CAS 2008/A/1545 Andrea Anderson, LaTasha Colander Clark, Jearl Miles-Clark, Torri Edwards, Chryste Gaines, Monique Hennagan, Passion Richardson v/ IOC

Ms Andrea Anderson, Ms LaTasha Colander Clark, Ms Jearl Miles-Clark, Ms Torri Edwards, Ms Chryste Gaines, Ms Monique Hennagan and Ms Passion Richardson are all track and field athletes from the United States of America. The Athletes participated in the Sydney Olympic Games in 2000 as members
of the U.S. Olympic team sent by the United States Olympic Committee (USOC).

The issue to be solved in this case is whether, under the applicable rules in force at the time of the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, the results obtained by the US track and field
teams in the women’s 4×100m and 4×400m relay events should be annulled and the medals withdrawn from those teams because one team member – Ms Marion Jones –
has been subsequently disqualified due to an admitted anti-doping rule violation.

Following investigations the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) reported in 2003 that the Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO) was involved in a conspiracy for the purpose of the distribution and use of doping substances and techniques. These substances were either undetectable or difficult to detect in routine drug testing.

BALCO is alleged to have distributed several types of banned doping agents to professional athletes in track and field, baseball and football. Thereupon multiple athlete's were charged and convicted for the use of various performance-enhancing drugs.

Consequently on 10 April 2008 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) decided to disqualify the USOC women relay teams and their results obtained at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games because of their use of prohibited substances provided by BALCO.

Hereafter in April 2008 the Athlete appealed the IOC decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The Athletes requested the Panel to set aside the Appealed Decision and to reverse the disqualifcation of their results obtained at the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games.

The Athletes argue that the IOC violated their rights to due process, fundamental fairness and natural justice through proceedings conducted in violation of the Olympic Charter.

In particular, according to the Athletes, the IOC knowingly and repeatedly disregarded the Olympic Charter and violated their right to be heard in the following ways:

• a) the IOC consistently refused to acquaint the Athletes with the charges and evidence against them;
• b) the Athletes were not granted any meaningful opportunity to tender a defence, in writing or in person;
• c) the IOC Disciplinary Commission and Executive Board were composed of individuals who had prejudged the matter, as demonstrated by some public statements;
• d) the Executive Board never adopted a valid decision.

Following assessment of the case the Panel determines that at the time of the Sydney Olympic Games there was no express IOC rule or IAAF rule that clearly allowed the IOC to annul the relay team results if one team member was found to have committed a doping offence.

As a result, the Panel is unanimously of the opinion that, on the basis of the IOC and IAAF rules applicable at the time of the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, the Appealed Decision taken by the IOC Executive Board on 10 April 2008 is incorrect and must be set aside. The Panel reaches this conclusion with all due respect to the IOC Executive Board and its fundamental role under the Olympic Charter.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 16 Juy 2010:

1.) The appeal filed by the Appellants Ms Andrea Anderson, Ms LaTasha Colander Clark, Ms Jearl Miles-Clark, Ms Torri Edwards, Ms Chryste Gaines, Ms Monique Hennagan and Ms Passion Richardson on 30 April 2008 is upheld.

2.) The Decision of the IOC Executive Board dated 10 April 2008 is hereby set aside.

3.) On the basis of the IOC and IAAF Rules in force and applicable at the time of the 2000 Sydney Olympic Games, the United States’ teams that competed in the women’s 4×100m and 4×400m athletics relay events at those Games shall not be disqualified; the medals and diplomas awarded to the above noted Appellants in those events shall not be returned to the IOC.

4.) All other requests, motions or prayers for relief are dismissed.

5.) The award is pronounced without costs, except for the Court Office fee of CHF 500.- already paid by the Appellants and which is retained by the CAS.

6.) The IOC shall pay a global amount of CHF 10’000.- to the above noted Appellants as contribution towards their expenses incurred in this arbitration.

TAS 2009/A/2018 Davide Rebellin c. CIO

CAS 2009/A/2018 Davide Rebellin vs IOC

Related case:

IOC 2009 IOC vs Davide Rebellin
November 17, 2009


Mr. Davide Rebellin is an Italian cyclist who competed at the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games.

In January 2009 the International Olympic Committee (IOC) decided to perform further testing on the Athlete’s samples collected during the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, due to a fully validated test to detect CERA became available. In April 2009 Thereupon the IOC reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete after his 2008 A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance CERA.

After notification by the IOC in April 2009 the Athlete file a statement in his defence and was heard for the IOC Disciplinary Commission. The Cyclist stated he had used medication, supplements and vitamins prior to the Olympic Games and alleged in his defence that the burden of proof has not been met.

The IOC Disciplinary Commission finds that no departure from the ISL occurred in this case and concludes that the Athlete has committed an anti-doping rule violation.
On 17 November 2009 the IOC Executive Board, recommended by the IOC Disciplinary Commission, decides that:

1.) the Athlete be disqualified from the Men’s Cycling Road event of the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, where he had placed 2nd.;
2.) shall have his medal and diploma in the above-mentioned event withdrawn.
3.) The Union Cycliste International (UCI) is requested to modify the results of the abovementioned event accordingly and to consider any further action within its own competence.
4.) The National Olympic Committee of Italy (CONI) is ordered to return to the IOC, as soon as possible, the medal and diploma awarded to the Athlete in relation to the abovementioned event.
5.) The NOC of Italy shall ensure full implementation of this decision.
6.) This decision shall enter into force immediately.

Hereafter the Athlete appealed the IOC decision of 17 November 2009 with the Court of Arbitration for Sport. The Athlete disputed the reliability of the sample storage and testing which the IOC rejected in their reply.

Considering the evidence the Panel finds that the conducted tests on the Athlete’s samples in 2008 and 2009 are valid and concludes that the Athlete failed to establish that there has been a departure of the IST and ISL. The Panel concludes that the Athlete committed an anti-doping rule violation due to the positive test result.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport Panel decides on 30 July 2010 to dismiss the Athlete’s appeal and to uphold the IOC decision of 17 November 2009.

CAS 2007/A/1283 WADA v/ASADA & AWF & Karapetyn

In February 2007 the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA) reported an anti-doping rule violation against the weightlifter Alex Karapetyn for the use of the prohibited substance Benzylpiperazine.

Consequently ASADA decided on 5 April 2007 to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete. Because of the principle of fairness ASADA determined not to disqualify the Athlete's results obtained between 27 June 2005 and 22 March 2006.

Hereafter in April 2007 the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) appealed the ASADA Decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The primary issue for the Panel to determine is whether Mr. Karapetyn's individual results in all competitions subsequent to the Mermet Cup of 24-26 June 2005 should be disqualified, under article 13.8 of the Policy.

The Panel finds that there is no basis to WADA's assertion that Mr Karapetyn was not actually sanctioned because of the combination of Mr Karapetyns results not being disqualified between 26 June 2005 and the commencement of his period of ineligibiliity and his ineligibility period commencing after he elected to cease competing.

In fact, Mr Karapetyn ceased competing upon learning of the ASADA investigation, nor can he make a living as a professional weightlifter as he had done previously. This can most certainly be deemed a sanction.

Furthermore, the sanction eliminates his participation in the sport as a coach, trainer or in any other capacity. Those are real and continuing sanctions even if the athlete has no intention of competing in the future.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 15 November 2007:

1.) The apeal filed by WADA on 4 May 2007, against a decision of ASADA dated 5 April 2007, is dismissed.

2.) The award Is pronounced without costs, except for the Court Office fee of CHF 500 (five hundred Swiss francs) already paid by the Appellant and to be retained by the CAS.

3.) WADA shall contribute CHF 6,000 (six thousand Swiss francs) towards the legal costs incuired by ASADA in connection with this appeal. WADA, the AWF and Mr Karapetyn shall each bear their own costs.

CAS 2005/A/908 World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) v. Coetzee Wium

• Paralympic powerlifting
• Doping (testosterone)
• Departures from standards with regard to transportation, collection and testing
• Burden to establish the cause of the Adverse Analytical Finding
• Standard of proof required by CAS

1. In a case where departures from the WADC International Standard for Testing and/or the WADA Technical Documents for Laboratory Analysis are established, the question a CAS panel has to answer is: “Do these deviations cast sufficient doubt on the reliability of the test results to an extent that the finding of a Prohibited Substance in the athlete’s urine was not sufficient to establish a doping offence to the comfortable satisfaction of the Panel”?

2. If an athlete establish that departures occurred during transportation, collection and/or testing, then the Anti-Doping Organisation shall have the burden to establish that such departures did not cause the Adverse Analytical Finding.

3. The standard of proof required by CAS in all such cases is comfortable satisfaction, that is, greater than mere balance of probability but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

On 14 March 2005 the IPC Anti-Doping Committee decided to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the South African Parathlete Coetzee Wium after he tested positive for the prohibited substance Testosterone with a T/A ratio above the WADA threshold.

Thereupon on 2 May 2005 the IPC Management Committee decided to reinstate the Parathlete because a significant departure of the ISTI had occurred.

The IPC deemed that the chain of custody was broken because following the sample collection the Parathlete's samples were left unattended for 45 minutes, during which time they sealed Berlinger Test Kit had been moved around by a cleaning lady. Accordingly the IPC could not establish, on the balance of probabilities, that these events had not caused the Adverse Analytical Finding.

Hereafter in June 2005 the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) appealed the IPC Decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). WADA requested the Panel to set aside the Appealed Decision and to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete.

The Parathlete asserted that departures from standards occurred with regard to transportation, collection and testing. He argued that the case was conducted far away from standards.

WADA admitted that a departure from standards did occur, but holds that this was of minor significance and that, by no means, did this departure have any impact on the result of the IPC establishing an Adverse Analytical Finding for Testosterone in the Parathlete’s sample.

Following assessment of the evidence the Panel determines that:

• The delayd pick-up by DHL of the Athlete's samples resulting in a delay of one day could not cast any doubt on the reliability of test results under the given circumstances.
• The athlete could not rebut the presumption that a WADA-accredited laboratory conducted Sample Analysis and custodial procedures in accordance with the WADC International Standard for Laboratories.
• No departure from the International Standard, which would undermine the validity of the Adverse Analytical Finding, was established, once the exogenous origin of the Prohibited Substance had become clear.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 25 November 2005 that:

1.) The appeal filed by WADA on 21 June 2005 is upheld.

2.) The decision of the IPC Management Committee of 2 May 2005 is annulled.

3.) Coetzee Wium is sanctioned under art. 12.2 IPC Anti-Doping Code by a two (2) years ineligibility period, which starts on the date of this decision. The period of suspension from 13 December 2004 – 2 May 2005 shall be credited against the total period of ineligibility to be served.

4.) Coetzee Wium is sanctioned under art. 12.7 IPC Anti-Doping Code by the disqualification of all competitive results obtained by Coetzee Wium from 13 December 2004. This includes forfeiture of any medals, points and prizes.

(…).

CAS 200I/A/317 Aanes v/FILA

CAS 2001/A/317 A. / Fédération Internationale de Luttes Associées (FILA)

• Wrestling
• Doping (nandrolone)
• Use of nutritional supplements
• Strict Liability Rule
• Mitigating circumstances

1. The legal relations between an athlete and a federation are of a civil nature and do not leave room for the application of principles of criminal law. This is particularly true for the principles of in dubio pro reo and nulla poena sine culpa and the presumption of innocence as enshrined in Art. 6 ECHR.

2. It is perfectly proper for the rules of a sporting federation to establish that the results achieved by an athlete at a competition during which he was under the influence of a prohibited substance must be cancelled irrespective of any guilt on the part of the athlete. This conclusion is the natural consequence of sporting fairness against the other competitors. The interests of the athlete concerned in not being punished without being guilty must give way to the fundamental principle of sport that all competitors must have equal chances.

3. If the federation is able to establish the objective elements of a doping offence, there is a presumption of guilt against the athlete. The principle of presumed fault on the part of the athlete does not, however, leave him without protection because he/she has the right to rebut the presumption, i.e. to establish that the presence of the prohibited substance in his/her body was not due to any intent or negligence on his/her part.

4. An athlete cannot exculpate himself/herself by simply stating that the container of the particular product taken by him/her did not specify that it contained a prohibited substance. It is obvious that the sale of nutritional supplements, many of which are available over the internet and thus sold without an effective governmental control, would go down dramatically if they properly declared that they contain (or could contain) substances prohibited under the rules governing certain sports. Therefore, to allow athletes the excuse that a nutritional supplement was mislabelled would provide an additional incentive for the producers to continue that practice. In summary, therefore, it is no excuse for an athlete found with a prohibited substance in his/her body that he/she checked the label on the product he took and that the label did not specify that the product contained a prohibited substance.

In September 2000 the International Olympic Committee reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Norwegian weightlifter Fritz Aanes after he tested positive for the prohibited substances 19-norandrostenedione and 19-norandrosterone (Nandrolone).

Consequently on 1 October 2000 he was disqualified and excluded from the Sydney Olympic Games. Thereupon on 24 October 2000 the FILA Sport Judge decided to impose a sanction of 2 years on the Athlete.

Hereafter in Januari 2001 the Athlete appealed the FILA Decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The Athlete requested the Panel to set aside the Appealed Decision and to declare it invalid.

The Athlete denied the intentional use of the substance nor that he acted negligently. He asserted that a contaminated supplement was the source of the positive test and because of exceptional circumstances there were no grounds to impose a sanction.

The Panel finds that the presence of a prohibited substance has been established in the Athlete's samples and accordingly that he committed an anti-doping rule violation.

The Panel determines that the violation was not intentional and that he had acted negligently. Further the Panel deems that mitigating circumstances justify the imposition of a reducted sanction.

Therefore on 9 July 2001 the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides:

1.) The appeal filed by A. on 3 January 2001 is partially upheld.

2.) The decision of the FILA Sport Judge of 24 October 2000 shall be modified as follows: A. is suspended for a period of 15 months from 27 September 2000 to 26 December 2001.

3.) (…).

CAS 2011/O/2422 United States Olympic Committee (USOC) v. International Olympic Committee (IOC)

Related cases:

• AAA No. 77 190 00288 08 JENF USADA vs Jessica Hardy - Interim Award
  August 1, 2008
• AAA No. 77 190 00288 08 USADA vs Jessica Hardy
  May 30, 2009
• AAA No. 77 190 00293 10 USADA vs Lashawn Merritt
  October 15, 2010
• CAS 2009_A_1870 WADA vs Jessica Hardy & USADA
  May 21, 2010
• CAS 2009_O_1824 IOC
  June 11, 2009
  
  

• Olympics
• Doping
• Validity and enforceability of a rule prohibiting doped athletes from participation in the next Olympic Games
• Definition of eligibility rules
• Definition of sanctions
• Proper characterisation of the rule
• Consistency with the WADA Code
• Principle of autonomy of the association
• Consistency with the Olympic Charter
• Principle of double jeopardy or ne bis in idem

1. CAS jurisprudence has indicated that qualifying or eligibility rules are those that serve to facilitate the organization of an event and to ensure that the athlete meets the performance ability requirement for the type of competition in question. A common point in qualifying (eligibility) rules is that they do not sanction undesirable behaviour by athletes. Qualifying rules define certain attributes required of athletes desiring to be eligible to compete and certain formalities that must be met in order to compete.

2. In contrast to qualifying rules are the rules that bar an athlete from participating and taking part in a competition due to prior undesirable behaviour on the part of the athlete. Such a rule, whose objective is to sanction the athlete’s prior behaviour by barring participation in the event because of that behaviour, imposes a sanction. A ban on taking part in a competition can be one of the possible disciplinary measures sanctioning the breach of a rule of behaviour.

3. Having regard to its objective and purpose and to its scope and application, a rule prohibiting doped athletes from participation in the next Olympic Games is more properly characterised as a sanction of ineligibility for a major Competition, i.e. as a disciplinary measure taken because of a prior behaviour, than as a pure condition of eligibility to compete in the Olympic Games. Even if one accepts that the rule has elements of both an eligibility rule and a sanction, it nevertheless operates as, and has the effect of, a disciplinary sanction.

4. A rule prohibiting doped athletes from participation in the next Olympic Games provides for a period of ineligibility (non-participation) that is not provided for under Article 10 of the WADA Code. In so doing, the rule constitutes a substantive change to the WADA Code, which Signatories of the WADA Code have contractually committed themselves not to do and which is prohibited by Article 23.2.2 of the WADA Code.

5. Recognised by the Swiss federal Constitution and anchored in the Swiss law of private associations is the principle of autonomy, which provides an association with a very wide degree of self-sufficiency and independence. The right to regulate and to determine its own affairs is considered essential for an association and is at the heart of the principle of autonomy. One of the expressions of private autonomy of associations is the competence to issue rules relating to their own governance, their membership and their own competitions. However, this autonomy is not absolute.

6. Because the Panel has found that the rule prohibiting doped athletes from participation in the next Olympic Gamesis not in compliance with the WADA Code, and because the WADA Code has been incorporated into the Olympic Charter, the rule is not in compliance with the IOC’s Statutes, i.e. the Olympic Charter.

7. CAS case law has consistently held that the principle of ne bis in idem can apply to sanctions under sports law and academic authorities on the subject have come to the same conclusion. If the ne bis in idem principle is indeed applicable to sanctions imposed under anti-doping regulations, the rule prohibiting doped athletes from participation in the next Olympic Games would contravene this principle. The effective purpose of the sanction is the same (even if the underlying motivations are different); the sanction is attributable to the same behaviour, and the sanction results in the same consequence, ineligibility from Competition.

The IOC Executive Board, at its meeting in Osaka, Japan on 27 June 2008, enacted the following rule which has come to be known as the Osaka Rule:

“The IOC Executive Board, in accordance with Rule 19.3.10 OC and pursuant to Rule 45 OC, hereby issues the following rules regarding participation in the Olympic Games:

1.) Any person who has been sanctioned with a suspension of more than six months by any anti-doping organization for any violation of any anti-doping regulations may not participate, in any capacity, in the next edition of the Games of the Olympiad and of the Olympic Winter Games following the date of expiry of such suspension.

2. These Regulations apply to violations of any anti-doping regulations that are committed as of 1 July 2008. They are notified to all International Federations, to all National Olympic Committee and to all Organizing Committees for the Olympic Games”.

The IOC Regulation came into effect in July 2008 but does not appear to have impacted any athletes who applied to attend the Vancouver Winter Olympic Games in February 2010. However, the IOC Regulation will impact a number of athletes around the world for the 2012 Summer Olympic Games in London. The IOC Regulation appears to have also affected doping adjudications since it came into effect.

In one of those athletes’ situations, the IOC Regulation came under scrutiny before the American Court of Arbitration for Sport in the cases against the Athletes LaShawn Merritt and Jessica Hardy. The AAA Panel was required to determine whether the IOC Regulation could be applied to Mr. Merritt and Ms. Hardy.

USOC and the IOC to this proceeding recognized that there was considerable uncertainty facing the world’s aspiring Olympic athletes and their national Olympic committees because of the IOC Regulation. In recognition of these concerns and to their credit, in April 2011 the parties voluntarily entered into an Arbitration Agreement and submitted this dispute for resolution by the Panel in a CAS Ordinary Arbitration Procedure.

The CAS Panel concludes for the reasons set out in this Award and taking in due consideration all arguments submitted by the parties as well as the amicus curiae briefs filed by third parties, that the IOC Regulation is not in compliance with the WADA Code and violates the IOC’s own Statutes.

The Arbitration Agreement provides for this dispute to “be submitted exclusively to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) in Lausanne, Switzerland, and settled definitively in accordance with the Code of Sports-related arbitration, under the rules applicable to the Ordinary Arbitration Procedure”. In the exercise of this power conferred upon the Panel by the Arbitration Agreement and in light of these findings, the IOC Regulation is found to be invalid and unenforceable.

Therefore on 4 October 2011 the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides:

1.) The IOC Executive Board’s June 27, 2008 decision prohibiting athletes who have been suspended for more than six months for an anti-doping rule violation from participating in the next Olympic Games following the expiration of their suspension is invalid and unenforceable.

2.) (…).

CAS 2007/A/1201 Nathan Baggaley vs Australian Canoeing, International Canoe Federation & Surf Life Saving Australia

Related case:

CAS 2006_A_1168 Nathan Baggaley vs ICF
December 29, 2006

The Application before us was filed with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) Oceania Registry on 4 January 2007, it being what is commonly seen as and entitled, an Application. It has the effect of being a Statement of Appeal under Rule 48 of the Court of Arbitration for Sport Arbitration Rules, edition 2004 (the Code). There was also filed with the CAS Oceania Registry on 15 January 2007 an Amended Application form.

One of the paragraphs of the Order for Directions given in this matter dealt with the jurisdiction of the presently constituted Panel. That order was signed and executed by the Appellant (Mr Baggaley), the respondent, Australian Canoeing Inc. (ACI), and by the then affected parties, Surf Life Saving Australia (SLSA), Australian Sports Commission (ASC) and Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA).

The order was not executed by or on behalf of the then respondent, International Canoe Federation (ICF) which submitted in substance that this Panel did not have authority to arbitrate the dispute alleged against the ICF. Consequently, there arose at the very beginning of these proceedings the question as to whether this Panel had jurisdiction to entertain the Application, being in the nature of appeal, and specifically to make orders of the specific nature sought in the Application.

Therefore, we have concluded that there is no jurisdiction in the Panel to make orders of the nature sought by Mr Baggaley against the ICF, it being a respondent to the appeal before us.

For those reasons, we conclude that the jurisdictional point taken by and on behalf of the ICF is sound and we uphold the submission.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 20 January 2007 that:

1.) The appeals of Mr Baggaley against the decisions of ACI of 14 December 2006 and SLSA of 15 January 2007 are dismissed.

2.) The question of costs is reserved. The Panel directs that the parties within 21 days of this date file with the CAS Oceania Registry their submissions relevant to the question of costs.

CAS 2006/A/1168 Baggaley v/International Canoe Federation

Related case:

CAS 2007_A_1201 Nathan Baggaley vs Australian Canoe, ICF & Surf Life Saving Australia - Partial Award
January 20, 2007

• Canoeing
• Doping
• Inherent powers of CAS
• Interpretation of the CAS Rules
• Interpretation of “Appeal” in the CAS Rules
• Time limit to lodge a Statement of Appeal
• Beginning of the time limit to appeal

1. The CAS is an arbitral body not a court of law. It does not possess any inherent powers nor any discretion, afforded by Rules of Court, to control its own processes or to unilaterally vary, adjust or waive the requirements of the contract by which the parties and the CAS have agreed to be bound and which relevantly finds expression in the Code of Sports-related Arbitration.

2. All of the CAS Rules, and each individual Rule must be construed in their context and, in particular, in the context of the Rules as a whole. Furthermore, the CAS Rules must be construed in a practical, sensible and reasonable fashion to give practical effect to them and no provision should be regarded as otiose, redundant or superfluous unless such a conclusion is rendered necessary by a consideration of the Rules as a whole.

3. The expressions “Appeal” and “Statement of Appeal” in art. R47 to R49 of the Code of Sports-related Arbitration are intended to be read as synonyms and as interchangeable expressions. To construe the Rules otherwise would be to make a nonsense of the exception set out in art. R32 or at least render it otiose or superfluous.

4. In the absence of a time limit set in the statutes or regulations of the federation, association or sports-related body concerned, or of a previous agreement, a Statement of Appeal shall be lodged by an appellant within 21 days of the receipt of the decision appealed against.

5. In order for a Tribunal to be able to determine whether or not the previous instance decision is reasoned, written or timely, the appeal itself must be timely. If the CAS were to hold that time only starts to run when a decision is timely, written and reasoned, such criteria would make it impossible for a potential Appellant to objectively determine when time starts to run.

By an Application Form dated 11 October 2006 the Appellant, Mr Nathan Baggaley lodged an appeal against a decision of the International Canoeing Federation (ICF), handed down on or shortly before 15 March 2006 whereby the ICF decided to suspend the Appellant for a 2-year period from all International Competitions in the sport of canoeing, commencing on 13 September 2005. The ICF is the peak world body controlling or administering the sport of canoeing.

The Panel concludes that this Appeal was filed out of time and must be deemed inadmissible by reason of R48 and R49 of the CAS Rules. It gives the Panel no pleasure in deciding this matter on such a technical basis. As we have said, we do not think it appropriate to express any concluded view at all on the merits of the substantive decisions but it would have been far preferable that this Appeal had been determined on such merits.

In reaching the decision which it has, the Panel does not wish in any way to suggest that it is in any way giving its seal of approval to the ICF’s decision of March 2006 or the circumstances in which it is made. Neither the ICF nor any similar organisation should regard this Award as supporting the notion that it can make decisions such as the one made here in March 2006 without giving the relevant Athlete a fair hearing and without providing a timely and reasoned decision.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 29 December 2006 that:

1.) The appeal filed by Mr Nathan Baggaley on 11 October 2006 against a decision of the International Canoe Federation is inadmissible.

2.) The question of costs is reserved.