to someone else. The athlete's negligence lies in the fact that he/she uses food supplements which include a generally known risk of contamination. The extent of the precaution taken to reduce the risk of contamination may have a bearing on the extent of the sanction.

Between September 2001 and February 2002 the International Gymnastics Federation (FIG) reported two anti-doping rule violation against the Russian Athlete after her A and B samples, collected in Australia and in Spain, tested positive for the prohibited substance furosemide.

On 20 February 2002 the FIG Special Commission decided to impose a 1 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete followed by 1 year’s suspension with probation.
On 9 May 2002 the FIG Executive Committee dismissed the Athlete’s appeal against the FIG decision of 20 February 2002. Hereafter in May 2002 the Athlete appealed both FIG decisions of 20 February and 9 May 2002 with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The Athlete requested the Panel to annul the FIG decisions and argued that her rights were infringed during the doping test procedure because the laboratory reports showed signs of irregularities and because she was not informed of the date and the time when the B-sample was to be opened and analysed by the Australian laboratory. Furthermore, the Athlete denied that she ever admitted having taken a forbidden substance.

Consideration all the elements of this case, in particular the fact that the Athlete acted negligently but without intent and that she was only 19 years old at the time of the offence, the Panel is of the view that, based on the evidence produced, there are mitigating circumstances which warrant a considerable reduction from the maximum penalty allowed under the rules and regulations of the Respondent.

As a result, the Panel is of the opinion that the suspension for a 12 month period and a "probation" for an additional 12 month period, as imposed by the FIG, is adequate and appropriate.

Therefore on 23 January 2003 the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides:

1.) The appeal filed by T. is rejected.

2.) The decision of the FIG Executive Committee of 8/9 May 2002 is confirmed.

3. (...).

CAS 2002/A/400 M. / International Ski Federation (FIS)

Related cases:

• CAS 2002_A_374 Johann Muehlegg vs IOC
  January 24, 2003
• IOC 2002 IOC vs Johann Muehlegg
  February 24, 2002
  
  

• Cross Country Skiing
• Doping
• Deliberate use of prohibited substance
• Applicable sanction

1. The substance Darbepoetin alfa is an analogue-mimetic to EPO, which is a Prohibited Substance under the FIS Medical Guide. Darbepoetin is an artificial substance, which is never produced naturally by the human body and is different than EPO. Darbepoetin is easily detected using testing methods similar to those used to detect exogenous EPO.

2. In the absence of any explanation by the athlete of the presence of the Prohibited Substance in his body, there is no alternative, given the nature of Darbepoetin and its very effective performance enhancing effect, but to conclude that there is no other explanation than deliberate use.

3. In the absence of a personal appearance by the athlete (and a corresponding explanation of how the Prohibited Substance might have found its way into his body in a situation where there could only be exogenous administration of the Prohibited Substance) there is simply no reason whatsoever for CAS to consider reducing the disciplinary sanction imposed.

The Spanish Athlete Johann Muehlegg competed in the men’s cross-country ski event at the Salt Lake City 2002 Olympic Winter Games.

On 3 June 2002 the International Ski Federation (FIS) decided to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete after his sample, provided in February 2002 at the Olympic Winter Games, tested positive for Darbepoetin.

Hereafter the Athlete appealed the FIS decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The Athlete argued that the imposed automatic fixed suspension cannot be justified and asserted that there a grounds for a reduced sanction.

The CAS Panel rules that the Athlete committed a doping infraction and that he shall be sanctioned for a period of two years. The Panel deems that the Athlete has not provided any acceptable reason for to reduce his sanction.

Furthermore the Athlete failed to appear before the Panel. The Panel notes that it is difficult to imagine how a reduction of a sanction could ever be warranted without an opportunity to assess the credibility of the Athlete and the explanations, which he might have. He most certainly did not express remorse for his actions.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 24 January 2003:

1.) The appeal filed by M. on 12 July 2002 is dismissed.

2.) The decision of the FIS Council of 3 June 2002 is upheld.

3.) (…).