CAS 2002/A/409 Longo / International Association of Athletic Federations (IAAF)

• Athletics
• Doping
• Application for early reinstatement
• CAS jurisdiction

1. The nature of the appealed decision should determine whether an appeal is possible within the meaning of art. 47 of the Code. The test should be whether the nature of the decision is disciplinary, irrespective of whether a judicial or an administrative authority has made the decision against which an appeal is directed.

2. A decision of the IAAF Council admitting an application for early reinstatement in case of exceptional circumstances (IAAF Rule 60.9) relates to the execution of a sanction, not to the sanction itself. Consequently, according to art. R47 of the Code, the CAS has no jurisdiction to review a decision of this nature.

3. A right of appeal against decision of the IAAF Council could be drawn from other IAAF rules than Rule 60.9, in particular Rules 21.2 & 21.3. However applications for reinstatement based on exceptional circumstances are not proceedings between two parties in the sense of IAAF Rule 21.2 and do not fall under the category of disputes listed in IAAF Rule 21.2. Therefore decision on reinstatement applications on the grounds of exceptional circumstances pursuant to IAAF Rule 60.9 cannot be appealed against by invoking the CAS.

On 29 November 2001 the Italian Federazione Italiana di Atletica Leggera (FIDAL) decided to impose a 2 year period of ineglibility on the Athlete Mr. Andrea Longo after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance Nandrolone. The FIDAL decision was upheld by the FIDAL Appeal Committee on 23 January 2002.

The Athlete did not appeal against the decision of the FIDAL’s appeal tribunal of 23 January 2002 to the CAS nor to the IAAF’s Arbitration Panel. On 13 April 2002, The Athlete, with the assistance of FIDAL, applied to the IAAF Council under IAAF Rule 60.9 for early reinstatement on the grounds of exceptional circumstances.

By letter dated 22 July 2002, The Athlete Mr. Andrea Longo was informed by FIDAL that the IAAF had rejected his application for early reinstatement.

Hereafter on 20 August 2002 the Athlete filed an appeal with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) against the decision of the IAAF Council of 3 and 4 July 2002 rejecting Mr. Andrea Longo’s application for early reinstatement.

The CAS Sole Arbitrator concludes that decisions of the IAAF Council on reinstatement applications on the grounds of exceptional circumstances pursuant to IAAF Rule 60.9 cannot be appealed against by invoking the CAS.

Therefore on 28 March 2003 The Court of Arbitration for Sport decides:

1.) The jurisdiction of the Court of Arbitration for Sport is denied.

2.) The appeal filed by Mr. Andrea Longo on 20 August 2002 is not entertained.

3.) (…).

CAS 2002/A/417 IAAF v/CADA & S. Witteveen

Ms. Solange Witteveen, is a world class high jumper and member of the Confederación Argentina de Atletismo (CADA).
The IAAF reported to CADA an anti-doping rule violation after
Witteveen’s A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance pemoline. The sample’s were provided at the South-American Championships in Manaus, Brazil, May 19, 2001.

After deliberations with the IAAF, CADA notified Witteveen of the doping violation and ordered a provisional suspension. Witteveen filled a statement in her defence and was heard for the CADA arbitral court.

Witteveen stated she did not take, at least voluntarily, any prohibited substance; all medication were provided by her personal physician; no medicine were taken without her physician’s consent and approval; and her previous doping controls in de last nine years tested negative.

On 20 June 2002, the CADA arbitral court in question decided that Ms Solange Witteveen was not guilty of a doping offence. One of the arbitrators, Dr. Juan Carlos Rivera, rendered a dessenting opinion.

On 21 August 2002, the decision of the arbitral court was sent to the IAAF by the President of CADA and received the same day by the IAAF. The lAAF determined to appeal the finding of the arbitral court in question, and filed its Statement of Appeal with the CAS on 1 October 2002.

The Court of Arbitration for Sport Panel considers for the following reasons that Ms Solange Witteveen has not established that her doping offense was unintentional:

• Pemoline is not found in any foodstuff and in principle can only be obtained on prescription.
• Consequently, Ms Solange Witteveen cannot have been contaminated through any food forming part of her ordinary diet.
• Ms Solange Witteveen herself ruled out the idea of an act of sabotage and has offered no evidence that an act of sabotage took place or might have been attempted.
• Ms Solange Witteveen has offered no evidence that her supplement was contaminated or that there was any risk that it be contaminated. For example, no evidence was offered that the chemist who prepared her supplement might have handled Pemoline and accidentally contaminated the supplement, whereas the testimony of both expert witnesses left the impression this was an unlikely occurrence in the circumstances.
• The only indication that Ms Solange Witteveen would not have resorted to taking Pemoline is constituted by her active participation in events against doping and her past choice of spontaneously subjecting herself to doping tests on certain occasions.

However, the Panel considers such factors insufficient to prove her innocence given the lack of evidence of any form of contamination or act of sabotage and the unlikelihood of either having occurred.
The fact that Ms Solange Witteveen could have stopped jumping after winning the event instead of continuing to jump to beat her own record with the certitude of being tested is not in itself a convincing argument, since experience teaches that when medals and/or new records are at stake athletes often underestimate or accept the risk of a test.
Consequently, the Panel considers that the Appellant's decision to apply the fixed sanction of lAAF Rule 60.1l(i)(a) is well founded. The referred decision was in error due to the failure to correctly apply the relevant lAAF rules.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 12 May 2003 that:

1.) The appeal filed by the International Association of Athletics Federations (lAAF) on 1 October 2002 is upheld.

2.) The decision issued by the Confederación Argentina de Atletismo (CADA) on 28 June 2002 is annulled.

3.) The following sanction is imposed on Solange Witteveen:
suspension of two years starting from 11 March 2003; after deduction of the served period of ineligibility of one year, seven months and twenty-four days, such suspension shall last until 17 July 2003, inclusive.

TAS 2002/A/431 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) c. R. & Fédération Française de Cyclisme (FFC)

Related case:

Swiss Federal Court 4P.149_2003 R vs UCI, FFC & CAS
October 31, 2003

In May 2002 the International Cycling Union (UCI) has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete R. after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substances methylamphetamine, parahydroxyamphetamine, d'amphetamine and bétamethasone.

The French Cycling Federation (FFC), notified the Athlete and ruled on 8 October 2002 that the presence of a prohibited substance was established. However it decided not to sanction the Athlete due to the FFC ruled that the circumstances of the sample collection were an infringement of the French public order.

Hereafter in November 2002 the UCI appealed the FFC decision of 8 October 2002 with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The CAS Panel rejected the Athlete’s argument that after signing the FFC sport licence he did not accept the CAS jurisdiction to appeal a case. The Panel also ruled that the circumstances related to the Athlete’s sample collection were not a breach of the French public order.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport ruled that:

1.) the UCI appeal of 22 November 2002 is upheld;

2.) the Decision of the French Cycling Federation of 8 October 2002 is set aside;

3.) Due to this is Athlete’s second violation, he is sanctioned with a 4 year period of ineligibility and a fine of CHF 4000, -

4.) The suspension starts on the date of notification of this decision.

CAS 2002/A/432 D. / Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA)

• Swimming
• Doping (nandrolone)
• FINA’s competence to initiate disciplinary proceedings
• Strict liability
• Negligence of the athlete
• Prohibition of the reformatio in pejus
• Future implementation of the World Anti-doping Code: consequences on the sanctions

1. In accordance with the FINA Rules, a review by the FINA Doping Panel of a decision rendered by a member federation can be ordered by the Executive if it “believes” that the member federation has not followed the applicable FINA Rules. The requirement for such review is the belief that an erroneous application of the FINA Rules has, firstly, been committed and, secondly, that the erroneous application was committed by the member federation. Concerning the belief of an erroneous application of the FINA Rules, the CAS holds that such an evaluation lies within the sole judgment of the FINA Executive and that the Panel has no authority to review the Executive’s exercise of such judgment.

2. If an athlete who competes under the influence of a prohibited substance in his body is permitted to exculpate and reinstate himself in competition by merely pleading that he has been made the unwitting victim of his or her physician’s (or coaches) mistake, malfeasance or malicious intent, the war against doping in sports will suffer a severe defeat. It is the trust and reliance of clean athletes in clean sports, not the trust and reliance of athletes in their physicians and coaches which merits the highest priority in the weighing of the issues in the case at hand. If such a defence were permitted in the rules of sport competition, it is clear that the majority of doped athletes will seek refuge in the spurious argument that he or she had no control over the condition of his or her body.

3. The CAS applies the principle of the prohibition of the reformatio in pejus according to which the appeal body can modify the decision that is contested only in the interest of the appellant, without prejudice for him. There are exceptions to this principle: 1) if the appeal body must rule on the application of statutory laws, applicable ex officio, that body will be bound to deliver a decision which complies with the applicable law; 2) if the respondent lodges a counter-appeal, then the appeal body is bound to consider the claims of the respondent which, if they are granted, may result in even more prejudice to the appellant.

In September 2003 Κολυμβητική Ομοσπονδία Ελλάδος (KOE), the Hellenic Swimming Federation, has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete D. after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substances 19-norandrosterone (nandrolone) and lidocaine.

Thereupon the Board of Directors of the Hellenic Swimming Federation sanctioned the Athlete with a lifetime ineligibility which was reformed by the Supreme Sports Arbitration Council to a 20 month period of ineligibility after the Athlete had filed an appeal.

Reffered to the FINA the Doping Panel decided on 26 September 2002 to impose a 4 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete including disqualification of all results achieved between March and September 2002. Hereafter the Athlete appealed the FINA decision of 26 September 2002 with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The Athlete disputed the jurisdiction of the FINA Doping Panel and stated that he trusted his coach that the administered injections were food supplements.

Considering the Athlete’s own statements and those of the experts, the Panel is unable to draw a final conclusion regarding the origin of the prohibited substances found in the Athlete’s body fluids, but does not exclude the possibility that the injection administered by his coach was the cause.

Having said that, however, the Panel takes the position that the Athlete clearly acted with negligence in not specifically queried both his physician and his coach regarding the identity of the substances which were administered to him.

The Panel finds that the imposed 4 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete must be shortened within the framework of such transitional rules to harmonize with the shorter sanctions under the WADC rules.

If, on the date upon which the WADC rules become effective, the remaining term of ineligibility of an athlete sentenced under the former FINA rules exceeds two years, FINA must carefully review whether any time served by the Athlete under the former FINA penalty should be credited to the term he would serve, if he had been sentenced under the new WADC rules.

The Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 27 May 2003:

1.) The appeal filed by D. on November 25, 2002 is dismissed.

2.) The decision of the FINA Doping Panel dated September 26, 2002 is confirmed.

3.) (...)

TAS 2002/O/373 COC & Scott v/IOC
CAS 2002/O/373 Canadian Olympic Committee (COC) & Beckie Scott / International Olympic Committee (IOC)

• Olympic Winter Games Cross-country skiing
• Standing to challenge a decision even if the claimant was not a party in the first instance
• Exclusion of the Olympic Games
• Interpretation of the Olympic Charter

1. In Swiss civil procedural law, the basic principle is that a claimant has standing to sue and the claim is admissible providing the person is invoking a substantive right of its own, i.e. a right deriving from contract, tort or another source. Gaining an Olympic medal is one of the ultimate goals in a star athlete’s career, which can bring with it many fruits, thereby giving her/him a very particular interest in challenging a decision if the modification of the decision could allow her/him to obtain a gold medal or a medal she/he did not get.

2. The interpretation of Rule 25 §2.2.1 of the Olympic Charter (“In case of exclusion from the Games…any medals or diplomas obtained shall be returned to the IOC”) is that the exclusion of an athlete under this provision must always be combined with the disqualification of the sanctioned athlete from all the competitions in which she/he participated during the games and by the forfeiture of all related medals.

On 15 February 2002, Olga Danilova, Larissa Lazutina and Beckie Scott competed in the women’s 5 km pursuit cross-country skiing competition at the 2002 Salt Lake City 2002 Olympic Winter Games. They placed first, second and third respectively, with Beckie Scott receiving the bronze medal.

Prior to the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Winter Games, in two post-competition doping controls on 8 and 20 December 2001, Larissa Lazutina tested positive for the banned substance Darbepoetin.

Larissa Lazutina nevertheless took part in the Salt Lake City 2002 Olympic Winter Games because the International Ski Federation (FIS) only imposed its sanction - a two-year suspension effective 8 December 2001- in June 2002 after the Games.

In February 2002 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Russian Athlete Olaga Danilova after her sample tested positive for the prohibited substance Darbepoetin (dEPO). On 24 February 2002 the IOC Disciplinary Commission disqualified the athlete Olga Danilova and excluded her from the 2002 Olympic Winter Games.

In June 2002, due to Larissa Lazutina’s positive testing prior to the Olympic Games, the FIS suspended her from competition from 8 December 2001 to 7 December 2003.
Accordingly, on 29 June 2003, the IOC’s Executive Board announced its decision to annul all the results of Larissa Lazutina obtained at the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Winter Games.

The affect of the above decisions upon Beckie Scott is that she would receive the silver medal in the women’s 5 km free pursuit cross-country skiing competition at the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Winter Games. However, Beckie Scott considers she is entitled to receive the gold medal in such event because Olga Danilova should have had all her medals withdrawn, including the silver medal obtained in the women’s 5 km pursuit cross-country skiing competition.

Consequently, the COC and Beckie Scott decided to challenge the IOC’s decision of 24 February 2002 and filed their claim with CAS.

The CAS Panel considers that it necessarily follows from the IOC Executive Board’s decision to exclude Olga Danilova from the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Games that she be disqualified from all the competitions she participated in and that all her corresponding medals be forfeited.

Because Beckie Scott is waiting to receive the medal she is entitled to, the Panel considers the IOC must render its new decision as soon as possible. However, in order to leave the IOC sufficient time to prepare its new decision and since the scheduled date for the next meeting of its Executive Board is the end of February 2004, the Panel considers 15 March 2004 to be an appropriate deadline within which the new decision must be rendered.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides unanimously on 18 December 2003:

1.) The request for relief filed by Beckie Scott on 30 June 2003 is admitted.

2.) The request for relief filed by the Canadian Olympic Committee on 30 June 2003 is rejected.

3.) The decision of 24 February 2002 issued by the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee is annulled.

4.) The matter in dispute is remitted to the Executive Board of the International Olympic Committee with the order for it to render a new decision, by 15 March 2004, whereby in effect the IOC:

- i. Confirms the exclusion of Olga Danilova from the XIX Olympic Winter Games of Salt Lake City 2002.

- ii. Disqualifies Olga Danilova from all the cross-country skiing competitions in which she participated at the XIX Olympic Winter Games of Salt Lake City 2002.

- iii. Annuls all the results obtained by Olga Danilova at the XIX Olympic Winter Games of Salt Lake City 2002.

- iv. Gives the necessary orders and takes the measures required to withdraw all the medals obtained by Olga Danilova at the XIX Olympic Winter Games of Salt Lake City 2002.

- v. Gives the necessary orders and takes the measures required to amend accordingly the rankings in the women’s 5 km free pursuit cross-country skiing competition at the 2002 Salt Lake City Olympic Winter Games, in which Olga Danilova participated; ensuring in particular that Beckie Scott is ranked first and awarded the Olympic gold medal in the foregoing competition.

5.) (...).

CAS 2002/O/401 IAAF vs USATF

CAS 2002/O/401 International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF) / USA Track & Field (USATF)

• Athletics
• Interpretation of the IAAF rules
• Obligation for USATF to furnish the results of positive tests to the IAAF
• Validity of the USATF confidentiality regulation

1. The IAAF Rules are to be read as resolutions adopted by and binding upon all Members, including USATF. Where the rules and regulations of a Member do not conform with or are wider than those of the IAAF, it is the latter which prevail. The IAAF Rules during the relevant period did require that USATF provide the IAAF with the results of positive tests and copies of decisions of domestic panels exonerating athletes of doping offences, as well as related material.

2. The Panel finds that there are valid reasons why the information which the IAAF seeks in relation to the thirteen athletes concerned with this arbitration need not be disclosed to it by USATF. Although the meaning of the IAAF Rules remains relevant, the Panel‟s answer turns on the facts and circumstances. A very telling circumstance is the IAAF‟s persistent inability, or simple failure, or, indeed, refusal, throughout the period 1996 to 2000 to identify the particular IAAF Rules allegedly violated by USATF‟s confidentiality policy, to articulate clearly a position concerning the supposed illegitimacy of that confidentiality policy or to take some positive action against USATF to compel disclosure. It allowed the issue to drag on for years leading USATF to believe that it had discretion to make contractual promises of confidentiality to those athletes it tested domestically.

3. Support for USATF‟s position can be found in various CAS decisions, including the AEK Athens case, in which it is enunciated that “Where the conduct of one party has led to legitimate expectations on the part of a second party, the first party is estopped from changing its course of action to the detriment of the second party”. The concept of legitimate expectations – more particularly, the concept of protecting athletes‟ legitimate expectations – has repeatedly been recognized by the CAS, for example, in the USA Shooting, Watt and Prusis. Underlying all these decisions lies the notion of fairness.

4. The unique facts and circumstances of this case constitute a valid and compelling reason why USATF should not be required to disclose the information in question to the IAAF, notwithstanding the proper interpretation of the relevant IAAF Rules.

On 29 September 2000, further to allegations made during the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, Australia, that USATF "had concealed information about US athletes who may have tested positive for the use of performance enhancing drugs," USATF appointed an Independent Review Commission, chaired by Professor Richard McLaren (the "McLaren Commission") which issued its report on 11 July 2001.

The second circumstance to be noted concerns the transfer by USATF of all responsibility for doping control and related disciplinary proceedings to the independent United Sates Anti-Doping Agency ("USADA") in October 2000. Since that time, it is USADA, not USATF, which tests athletes both in and out-of-competition, analyses the results, notifies athletes of positive tests and adjudicates such disputes as may arise; and unlike the USATF regulation previously in force, USADA's Protocol for Olympic Movement Testing provides for disclosure of domestic drug tests to the IAAF during the adjudicative process.

(A) The IAAF are in dispute with USATF over the obligation of USATF under IAAF Rules to disclose to the IAAF the results of "positive tests" conducted by or on behalf of USATF; to disclose the determinations of Hearing Panels convened by USATF in cases where athletes have been exonerated of a Doping Offence; and to disclose the material underlying such positive results and/or determinations of
USATF Hearing Panels.

(B) The IAAF contends that it requires such information in order to decide whether or not to exercise its power under IAAF Rule 21.3(ii) to refer such cases for review by its Arbitration Panel (or CAS), where the IAAF believes in the conduct or conclusions of such a hearing the relevant tribunal of the Member has misdirected itself or otherwise reached an erroneous conclusion.

(C) USATF contends that disclosure of domestic doping control results is not required by IAAF Rules or any other legal constraints, and is neither required nor permitted by the US laws, rules, regulations and agreements to which USATF is subject. USATF also contends that in any event the information requested by the IAAF cannot be disclosed because it would violate the legal and personal rights of the athlete. USATF further contends that the IAAF has no authority to review such domestic doping control cases.

(D) The dispute relates to a failure by USATF to disclose the information in (A) above during the period 1 October 1996 to a date to be determined by mutual agreement of the parties.

(E) The facts will be set out in the Statements of Case to be filed by the parties to the dispute.

In the opinion of the CAS Panel, based on its appreciation of the evidence as a whole, the unique facts and circumstances of this case constitute a valid and compelling reason why USATF should not be required to disclose the information in question to the IAAF, notwithstanding the proper interpretation of the relevant IAAF Rules. In the circumstances, and as requested by USATF, the Panel explicitly refrains from applying the relevant IAAF Rules, as interpreted, to the thirteen cases at issue in these proceedings.

Therefore on 10 January 2003 the Panel decides and orders as follows, unanimously with respect to the first question and by majority with respect to the second question and the issue of costs:

1. QUESTION (i) set out in paragraph 1.1 of the Arbitration Agreement dated 10 July 2002 is answered in the affirmative;

2. QUESTION (ii) set out in paragraph 1.1 of the Arbitration Agreement dated 10 July 2002 is also answered in the affirmative;

3. The costs of the arbitration up to the date of the present award, which will be calculated later by the CAS Court Office, shall be shared equally by the parties.

4. Each party shall bear all of its own legal and other costs incurred in connection with this arbitration.

The issues to be resolved between IAAF and USATF by the CAS Panel are simply stated in the Arbitration Agreement:

1.1 The IAAF and USATF agree to submit to arbitration the following issues:

(i) properly construed, at all material times did IAAF Rules provide that USATF was obliged:

(a) to furnish the results of positive tests to the IAAF;

(b) to provide the IAAF with copies of decisions of USATF Hearing Panels exonerating athletes of Doping Offences, and

(c) to provide the IAAF with the material it needs to decide whether or not to seek to have a Hearing Panel's decision reviewed by its own Arbitration Panel or CAS?

(ii) if IAAF Rules did so provide, is there any valid reason why USATF should not be required to comply with these Rules?

CAS 2003/A/441 Kryxa v/PZLA

In June 2002 the Polish Athletic Federation (PZLA) has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete Violetta Kryza after her A and B samples, collected in the USA in May 2002, tested positive for the prohibited substances 19-norandrosterone and 19-noretiocholanolone (Nandrolone).

On 26 September the PZLA Disciplinary Committee decided to impose a reprimand on the Athlete. After notification of the PZLA reprimand the IAAF informed the PZLA that the appropriate minimum penalty under the IAAF Rules is two years and asked the PZLA to reconsider the matter.

Because the PZLA Disciplinary Committee failed to respond the PZLA Council decided to appeal this case with the PAA Board which imposed on 11 December 2002 a two year period of ingeligibility on the Athlete. Yet, a PAA hearing was held without notificaton to the Athlete and the decision was communicated to her afterwards.

Hereafter in December 2002 the Athlete filed an appeal with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The CAS Panel finds that the failure to afford Ms Kryza a hearing on the 11 December 2002, or even to notify her that a hearing was to take place, was a serious lapse on the part of the PZLA. In addition, it was a breach of the IAAf Rules and of the principle of' "audi alteram partem".

However, in the particular circumstances of this case, and hearing in mind that Ms Kryza did not challenge the test results, which showed the presence of norandrosterone in the concentration alleged, but has, on this appeal, relied simply on the procedural lapses by the IAAF to protest timeously and PZLA's failure to notify her of the 11 December 2002 hearing, the Panel concludes albeit with considerable regret, that had Ms Kryza been affofded a hearing, it would have been inevitable that the mandatory minimum 2 year suspension would be imposed.

The Panel concludes that no substantial injustice has been done to Ms Kryza as a result of the failure to afford her a hearing.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sports decides on 13 August 2003:

1.) The appeal filed by Violetta Kryza on 9 February 2003 is dismissed.

2.) The Court Office fee of CHF 500 (five hundred Swiss Francs) already paid by the Appellant shall be retained by the CAS.

3.) Each party shall beat its own costs.

CAS 2003/A/442 Fédération Française d’Escrime (FFE) / Fédération Internationale d’Escrime (FIE)

TAS 2003/A/442, Fédération Française d’Escrime (FFE) / Fédération Internationale d’Escrime (FIE)

• Fencing
• Doping
• Retroactive Suspension inposed on Athlete
• Disqualification and withdrawal of points from the team of the suspended athlete

1. According to its jurisprudence, CAS must decide within the frameword of sport law and can’t invent sanctions when they don’t exist. In other words, when the regulatory texts define the sanctions and their conditions of application to specific facts, the principle of strict interpretation must be respected in all its rigor by sports bodies and also by CAS. The possibility provided in a disposition of the FIE Technical Rules to apply the "appropriate rules" can not by itself constitute a sufficient legal basis. The literal and systematic interpretation of this disposition does not lead to the conclusion that it allows the FIE a complete blanc sign, for adopting an infinite possibility of new rules to situations at its discretion. This disposition can only refer to existing rules and provisions anywhere else.

2. If, in general, disqualification constitutes an automatic sports sanction of a competitor or his team, in the case of an individual or collective anti-doping violation, with the aim of avoiding unequal remedy between the athletes or their teams, the suspension constitutes a disciplinary sanction repressing the individual behavior of an athlete. The disqualification of a team from a competition due to the positive control of one of its members, automatic sports measure expressly according to provisions in the FIE Rules, is therefore perfectly admissible and coherent. On the other hand, the justification of imposing the same automatic sporting sanction on a team, that would have participated in a competition when the athlete was not suspended and who was not informed about the positive doping control, due to the athlete is later suspended retroactively. Such a sanction can certainly not be imposed in the absence of an explicit and clear legal basis.

On 15 January 2003 the Disciplinary Tribunal of the International Fencing Federation (FIE) decided to impose on the French fencer L. a 10 month period of ineligiblility, starting on 16 June 2002, and a € 500,- fine, after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance 19-norandrosterone.

As a consequence of the violation the results of the French fencing team obtained in competitions was annulled with retroactive effect from 16 June 2002.
The French Fencing Federation (FFE) asserted to FIE that the decision to annul the results of the French Fencing was invalid under the FIE Anti-Doping Rules and also under the IOC Anti-Doping Rules. However the FIE decided in January 2003 to uphold the annulment.

Hereafter in February 2003 the FFE appealed the FIE decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The FFE considered it acceptable that the results were lost of the competitions where the Athlete L. competed but argued that the team should not be disqualified from the competitions were no member of the French team was tested.

The Court of Arbitration for Sport accepts the FFE appeal and concludes that there is no legal basis for the FEI sanction against the French fencing team. Therefore the Panel decides on 19 August 2003 that the disqualification of the results of two competitions must be cancelled.