CAS 2005/A/828 Mr. Stefan Koubek v/ International Tennis Federation

On 18 Januari 2005 the ITF Anti-Doping Tribunal decided to impose a 3 month period of ineligibility on the tennis player Stefan Koubek after he tested positive for the prohibited substance Triamcinolone acetonide.

In first instance the Panel accepted that the violation was not intentional and the result of the medical treatment he underwent for his injury.

Hereafter in January 2005 the Athlete appealed the ITF decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The Athlete denied the intentional use of the substance and asserted that the imposed sanction wasn't admissible and appropriate. He argued that due to the medical treatment he underwent he acted with No Fault of Negligence.

The Sole Arbitrator assessed the Athlete's conduct in this case and establishes that the Athlete could and should have been
more serious in educating himself about anti-doping measures and more responsible in implementing what he had learnt.

The Sole Arbitrator agrees with the Anti-Doping Tribunal’s foregoing findings and considers the sanction of three months – compared to a possible maximum penalty of one year – to be reasonable given the Athlete’s attitude towards doping issues in general.

The Arbitrator deems that the Athlete disregarded  the rules of conduct required of tennis players in relation to the wallet cards and to act without any particular precaution when dealing with his doctor.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 13 April 2005:

1.) Dismisses the appeal filed by Stefan Koubek on 31 January 2005.

2.) Declares that the award is pronounced without costs, except for the Court Office fee of CHF 500 (five hundred Swiss Francs) already paid by the Appellant and to be retained by the CAS.

3.) Orders Stefan Koubek to pay an amount of CHF 2’500 (two thousand five hundred Swiss Francs) to the ITF as a contribution towards its costs.

CAS 2005/A/830 G. Squizzato v/ FINA
CAS 2005/A/830 S. v. FINA

• Swimming
• Doping (clostebol)
• Strict liability
• Duty of diligence
• Proportionality of the sanction

1. Under the FINA Doping Policy, an offence has been committed when it has been established that a prohibited substance was present in the athlete’s body. There is thus a legal presumption that the athlete is responsible for the mere presence of a prohibited substance. The burden of proof lies within FINA and its Member Federation to establish that an anti-doping rule violation has occurred.

2. An athlete fails to abide by his/her duty of diligence if, with a simple check, he/she could have realised that the medical product he/she was using contained a prohibited substance, the latter being indicated on the product itself both on the packaging and on the notice of use. Furthermore, it is indeed negligent for an athlete willing to compete in continental or world events to use a medical product without the advice of a doctor or, at the very least, a physiotherapist. However, if it appears that the athlete had no intention whatsoever to gain advantage towards the other competitors, his/her negligence in forgetting to check the content of the medical product can be considered as mild in comparison with an athlete that is using a doping product in order to gain such advantage. Accordingly, although it cannot be considered that the athlete bears no fault or negligence in such a case, it can be held that he/she bears no significant fault or negligence, which opens the door to a reduced sanction.

3. Substantial elements of the doctrine of proportionality have been implemented in the body of rules and regulations of many national and international sport federations by adopting the World Anti-Doping Code, which provides a mechanism for reducing or eliminating sanctions i.a. in cases of “no fault or negligence” or “no significant fault or negligence” on the part of the suspected athlete. However, the mere adoption of the WADA Code by a respective Federation does not force the conclusion that there is no other possibility for greater or lesser reduction of a sanction.

4. A mere “uncomfortable feeling” alone that a one year penalty is not the appropriate sanction cannot itself justify a reduction of the sanction. The individual circumstances of each case must always hold sway in determining any possible reduction. Nevertheless, the implementation of the principle of proportionality as given in the WADA Code closes more than ever before the door to reducing fixed sanctions. Therefore, the principle of proportionality would apply if the award were to constitute an attack on personal rights which was serious and totally disproportionate to the behaviour penalised.

In September 2004 the International Swimming Federation (FINA) has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete Gioriga Squizzato after her sample tested positive for the prohibited substance Clostebol. Consequently on 9 December the FINA Doping Panel decided to impose a 1 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete, starting on the date of the decision.

Hereafter in February 2005 the Athlete appealed the FINA decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). She requested the Panel to acquit her from the charge, or in any event, to reduce the sanction.

The Athlete argued that the violation was non intentional and acknowledged that she had used a cream to her foot as treatment for her skin condition which does not enhance her performance. On this basis, she claimed that she did not commit any fault, nor that she had been negligent.

The Panel finds that the Athlete indeed established how the prohibited substance had entered her system. However she failed to abide by her duty of diligence. With a simple check, she could have realised that the cream was containing a doping agent, as Clostebol is indicated on the product itself both on the packaging and on the notice of use. At least she could have asked her doctor, coach or any other competent person to double-check the contents of the cream bought by her mother.

As the Athlete was effectively suspended from 30 September 2004 onwards, the Panel is of the opinion that fairness requires that the sanction should not last more than one year and should therefore end on September 30, 2005. Therefore, as requested by the Athlete, the commencement of the sanction shall be September 30, 2004 and not December 9, 2004.

On 15 July 2005 the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides that:

1.) The appeal filed by the Athlete is partially upheld.

2.) The decision of the FINA is confirmed with the exception of the commencement of the sanction that shall be September 30, 2004.

(…)

CAS 2005/A/831 International Association of Athletics Federation (IAAF) v. Eddy Hellebuyck

Related cases:

• AAA No. 30 190 00686 04 USADA vs Eddy Hellebuyck
  December 9, 2004
• AAA No. 77 190 168 JENF USADA vs Eddy Hellebuyck
  January 30, 2012
  
  

• Athletics
• Doping (recombinant EPO)
• Reliability of the testing procedure used for detecting rhEPO
• Beginning of the period of ineligibility

1. A mere hypothetical possibility of false positives, i.e. pure speculation about the unreliability of the testing procedure, is, on its own, not sufficient for calling into question the reliability of the testing procedure. Rather evidence must be shown that the test procedure results are unreliable and that false positives occur. The threshold for this is high; for it must be taken into account that 1) the various WADA accredited laboratories already have extensive experience with the testing procedure; 2) there is a long jurisprudential basis for the acceptance of the testing procedure within the CAS and other dispute resolution Institutions in sport; 3) the validity of the testing procedure has been the subject of a number of studies that have been published in peer-reviewed journals and was also the subject of scrutiny at various scientific meetings.

2. If the athlete was able to continue to participate in competitions in the period between the taking of the sample and the hearing of his/her case, if it was within the athlete’s control to determine the commencement of the two-year suspension by accepting a “provisional suspension”, and if the athlete himself/herself contributed very significantly to the delay in the proceedings, then it cannot be said that he/she has suffered any legal disadvantages through the excessively long duration of the proceedings. Therefore, there are no compelling reasons of fairness which would justify an (unwritten) exception stating that the two-year sanction shall begin to run on the day on which the sample was taken, contrary to the clear and unambiguous wording of the applicable rule according to which the suspension shall start from the date of the hearing at which it is decided that the Doping Offence has been committed.

Mr Eddy Hellebuyck is an elite-level distance runner in the sport of track and field. He was born on 22 January 1961. He is a member of USA Track and Field (USATF) the national governing body of the sport of athletics in the United States of America.

USADA has reported an anti doping rule violation against the Athlete after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance recombinant human erythropoetin (rhEPO). After notification a provisional suspension was ordered.

The Athlete did not accept the provisional suspension and he participated in competitions during the entire period between the sample collection and the day he was heard for the North American Court of Arbitration for Sport (NACAS) on 30 November 2004.

On 9 December 2004 NACAS concluded that the Athlete violated the anti-doping rules and decided to impose 2 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete starting on 31 January 2004.

Hereafter in February 2005 te IAAF filed an appeal against NACAS’s decision with CAS. On 21 February 2005 the Athlete filed a motion to dismiss the IAAF appeal.
In its preliminary decision dated 4 July 2005 the CAS Panel rejected the Athlete’s motion to dismiss the IAAF appeal and ordered the Athlete to file his statements and objection’s.

The Athlete argued that the method adopted by the Laboratory to detect rhEPO has not been scientifically validated and the Athlete’s samples and the control samples were poorly stored.
The Athlete's questioned the commencement of the period of ineligibility.

Further he invoked the principle of lex mitior, in order to justify a commencement of the two-year sanction in derogation for Rule 60 (2)(a) of the former IAAF Rules.
Finally, the he is also invoked Art. 10.8 WADA in order to justify a different commencement date of the period of ineligibility from that required by Rule 60 (2)(a) of the former IAAF Rules.

The CAS Panel concludes that the Athlete has not established doubt about the reliability of the testing procedure. There is no evidence to establish that a false positive occurred. The Panel is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the Athlete’s sample contained rhEPO.

Therefore the Athlete’s counter appeal is dismissed. The Panel deems that there is no legal basis for a point in time other than 30 November 2004 as a commencement date for the two-year sanction.

The NACAS’s decision must therefore be set aside and the IAAF appeal is admissible. The two-year period of ineligibility begins on the date of the hearing before NACAS on 30 November 2004 and ends on 29 November 2006. Furthermore the Athlete’s competition results achieved from the date on which the sample was provided, until the date of the hearing, shall be annulled.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport Panel decides on 5 May 2006:

1.) Upon appeal by the IAAF, the decision of the NACAS dated 9 December 2004 is set aside.

2.) The Respondent, Eddy Hellebuyck, has committed an anti-doping rule violation under Rule 60 (2)(a) of the IAAF Rules 2002-2003.

3.) The Respondent is declared ineligible for a period of two years. The period of ineligibility commences on 30 November 2004 and ends upon expiry of 29 November 2006.

4.) Any competition results between the 31 January 2004 and the date of the hearing on 30 November 2004 are annulled under Rule 59 (4) of the IAAF Rules 2002-2003.

5.) The counter appeal by the Respondent is dismissed.

6.) The Award is rendered without costs except for the CAS Court Office fee of CHF 500, which is retained by the CAS.

7.) Each party shall bear its own costs.

CAS 200S/A/834 Dubin, Österreichischer Behindertensportverband & Austrian Paralympic Committee v/ IPC

In October 2004 the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Austrian Parathlete Wolfgang Dubin after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance Propylhexedrine.

The Athlete explained that he used for many years prescribed medication for his epilepsy while he was unaware that it contained a prohibited substance. The IPC concluded that the Athlete's violation was not intentional and that he had failed to apply for a TUE.

On 8 November 2004 the IPC decided on 8 November 2004 to impose a warning and a reprimand on the Athlete including disqualification of his results. Following the Athlete's appeal the IPC decided on 2 February 2005 to uphold its previous decision.

Hereafter in February 2005 the Athlete, the Austrian Paralympic Committe and the Austrian Anti-Doping Committee appealed the IPC Decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

Following assessment of the case the Panel determines that:

• The presence of a prohibited substance has been established in the Athlete's samples and accordingly he committed an anti-doping rule violation.
• The Athlete did not use the substance intentionally, but only as treatment to control his epilepsy.
• The IPC acted not in accordance with the WADA Code during the analysis of the Athlete's B sample while the IPC already rendered its decision and a press release.
• The substance Propylhexedrine was listed on the 2003 IOC Prohibited List, but was then removed in 2004 without any explanation by WADA.
• The Athlete nor his doctor were fully aware of the situation, due to the ambiguous listing / de-listing of substances on the 2003 and 2004 Prohibited Lists.
• The Athlete acted with No Fault or Negligence.
• No period of ineligibility has been imposed on the Athlete and the warning and reprimand are cancelled.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 8 February 2006:

1.) The Appeal filed on 21 February 2005 by Mr Dubin, the Austrian Paralympic Committee and the Austrian Anti-Doping Committee against the decision issued on 2 February 2005 by
which the appeal against the Decision of 8 November 2004 was dismissed is partially admitted.

2.) The Decision of the IPC Management Committee of 2 February 2005 is corrected in the sense that the waming and the reprimand imposed on the appellant Wolfgang Dubin are fully cancelled.

3.) The present arbitration procedure is rendered without costs, except for the CAS Court Office fee of CHF 500 (five hundred Swiss Francs) already paid by the Appellants which is retained by the CAS.

4.) The Respondent shall refund the CAS Court Office fee of CHF 500 (five hundred Swiss Francs) to the Appellants.

5.) Each party shall bear its own costs.

CAS 2005/A/847 Hans Knauss v. FIS

• Alpine skiing
• Doping (norandrosterone)
• Contaminated nutritional supplements
• Reduction of the sanction when the athlete both bears no significant fault or negligence and provides substantial assistance in establishing an anti-doping rule violation by another person
• Principle of proportionality

1. The risk of contamination and/or mislabelling in nutritional supplements cannot and shall not have remained ignored by an experienced athlete who has competed at the highest levels for many years taking into consideration the express warnings of numerous federations and anti-doping organisations that clearly and repeatedly over the past years have emphasized the risk of contamination and/or mislabelling in nutritional supplements. In such case, the standard of care required for “no fault or negligence”, namely utmost caution cannot be considered.

2. The requirements to be met by the qualifying element “no significant fault or negligence” must not be set excessively high. The higher the threshold is set, the less opportunity remains for differentiating meaningfully and fairly within the (rather wide) range of the period of ineligibility sanctioning the fault or negligence. But the low end of the threshold must also not be set too low; for otherwise the period of ineligibility of two years laid down for an anti-doping rule violation would form the exception rather than the general rule.

3. Linking the applicability of the rule providing for a reduced period of ineligibility in case of the athlete’s substantial assistance in establishing an anti-doping rule violation by another person to a formal criterion such as whether and to what extent a federation may or may not have jurisdiction over this other person or the facts disclosed by the athlete under the anti-doping rules of the federation is an arbitrary and unsuitable criterion for distinguishing conduct which is worthy of preferential treatment from other conduct which does not qualify for such treatment.

4. In the opinion of the Swiss Federal Tribunal, sports bodies can limit in their rules the circumstances to be taken into account when fixing sanctions and thereby also restrict the application of the doctrine of proportionality. However, the sport associations exceed their autonomy if these rules constitute an attack on personal rights, the nature and scope of which is extremely serious and totally disproportionate to the behaviour penalised.

In December 2004 the International Ski Federation (FIS) has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance 19-norandrosterone (Nandrolone). Consequently the FIS Panel decided on 1 March 2005 to impose an 18 month period of ineligbility on the Athlete.

In first instance the FIS Panel accepted that the Athlete did not act intentionally although he clearly acted negligently with the use of his supplements.

Analysis of the Athletes supplements showed that they were contaminated. Thereupon the Athlete had filed a criminal complaint against the importer of the nutritional supplement. This action resulted in a large amount of (contaminated) nutritional supplements being seized and confiscated.

Hereafter the Athlete appealed the FIS decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

Following assessment of the evidence in this case the Panel concludes that the Athlete did less rather than more than could be expected of him to minimise the risk associated with nutritional supplements about which he was warned, in particular, those originating from this company in question.

If one therefore weighs the efforts and precautions undertaken by the Athlete in their totality, they fall just under the threshold of “no significant fault or negligence”.

In the light of the particularities of the present case and the principle of proportionality, the Panel considers that the sanction of 18 months imposed by the FIS is fair and reasonable.

Therefore on 20 July 2005 The Court of Arbitration for Sport decides that:

1.) The appeal filed by Hans Knauss on 21 March 2003 is dismissed.

2.) The award is pronounced without costs, except for the Court Office fee of CHF 500.- already paid by the Athlete and which is retained by the CAS.

3.) Each party shall bear its own costs.

CAS 2005/A/872 Union Cycliste Internationale v. Federico Muñoz Fernandez & Federación Colombiana de Ciclismo

On 27 October 2004 Mr. Muñoz participated in the Vuelta a Guatemala where he was selected to supply a urine sample.
On 20 December 2004 the Union Cycling Union (UCI) reported an anti doping rule violation against Mr. Muñoz after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance recombinant human erythropoietin (rhEPO).

On 18 February 2005 The Federación Colombiana de Ciclismo (FCC) Disciplinary Committee concluded that Mr. Muñoz had violated the anti-doping rules and decided to impose a period of ineligibility of 18 months. The FCC did not disqualify Mr. Muñoz’s results from the Vuelta a Guatemala.

Mr. Muñoz appealed against this FCC Disciplinary Committee’s decision to the General Disciplinary Committee of the Colombian National Olympic Committee. On 21 April 2005 the Colombian National Olympic Committee declared the decision of the FCC Disciplinary Committee to by null and void, and remitted the matter to the FCC for re-hearing.

On 20 April 2005 the UCI appealed against the FCC Disciplinary Committee’s decision, dated 18 February 2005, to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). Both parties were heard for the Panel and filed their statements and documents in their defence.

Because it is an athlete’s responsibility to ensure that what enters into his body does not contain a prohibited substance, the Panel concluded Mr. Muñoz had to do more than simply rely on his doctor. He should attempt to obtain written confirmation from the doctor that the medicines he administered did not contain any prohibited substances.

It is essential that doctors who treat athlete play their full part in de waging of the fight against doping in sport. It can be no excuse for a doctor who is treating an athlete not to make himself familiar with the list of prohibited substances.

The Panel finds Mr. Muñoz took no precautions and must bear the responsibility for his failure. On the facts of this case the Panel cannot eliminate or reduce a 2 year sanction that must follow from Mr. Muñoz failure. That period will commence on 18 February 2005, the date of the FCC decision.

The Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 30 January 2006 that:

1.) The appeal by the Union Cycliste Internationale against the decision issued on 18 February 2005 by the Disciplinary Commission of the Federación Colombiana de Ciclismo is allowed.

2.) Mr. Muñoz is disqualified from the Vuelta a Guatemala and all of his results since 27 October 2004 are cancelled.

3.) Mr Federico Muñoz Fernandez is ineligible to compete in cycling races for two years from 18 February 2005 until 17 February 2007.

4.) This award is pronounced without costs, except for the court office fee of CHF 500 paid by the Union Cycliste Internationale, which is retained by the CAS.

5.) The Federación Colombiana de Ciclismo shall pay the Union Cycliste Internationale a contribution of CHF 5,000 towards the latter's legal and other costs relating to this arbitration.

CAS 2005/A/876 Adrian Mutu v/Chelsea Football Club

• Football
• Employment contract between a player and a club
• Admitted use of cocaine
• Unilateral breach of contract without just cause

There is no basis in the wording of the FIFA Regulations for a distinction between a player unlawfully walking out under a contract and another player who breaches his contract through other serious misconduct, like the player’s taking cocaine or committing a serious on or off the pitch offence which goes to the roots of his contract with his employer. The Player’s admitted use of cocaine constitutes the “unilateral breach without just cause” provided by the FIFA Regulations and triggers the consequences deriving thereof, no matter whether this breach causes the Club to give notice of termination or whether the Club continues to hold on to and insist upon performance of the contract despite the Player’s breach.

On 4 November 2004 the Disciplinary Commission of the Football Association (FA) decided to impose a fine and a period of ineligibility on the Romanian football player Adrian Mutu after he tested positive for the prohibited substance Cocaine.

The Athlete had admitted the violation and consequently the Football Associaton Premier League Appeals Committee (FAPLAC) deemed that the Chelsea Football Club was entitled to terminate the Player Contract. The Club also seeked compensation and for the imposition of further sport sanctions.

Hereafter the Athlete appealed the FAPLAC decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The Player acknowledged that his use of Cocaine was gross misconduct under his contract with the Club and amounted to a unilateral breach without just cause or sporting just cause for purposes of the FIFA Regulations.

The Club contends that any breach of contract which is serious enough to destabilize the contractual relationship can give rise to a claim for compensation under the Regulations.

The only issue for this Panel to decide is whether in the Player Contract the words “unilateral breach without just cause or sporting just cause” in Article 21 of the FIFA Regulations cover

• only cases in which a player “terminates” or “renounces” his contract, e.g. by walking out, as the Player contends, or
• also apply to other serious misconduct by the player as is argued by the Club.

Following assessment the Panel dismissed the Athlete's reasoning regarding the Breach and the distinction between different types of Breach.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 15 December 2005:

1.) The appeal filed by M. against the decision issued by the Football Association Premier League is dismissed.

2.) (...).

CAS 2005/A/884 Tyler Hamilton v. United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) & Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI)

Related cases:

• AAA No. 30 190 00130 05 USADA vs Tyler Hamilton - Awards & Dissenting Opinion
  April 18, 2005
• Affidavit Tyler Hamilton [USADA vs Lance Armstrong October 10, 2012]
  September 22, 2011
• CAS 2004_A_748 ROC & Viatcheslav Ekimov vs IOC, USOC & Tyler Hamilton
  June 27, 2006
• IOC 2012 IOC vs Tyler Hamilton
  August 10, 2012

• Cycling
• Doping (homologous blood transfusion, HBT)
• Proof by “any reliable means”
• Shifting of the burden of proof when a laboratory is not accredited for a particular test
• Reliability of the HBT test
• Starting date of the sanction

1. The proof of an anti-doping violation “by any reliable means” gives great leeway to anti-doping agencies to prove violations, so long as they can comfortably satisfy a tribunal that the means of proof is reliable. As a result, it is not even necessary that a violation be proven by a scientific test itself. Instead, a violation may be proved through admissions, testimony of witnesses, or other documentation evidencing a violation. As a consequence, WADA need not designate a specific test to prove that a doping violation has occurred. Rather, WADA and its accredited laboratories are free to develop tests based on appropriate scientific principles to demonstrate the existence of a prohibited substance or the use of a prohibited method. This flexibility necessarily provides WADA and other anti-doping organizations with the means to combat new forms of doping.

2. Anti-doping organisations are generally aided by the presumption that WADA-accredited laboratories are presumed to conduct sample analysis in accordance with international laboratory standards. However, when WADA has not specifically accredited the laboratory for a particular test, the burden shifts to the anti-doping organisation to prove that the test has been conducted in accordance with the scientific community’s practice and procedures and that the laboratory satisfied itself as the validity of the method before using it. If the particular test is valid, then the presumption returns and the athlete must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the testing was not conducted in accordance with international standards.

3. As the HBT test has been used for many years for important medical purposes and has been scientifically reliable, the methodology to be applied for testing of athletes has been published in peer reviewed articles which were deemed to provide “proof of principle”, and the test methodology has been validated and considered as fit for purpose according to ISO 17025 and WADA ISL, the HBT test must be considered as a valid and reliable test for determining the usage of the prohibited method of blood doping through homologous blood transfusion.

4. Delays in the completion of the proceeding constitute a reason of fairness to start the period of ineligibility at an earlier date than the date of the hearing decision, for example at the date of the voluntary acceptance by the athlete of his suspension from his team.

On 18 April 2005 the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Panel decided to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the cyclist Tyler Hamilton for the presence of transfused blood in his A and B blood samples which he provided in September 2004 in the Vuelta de España.

Hereafter in May 2005 the Athlete appealed the AAA decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The Athlete asserted that regarding the used test the validation studies of this brand new test were limited, incomplete and unsatisfactory. He also contested the reliability of the alleged positive findings in connection with the Vuelta sample.

The Panel considered the evidence and arguments in this case and finds:

• that the HBT test as applied to the Athlete’s Vuelta sample was reliable;
• that on 11 September 2004, his blood did contain two different red blood cell populations; and
• that such presence was caused by blood doping by homologous blood transfusion, a Prohibited Method under the UCI Rules.

In these circumstances the Panel finds that it is not necessary to consider USADA’s and UCI’s alternative submission based on the results of the other testing of the Athlete which was said to corroborate the accuracy of the Vuelta analysis.

The Panel also has given serious consideration to the history of the requests and production of documents both before the current appeal Panel and before the original AAA hearing and whilst there may be some concerns about the way in which documents have been produced the Panel finds that there was no concealment such as would cast doubt on the validity of the test.

the Panel concludes that the presence of a mixed blood population in the Athlete’s Vuelta sample as detected by the HBT test proves that the Athlete was engaged in blood doping, a Prohibited Method, that violated the UCI Anti-Doping Rules; Chapter II, article 15.2 and Chapter III, article 21.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 10 February 2006:

1.) The appeal filed by Mr Tyler Hamilton against the award dated 18 April 2005 rendered by the AAA Panel is dismissed.
2.) Mr Tyler Hamilton is ineligible to compete in cycling races for two years from 23 September 2004 until 22 September 2006.
3.) All questions of costs are reserved for consideration and will be the subject of a separate award.