CAS 2004/A/690 D. Hipperdinger v/ATP
CAS 2004/A/690 H. v. Association of Tennis Professionals (ATP)

Related case:

ITF 2004 ATP vs Diego Hipperdinger

• Tennis
• Doping (cocaine)
• Use of a natural product (coca tea and coca leaves) for medical purpose
• Significant negligence
• Sanction

1. According to Rule S1. of Appendix Three of the ATP Rules, cocaine is considered a prohibited substance. When the presence of cocaine and metabolites in the athlete’s body is not disputed, the athlete committed a doping offence in the sense of Rule C.1.a of the ATP Rules, if he did not establish a granted therapeutic use exemption.

2. A professional athlete must be considered to be highly sensitive and alert to issues of doping. The principle of strict liability means that an athlete is responsible for whatever substance is in his body, without having regard to the reasons for such presence and the degree of any respective fault of the athlete. Every athlete must therefore be concerned about substances he or she is ingesting, in particular if this is done for a medicinal purpose. The athlete who did not comply with his duty of care acts negligently and cannot be considered as bearing no fault or negligence in the sense of Rule M.5.a of the ATP Rules or no significant negligence pursuant to Rule M.5.b of the ATP Rules.

3. Under the applicable anti-doping regulations, it is not the duty of the ATP to warn athletes against the use of certain substances. While it is certainly desirable that the ATP and any IF should make every effort to educate athletes about doping, it is principally the sole duty of the individual athlete to ensure that no prohibited substances enter his body. It is therefore irrelevant whether the ATP has warned athletes against the use of natural products. The list of prohibited substances is not intended to include each and every possible ingredient or base product – whether natural or synthetic – to a substance that is prohibited.

On 24 March 2005 the Court of Arbitration for Sport hereby decides:

1.) The Appeal filed by H. is partially allowed.

2.) The Decision of the ATP Anti-Doping Tribunal dated 23 July 2004 is upheld, save points 3 and 4 which are modified as follows: “

3. [Sentence 1 is annulled] The period of ineligibility has commenced on 9 February 2004 and will end on 8 February 2006.

4. [Sentence 1 is annulled] It is ordered that medals, titles, computer ranking points and prize money earned since 9 February 2004 be forfeited. [Sentence 3 is upheld].

(…)

CAS 2004/A/707 Mr. David Millar v The British Cycling Federation

As a result of an investigation in 2004 against certain members of the COFIDIS cycling team for possible doping offences, the residence of the British cyclist David Millar in Biarritz was searched and two used syringes found there. In consequence on 22 June 2004, he was arrested and held in custody by the French police. While in custody he admitted to doping offences.

On 1 July 2004 the Athlete was charged with possessing and using toxic substances. During his hearing by the Examining Magistrate, the Athlete explained he had taken Testosterone patches on one occasion and EPO on three occasions.

The Athlete explained the pressure placed upon him by his position as team leader, the need he faced to "produce results", and at the same time the personal isolation in which he found himself, all of which exacerbated his psychological vulnerability. Those factors in combination with a heavy race programme, various injuries, disappointing results in certain important races and consequential financial pressures made him succumb to the temptation to use prohibited substances.

On 6 August 2004 in the decision issued by the British Cycling Federation (BCF) a 2 year period of ineligibility and a minimum fine was imposed on the Athlete.

In this case the BCF considered:

• the Athlete gave a frank admission both to the French authorities and the BCF;
• the fact that he voluntarily stopped using banned substance prior to any investigation;
• the genuine contribution shown;
• his willingness to assist young riders to help them avoid falling into the trap of taking banned substances;
• the gravity of the consequences of the penaly for his sporting and economic position and the risk to his professional career.

Hereafter in August 2004 the Athlete appealed the BCF decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The Athlete accepted the fine and disqualification penalties and requested the Panel for a reduced sanction. The BCF argued that the imposed sanction was proportional and lenient while he deliberately had used doping and only admitted the offences after he was caught.

In view of the circumstances and the lenght of the sancion the Panel considers that it is necessary to have regard to the indisputable fact that notwithstanding the Athlete’s sincere change of heart in autumn 2003, his doping offence was a very serious one.

Given the particular circumstances of this case - in which the Athlete was arrested by the French police and admitted, before his discharge from custody, to being guilty of doping, thereby de facto excluding himself from the Tour de France and any other forthcoming competitions, while at the same time promptly announcing he was withdrawing from the British Olympic team for Athens - the Panel considers the 2 year suspension should in fairness take effect from the date of his arrest.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 17 February 2005:

1.) The appeal filed by David Millar on 23 August 2004 is partially upheld.

2. The decision of 6 August 2004 issued by BCF is modified in accordance with paragraph 3.

3.) Millar’s two-year suspension from all forms of cycling competition is maintained, except that the said suspension takes effect on 24 June 2004 and ends on 23 June 2006.

4.) This award is rendered without costs, except for the Court Office fee of CHF 500.-- (five hundred Swiss Francs) already paid by the Appellant, which shall be retained by the CAS.

5.) Each party shall bear its own costs.

CAS 2004/A/714 F. v. International Olympic Committee (IOC)

Related case:

IOC 2004 IOC vs Robert Fazekas
August 24, 2004

• Athletics
• Olympic Games
• Failure to submit to sample collection
• Validity of the sample collection procedure
• Doping offence

1. The presence of two witnesses (instead of one) cannot be invoked as a circumstance invalidating the entire doping sample collection procedure. According to the Rules in force, the sample collection cannot take place without the testimony of at least a witness, but the presence of two witnesses is not prohibited and is not a reason for the invalidity of the procedure. In the same way, no rule provides for the presence of a representative of the athlete at the moment the athlete passes the sample. As a result, the fact that no representative assisted the Athlete while passing the urine cannot be invoked as an irregularity affecting the validity of the sample collection procedure.

2. The athlete’s failure to provide a full urine sample cannot be excused by an alleged ignorance or inapplicability of the anti-doping rules in force at the Athens Games. It is undisputed that a full sample of 75ml was not provided. The IOC can therefore be held as having proved that a failure to submit to sample collection has occurred. The burden to prove that a compelling justification for such failure existed lies on the athlete: the “aggressive” conduct of the doping control staff resulting in a “psychological trauma” during the doping control procedure justifying the production of an insufficient sample, has not been established, and cannot be invoked as an excuse not to continue the sample collection procedure.

3. When no compelling justification for failing to submit to doping control exists, the Athlete has therefore committed an anti-doping rule infringement.

Mr. Robert Fazekas is a Hungarian Athlete competing in the men’s discus throw event at the Athens 2004 Olympic Games.

On 24 August 2004 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete after he refused or failed to provide a sample for doping control. After notification the Athlete filed a statement in his defence and was heard for the IOC Disciplinary Commission.

Despite several attempts the Athlete could provide on 24 August 2004 only a (partial) sample of 25 ml of urine. The athlete stated that he decided to finish the procedure because he did not feel well. The athlete was given the opportunity to continue the sample collection at the polyclinic where medical treatment could be given to him but the athlete did not accept.

The IOC Disciplinary Commission unanimously concluded that the Athlete Mr Robert Fazenas had committed a doping offence pursuant to Article 2.3 of the Rules in that he had refused or failed to submit to sample collection.

On 24 August the IOC Executive Board, as recommended by the IOC Disciplinary Commission, decides that the Athlete:

1.) is disqualified from the men’s discus throw event, where he had placed first;

2.) is not awarded a gold medal or diploma;

3.) is excluded from the Games of the XXVIII Olympiad in Athens in 2004; and

4.) shall have his Olympic identity and accreditation card withdrawn.

5.) The International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) is requested to modify the results of the above-noted event accordingly and to consider any further action within its own competence.

6.) This decision shall enter into force immediately.

Hereafter in September 2004 the Athlete Appealed the IOC decision of 24 August 2004 with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The Athlete requested the Panel to set aside the Appealed Decision in all counts and to award the gold medal to the Athlete for placing first.

The Athlete submited that he “rescinded” his consent to go to the Polyclinic when it became clear that the same two witnesses (that attended to the unsuccessful attempts at the Stadium) would accompany him; and also because he had been reassured (by an unnamed woman) that the partial sample was sufficient for testing.

The CAS Panel rules that the submissions of the Athlee cannot be accepted. The Panel, in fact, confirms that, pursuant to the applicable guidelines, the doping control officers present at the doping control station had the right to accompany the Athlete to the Village Polyclinic.

In addition, the Panel remarks that the Athlete at the hearing admitted that at the end of the procedure he was rather calm, and that he was perfectly aware of the consequences of his decision not to go to the Village Polyclinic. Finally, the Panel stresses that the Athlete could not rely on any declaration, by whomsoever made, as to the sufficiency of 25ml for testing, while it was all the way clear that he had to provide a quantity of 75ml of urine.

In the light of the foregoing, the Panel decides on 31 March 2005 that the appeal has to be dismissed and the IOC Decision of 24 August 2004 has to be confirmed.

CAS 2004/A/717 Intemational Paralympic Committee v/ Broekman & WADA

In July 2004 the TUE Committee of the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) decided to dismiss the TUE application of the British Parathlete Andrew Brockman.

By contrast on 23 August 2004 the WADA TUE Committee decided to reverse the IPC decision and to grant the Athlete's TUE application for the use of his medication.

Hereafter in September 2004 the IPC appealed the WADA Decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). IPC requested the Panel to set aside the WADA Decision and to deny the TUE granted to the Parathlete.

IPC argued that a TUE can be denied even in the case the Technical Criteria are satisfied, when the health of the athlete would be seriously impaired by the use of the otherwise prohibited substance and/or by the practice of sport under the effect of the otherwise prohibited substance.

WADA, on the other hand, while agreeing on the importance of the "health factor" for the practice of sport, claimed that the list of the Technical Criteria Is exhaustive, so that an athlete has the right to obtain a TUE if he fulfils them all.

In view of the evidence the Panel determines that the Athlete was suffering from a chronic medical condition, that the otherwise prohibited substance was not specificaliy used for sport, but also in the course of the normal life of the Athlete.

The Panel deems that the administration of the otherwise prohibited substance was medically justified. The Panel finds that no evidence, assessed on the basis of a direct examination of the Athlete, was given that the cessation of the practice of the sport by the Athlete was a reasonable alternative to the administration of the prohibited substance.

As a result, the IPC, by denying the TUE, did not properly apply the Technical Criteria (as set forth by the WADC TUE International Standards and by the IPC Anti-Doping Code). WADA, therefore, was entitled to reverse the IPC Decision
pursuant to Article 6.3 of the IPC Anti-Doping Code.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 8 June 2005:

1.) The Appeal filed by the International Paralympic Committee on 15 September 2004 is dismissed.

2.) The decision adopted by the Therapeutic Exemption Committe of the World Anti-Doping Agency on 23 August 2004 is confirmed.

3.) (...)

4.) (...)

CAS 2004/A/718 Adrian Annus vs IOC

Related case:

IOC 2004 IOC vs Adrian Annus
August 29, 2004

The Athlete Adrian Annus is a member of the Hungarian Athletics Association. He participated in the Olympic Games in Athens 2004 in the discipline of hammer throwing.

The International Olympic Committee (IOC) reported that on 24 August the Athlete didn’t show to provide a urine sample for doping control. The Athlete had already left the Olympic Village in Athens to return to Hungary. After he had been requested the Athlete informed the IOC that he could be met at his home on 26/27 August 2004, between 23:00 and 01:00.

At around 23:00 on 26 August 2005, two Doping Control Officers (DCOs) drove to the Athlete’s home to collect a urine sample. However they found themselves confronted by a number of journalists and fans, some of them with motorcycles, who had gathered outside the Athlete’s house. The DCOs felt threatened by the crowd, decided not to contact the Athlete and left.

When the DCOs returned in the morning of 25 August 2004, this time accompanied by two local police officers, the Athlete had already left his home. After official notification by the IOC for testing the Athlete failed to appear at the indicated doping control station at the material time.

On 29 August 2004, the IOC Executive Board made the following decision:

1.) Disqualification of the athlete Mr Adrian Annus from the men’s hammer throw event, in which he had placed first;
2.) Excluded from the Games of the XXVIII Olympiad in 2004;
3.) Withdrawn of his Olympic identity and accreditation card.
4.)The International Association of Athletics Federations
(IAAF) is requested to modify the results of the event accordingly.
5.) The Hungarian Olympic Committee is ordered to return to the IOC, as soon as possible, the gold medal and diploma awarded to the athlete in relation to the noted event.
6.) The disciplinary procedure will continue with regard to an alleged anti-doping rule violation (Tampering, or attempting to tamper, with any part of Doping Control).

Hereafter in September 2004 the Athlete appealed the IOC decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The CAS Panel determines that the Athlete failed to appear at the scheduled doping control in Bucsu, although he knew that he was required to do so. The Panel deems that there was no justification for his failure.

Because of the Athlete's “no show” and his general behaviour the Panel concludes that the Athlete had evaded sample collection and accordingly he had committed an anti-doping rule violation. Thus, the Panel concludes that the sanctions imposed by the Executive Board of the IOC are adequate.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport Panel decides on 31 March 2005 that:

1.) The appeal filed by Adrian Annus on 16 September 2004 is dismissed.

2.) The decision issued by the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee on 29 August 2004 is confirmed.

3.) This Award is rendered without costs, except for the Court Office fee paid by the Appellant, which shall be retained by the Court of Arbitration for Sport.

4.) The Appellant shall pay to the International Olympic Committee as a contribution towards the expenses incurred by the International Olympic Committee in connection with this arbitration.

CAS 2004/A/725 USOC & Michael Johnson, Antonio Pettigrew, Angelo Taylor, Alvin Harrison, Calvin Harrison vs IOC & IAAF

Related case:
CAS 2004/A/628 IAAF vs USATF & Jerome Young
June 28, 2004

1. This case, in its essence, concerns the interpretation of relevant IAAF Rules and their application to five members of the gold medal-winning U.S.A. team (the “U.S.A. team”) in the men's 4 x 400m relay event at the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games (the “relay event”). It is a most peculiar case, arising in most unusual circumstances.

2. As explained more fully in this Award, the results of the relay event and the fate of the medals awarded to the U.S.A. team at the 2000 Sydney Games have, five years later, been called into question as a result of two occurrences.

3. First, on 28 June 2004, a Panel of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”) found that a Doping Appeals Board of USA Track & Field (“USATF”), the national federation that governs the sport of athletics in the United States of America, had misdirected itself and reached an erroneous conclusion when, on 10 July 2000, it exonerated Mr. Jerome Young (a sixth member of the U.S.A. team, who is not one of the Appellants in this arbitration) of having committed a doping offence on 26 June 1999, just prior to the Sydney Games. The CAS Panel found that Mr. Young had committed a doping offence, that the resulting period of ineligibility extended through the Sydney Games, and that Mr. Young should therefore not have participated in those Games (CAS Arbitration 2004/A/628, IAAF v/ USATF & Jerome Young, award of 28 June 2004).

4. Second, on 18 July 2004, the IAAF Council determined that “as a consequence of Jerome Young’s ineligibility to have competed at the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000 [by virtue of having committed a doping offence on 26 June 1999], the result of the USA Men's 4 x 400m relay event is annulled and the final placings are revised accordingly.”

5. It is the subject matter of the second of these decisions - that is, whether under IAAF Rules in force at the time of the Sydney Games, the results of the relay event should be annulled and the final placings revised accordingly – that is the primary issue in the present appeal.

The CAS Panel is unanimously of the opinion that the decision taken by the IAAF Council on 18 July 2004 interpreting its rules is incorrect, and should be overturned. The Panel reaches this conclusion with all due respect to the IAAF Council and its role under the IAAF Constitution as the primary decision-maker regarding the interpretation of its Rules.

On the basis of IAAF rules applicable at the time of the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, the results obtained by the Athletes in the men's 4 x 400m relay event at the Sydney Games shall not be amended. Those results therefore stand. Furthermore, it is the understanding of the Panel that only Jerome Young in the US relay team should be stripped of his gold medal pursuant to the CAS award 2004/A/628 of 28 June 2004.

Having so found, the Panel considers it unnecessary for it to consider the other issues raised by the parties in these proceedings. In particular, the Panel considers that there is no need for it to determine, and it refrains from determining:

• Whether the IAAF has the jurisdiction, power or authority to annul the results of the relay event (the Panel having determined that, even assuming (without deciding) that the IAAF has such jurisdiction, its decision in this case was incorrect);
• Whether the IAAF decision should be overturned on grounds unrelated to the merits of that decision (for example, whether modification of the results of the relay event is time-barred, or whether the IAAF decision is vitiated by a lack of due process);
• Whether or not USOC, as distinct from the Athletes, has standing to appeal the IAAF decision.

The Court of Arbitration for Sport Panel rules that:

1.) The appeal filed by Michael Johnson, Antonio Pettigrew, Angelo Taylor, Alvin Harrison and Calvin Harrison on 27 September 2004 is upheld.

2.) The IAAF Council decision of 18 July 2004 is hereby overturned.

3.) On the basis of IAAF Rules in force and applicable at the time of the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, the results of the men's 4 x 400m relay event at those Games shall not be amended; those results stand.

4.) The award is pronounced without costs, except for the Court Office fee of CHF 500.- already paid by the Appellants and which is retained by the CAS.

5.) The IAAF shall pay an amount of US$ 10’000.- to the Appellants Michael Johnson, Antonio Pettigrew, Angelo Taylor, Alvin Harrison and Calvin Harrison as contribution towards their expenses incurred in this arbitration.

CAS 2004/A/726 Maria Luisa Calle Williams v. International Olympic Committee (IOC)

CAS 2005/A/726 Maria Luisa Calle Williams v/IOC

• Track cycling
• Doping (Isometheptene)
• CAS jurisdiction
• Substance with “a similar chemical structure or similar pharmacological effects” to the substances listed as prohibited
• Criteria to be considered when deciding to treat a substance as similar to a listed substance

1. In contrast to a decision to include a particular substance on the Prohibited List, a WADA determination to treat a substance as “similar” to a listed substance can be challenged by athletes.

2. The classification of a substance as having “a similar chemical structure or similar pharmacological effect(s)” requires a similarity to one or several of the particular substances on the list. It is not sufficient for WADA or the IOC, or any other anti-doping agency, simply to assert that a substance, such as Isometheptene, is “a stimulant” and thus a prohibited substance (when that assertion is disputed by an athlete) without specifying the particular substance on the List with which similarity is supposed to exist.

3. Before treating a substance as similar, the three criteria mentioned in 4.3 of the WADA Code (potential performance enhancement, health risk, violation of the spirit of sport) must be considered. Only if two of these three are met can a substance be treated as similar and thus prohibited.

Ms Maria Luisa Calle Williams is a Colombian Athlete competing in the Women’s point race for track cycling at the 2004 Athens Olympic Games.

On 29 August 2004 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) decided to disqualify the Athlete after her A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance Heptaminol.
Here the Athlete stated that she had used the prescribed medication Neo-Saldina containing Isometheptene as treatment for a migraine headache.

Hereafter in October 2004 the Athlete appealed the IOC decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

In this case during the proceedings with CAS the parties accepted the findings en conclusion of an expert report:

• that both Heptaminol and Isometheptene, even though not expressly listed in WADA’s Prohibited List, have a “similar chemical structure or similar pharmacological effect(s)” as those substances expressly named as “S.1-stimulants” in the WADA Prohibited List; and
• that both Heptaminol and Isometheptene are prohibited substances pursuant to the IOC Rules; and
• that Heptaminol is a marker for Isometheptene, i.e. “a compound, group of compounds or biological parameters that indicates the use of a prohibited substance or prohibited method”.

Subsequent UCI and the Lausanne Lab also concluded that the substance Isometheptene has not a similar chemical structure or pharmacological effect as the stimulants listed on the WADA 2004 list and can thus not be considered to be prohibited under IOC Rules.

The parties in this case, including WADA, agreed that the presence of Heptaminol in the Athlete’s sample was not due to she ingested that substance but the result of metabolizing Isometheptene into Desmethyl-Isometheptene which transformed in Heptaminol during laboratory analysis.

Initially, the IOC Decision argued that as a result of the strict liability principle the mere finding of Heptaminol - which the IOC claims was a prohibited substance at the relevant point in time - in the Athlete’s sample must lead to her disqualification.

However, during the proceedings before the Panel the IOC agreed that contrary to its original submissions the substance for which the Athlete tested positive was Isometheptene not Heptaminol. This was the result of the her’s admission to having taken Neo-Saldina and the biological and chemical process. Therefore, the Panel does not have to determine whether Heptaminol is in fact a prohibited substance.

The Panel is unanimously of the view that the classification of a substance as having “a similar chemical structure or similar pharmacological effect(s)” requires a similarity to one or several of the particular substances on the list.

It is not sufficient for WADA or the IOC, or any other anti-doping agency, simply to assert that a substance, such as Isometheptene, is “a stimulant” and thus a prohibited substance (when that assertion is disputed by an athlete) without specifying the particular substance on the List with which similarity is supposed to exist.

In summary, the Panel is unanimous in finding:

• that a decision by WADA to treat a substance as “similar” is subject to challenge;
• that the S1-Stimulants category of the 2004 Prohibited List is not an “open list” and that similarity must exist with a particular substance before a non-listed substance can be treated as similar; and
• that before treating a substance as similar the three criteria mentioned in 4.3 of the WADA Code must be considered.

Further, the majority of the Panel finds that the IOC failed to discharge the burden of proving that Isometheptene is a prohibited substance under the applicable rules.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 19 October 2015:

1.) The decision of the IOC of 29 August 2004 is set aside.

2.) The award to Maria Luisa Calle Williams of the bronze medal for the women’s Point race at the 2004 Olympic Games is confirmed.

(…)

CAS 2004/A/748 Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) & Viatcheslav Ekimov v. International Olympic Committee (IOC), United States Olympic Committee (USOC) & Tyler Hamilton

• Cycling
• Characteristics features of a „decision‟
• No anti-doping rule violation
• Jurisdiction of the CAS
• Standing to appeal

1. When a letter contains a clear statement of the resolution of the disciplinary procedure and when that statement has the additional effect of resolving the matter in respect of all interested parties it can be considered as a decision. It seems also evident from the text of the letter that its author intended such communication to be a decision issued on behalf of the IOC. The letter is therefore a true “decision” which can be appealed under Art. R47 of the Code.

2. The decision taken by the IOC whereby it is stated that a rider had not committed an anti-doping rule violation because the B sample did not confirm the A sample is tantamount to stating that the IOC determined that no anti-doping rule violation had been committed. Therefore, the said decision falls under Art. 12.2 of the IOC Anti-Doping Rules which allows the CAS to rule on appeals against a „decision that no anti-doping rule violation was committed‟ and the CAS has jurisdiction to review it.

3. Art. 12.2.2 of the IOC Anti-Doping Rules, corresponding to Art. 13.2.3 of the WADA Code, provides that only the following parties have the right to appeal to the CAS: “(a) the Athlete or other Person who is the subject of the decision being appealed; (b) the IOC; (c) the relevant International Federation and any other Anti-Doping Organisation under whose rules a sanction could have been imposed; and (d) WADA”. Neither a competitor (of the athlete subject to an anti-doping decision) nor his National Olympic Committee are among the individuals or organisations listed therein. This interpretation is confirmed by the Comment on the WADA Code – particularly relevant in light of Art. 16.5 of the IOC Anti-Doping Rules – which unambiguously states that such list of persons or organizations having standing to appeal “does not include Athletes, or their federations, who might benefit from having another competitor disqualified”. An application submitted to the CAS by a party having standing to appeal long after the time limit for the appeal had expired cannot be considered.

Mr. Tyler Hamilton is an American professional Athlete competing in the cycling Men's Individual Time Trial event and the Men's Road Race at the Athens 2004 Olympic Games.

Mr Viatcheslav Ekimov is a Russian professional Athlete competing at the Athens 2004 Olympic Games.

In August 2004 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete after his sample tested positive for blood doping. However the IOC Disciplinary Commission concluded on 23 September 2004 that no anti-doping rule violation was committed because the Athlete's B sample did not confirm the A sample.

Hereafter in October 2004 the Russian Olympic Committee (ROC) and the Athlete Viatcheslav Ekimov appealed the IOC Decision of 23 September 20014 with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The ROC and the Athlete requested the Panel to set aside the IOC decision and for the disqualification of the Athlete, including forfeiture of any medals, points and prizes won.
The Appellants contended that the new adverse analytical finding in respect of Mr Hamilton and the outcome of the related case would be relevant for the present procedure.

The Panel holds that the IOC Decision of 23 September 2004 falls under Art. 12.2 of the IOC Anti-Doping Rules and, thus, the CAS has jurisdiction to review it. However, a tribunal may have jurisdiction to decide a dispute, but it can only exercise that jurisdiction if the parties in front of it have standing to ask it to make the decision. Accordingly, the Panel must decide whether the Appellants are properly before it, i.e. whether they have locus standi to put the matter before the CAS under the IOC Anti-Doping Rules.

The Panel finds that both Appellants lack standing to appeal under Art. 12.2.2 of the IOC Anti-Doping Rules. As a result, the Panel may not entertain this appeal and must decline to adjudicate the case upon its merits.

On 27 June 2006 the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides:

1.) Mr Viatcheslav Ekimov and the Russian Olympic Committee have no standing to appeal against the decision issued on 23 September 2004 by the International Olympic Committee.

2.) The appeal filed by Mr Viatcheslav Ekimov and the Russian Olympic Committee on 14 October 2004 against the decision issued on 23 September 2004 by the International Olympic Committee is dismissed.

(…)