Drug Games: The International Politics of Doping and the Olympic Movement, 1960-2007 / Thomas Mitchell Hunt. - University of Texas: Austin, 2007

The widespread use of performance-enhancing drugs among elite athletes is the most important policy problem in modern Olympic history. Although several works have addressed the subject (a few of which are admittedly excellent), they have been limited either temporally or by a lack of access to archival sources of information. Based on research in both American and foreign archives, this dissertation complements earlier, path-breaking works by tracing the evolution of Olympic doping policy from 1960 to the present.
Olympic policymakers first seriously considered the subject of doping after suspicions arose that the death of Danish cyclist Knud Jensen at the 1960 Rome Olympic Games was triggered by the use of amphetamines. For most of the next decade, these officials attempted to define the doping problem and struggled to formulate a program for its solution. An international politics of doping consequently developed, under which the various bodies of the Olympic governance structure failed, due to their divergent interests and jurisdictions, to implement a coordinated plan. Until recently, administrators working at all levels of this organizational system tended to formulate doping policies with the idea of dampening the effects of public controversy. In addition, the influence of the Cold War on the Olympics exacerbated the situation, as national governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain, believing that success in the Olympic medals race was essential to their images abroad, condoned the use of ergogenic aids among elite competitors. It was not until Canadian track star Ben Johnson tested positive for an anabolic steroid after setting a new world record in the one-hundred meter sprint at the 1988 Seoul Games that a different policy direction was initiated. The involvement of national governments after the scandal led eventually to the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency in November 1999. The consolidation of regulatory authority in this agency has transformed the issue of doping in the Olympics from a combined political and scientific problem to one based more appropriately on the latter.

If elite sport has developed as a “vast, loosely coordinated experiment upon the human organism,” then the efforts to regulate doping within that experimentation have been decidedly dysfunctional. Since the subject first became an issue of public concern in the 1960's, Olympic policymakers, whichever the individual organization to which they belonged, confronted doping issues on ad-hoc bases with little long-term planning; substantive measures were, as a consequence, rarely undertaken outside times of crisis. This was in part due to the diffuse governance system under which the Olympic movement operated; regulatory power over doping was divided among several levels of international and national federations, national Olympic committees, and organizing bodies for individual competitions. At the same time, failures among public and private policymakers to recognize the salience of the doping issue and to fulfill responsibilities for its effective regulation ensured that this structure remained intact for multiple decades.
To be fair, there were successes in the struggle to curtail performance-enhancing drugs in the Olympics; at the same time, not every individual in the Olympic community was personally culpable for the movement’s failures. Few would argue, as an example, that Dick Pound was willing to overlook controversial subjects for individual or organizational gain. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Olympic leaders with Pound’s integrity remained far too few for much too long. During his presidency of the IOC, for instance, Avery Brundage was too enmeshed in notions of amateurism to spend much time on “insignificant” matters like doping; his successor, Lord Killanin, bumbled his John Hoberman, Mortal Engines: The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport (New York: Free Press, 1992) way through eight years of leadership, accomplishing little; perhaps worst of all, Juan Antonio Samaranch chose to largely ignore the issue in pursuit of ever more lucrative economic rewards. Even during the last several years, those willing to take a stand against the status quo were often punished; it was no accident that Dick Pound finished third in the 2001 IOC presidential election. If one wished to dampen the prospects for success in the battle against doping, organizational decentralization, venality, and individual indifference therefore provided a potent mixture.
Even when progress was made, plans for reform were usually prepared only after the occurrence of some “focusing event” that frightened policymakers into action. This shortcoming was perhaps best articulated at a November 2000 meeting of the WADA Foundation Board by member Paul Henderson, who observed, “No good lesson was ever learnt except through the eyes of disaster.”2 Although the use of performance-enhancing drugs in the Olympics was known to occur prior to 1960, serious dialogue regarding the subject did not begin until the death of Knud Jensen in that year’s Rome Olympic Games.
While regulations against doping were gradually instituted over the next decade, the powers to enforce them remained dispersed among the various components of the movement’s governance system. Despite periodic efforts at reform, this framework was maintained until public authorities threatened to intervene after Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson tested positive for an anabolic steroid at the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul, South Korea. Even then, it took policymakers over a decade to implement a more integrated regime through the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency in November 1999. To their credit, anti-doping authorities, freed from the problems created by the previously fragmented regulatory system with the creation of WADA and the ratification of the World Anti-Doping Code, began to plan in advance for the scientific advances that will collectively constitute the future of doping. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, for example, several conferences were held regarding the possible applications of genomics to athletic enhancement. Speaking to the anticipated benefits of this early start, WADA member Theodore Friedmann thus asserted, “There is a much greater level of awareness, and that’s the starting point. The World Anti-Doping Code even included a provision that “the use of genetic transfer technology to dramatically enhance sport performance should be prohibited as contrary to the spirit of sport even if it is not harmful.
The tragedy is that however admirable, these developments are too late to definitively “win” the war against doping in the Olympics. The fact is that we live in a performance-enhanced society. Examples of this abound: the stimulant Dexedrine was used by military pilots in the Gulf War of 1990, college students regularly take amphetamine-based psychiatric drugs in pursuit of higher grade-point averages and an increasing number of non-elderly individuals are prescribed testosterone and human growth hormone to counteract the effects of aging. In the Olympics, this “medicalized” environment has led to acceptable forms and levels of “soft doping.” Under current WADA guidelines, for example, a competitor’s testosterone to epitestosterone ratio must exceed 4.0 before a urine sample is submitted to isotopic ratio mass spectrometry.
Because this ratio far exceeds that which is ordinarily found in the human body, athletes are consequently allowed to “cheat” within arbitrarily-constructed limits.6 The genetic revolution will only make matters worse; alluding to novelist Aldous Huxley’s gloomy vision of the human future, Pound thus stated, “The drug problem is the devil we know . . . and here we are at the beginning of a brave new world.
The dilemmas presented by these prospects were perhaps best put in March 2002 by Joseph Glorioso, director of the Pittsburgh Human Gene Therapy Center, in a question that cut to the heart of the future of doping. “How do we distinguish enhancement from treatment?” he wondered. Elucidating the answer will be the central challenge for future Olympic policymakers.

Report to the commissioner of baseball of an independent investigation into the illegal use of steroids and other performance enhancing substances by players in major league baseball / George J. Mitchell. - Office of the Commissioner of Baseball, 2007

The Report, informally known as the "Mitchell Report," is the result of former Democratic United States Senator from Maine George J. Mitchell's 21-month investigation into the use of anabolic steroids and human growth hormone (HGH) in Major League Baseball (MLB). The 409-page report, released on December 13, 2007, covers the history of the use of illegal performance-enhancing substances by players and the effectiveness of the MLB Joint Drug Prevention and Treatment Program. The report also advances certain recommendations regarding the handling of past illegal drug use and future prevention practices. In addition, the report names 89 MLB players who are alleged to have used steroids or other performance-enhancing drugs.

The report describes motivations for its preparation, including health effects of steroids, legal issues, fair play, and reports that baseball players acted as role models for child athletes. For example, after news coverage in August 1998 that Mark McGwire had used the then-legal androstenedione, a steroid precursor, sales of the supplement increased over 1000%, and the National Institute on Drug Abuse reported that 8% of male high school senior athletes had used androstenedione in 2001.

Mitchell reported that during the random testing in 2003, 5 to 7 percent of players tested positive for steroid use. Players on the forty-man roster of major league teams were exempt from testing until 2004. One player is quoted: "Forty-man [roster] guys already have all of the [major league] club advantages, and then they could use steroids . . . it was not a level playing field."

According to the report, after mandatory random testing began in 2004, HGH became the substance of choice among players, as it was not then detectable in tests. Also, it was noted that at least one player from each of the thirty Major League Baseball teams was involved in the alleged violations

Schendt dopingbestrijding mensenrechten? / Gerke Berenschot. - Maastricht University, 2010 [master thesis]

One of the issues in this thesis is the question if Anti-Doping organisations should pay compensation to persons who were wrongfully accused for a doping violation. With a thorough equation of the legal issues and the applicability of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
The author concludes that a well-balanced anti-doping ruling, which secures the rights of the athlete, can lead towards more comprehension of the anti-doping organisations and lesser distrust.

Michelle Collins is a world-class sprinter. In 2000, she principally competed in the 400 meters, but in 2002, she began to compete more in 200-meter races. On March 15, 2003, she won the world indoor championship in that event. After that race, Collins was injured, and she did not reace again in 2003. In 2004, she ran the 200 meters twiece in May, but she has otherwise not competed.

In this case USADA seeks for the first time to sanction an athlete who has not tested positive in any of her in-competition or out-of-competition drug tests. Thus on the one hand, the case involves issues that have not previously had to be decided by Arbitral Tribunals. On the other hand, the straightforward application of legal principles to essentially undisputed facts leads to a clear resolution of this matter.

USADA seeks a lifetime ban of Michelle Collins for participating in a wide-ranging doping conspiracy implemented by the Bay Area Laboratory Cooperative (BALCO). USADA charges that, for a period of several years, Collins used various performance-enhancing drugs provided by BALCO. Collins has never had a single drug test found to be a positive doping violation, but USADA’s charges are based, in part, on all of the blood and urine tests at IOC-accredited laboratories that she has had in recent years. USADA also relies upon documents seized by the U.S. government from BALCO that have been provided to USADA; statements made by BALCO officials; documents obtained by other law enforcement means; and other documents about Michelle Collins.

For the reasons described in this Award, The Arbitral Tribunal holds that USADA has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Collins was guilty of doping through the use of prohibited substances and techniques for more that a year. This conclusion is bases principally on two sets of documents: emails from Collins in which she admits to using some of the prohibited substances and techniques, and undisputed blood and urine test results that together provide solid evidence of a pattern op doping.

The Arbitral Tribunal finds that USADA has proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Collins took EPO, the testosterone / epitestosterone cream, and THG, and that Collins used these substances to enhance her performance and elude the drug testing that was available at the time. The Tribunal further finds that Collins’s use op EPO, testosterone and epitestosterone, and THG were violations of the IAAF’s prohibitions of banned substances and banned techniques, as set forth in IAAF rules.

The North American Court of Arbitration for Sport Panel therefore rules that the following sanctions shall be imposed on Collins:
- The retroactive cancellation of all award or additions to Collins’s trust fund to which Collins would have been entitled by virtue of het appearance and/of performance at any athletics meeting occurring between February 1, 2002 and the date of this Award;
- A period of ineligibility under IAAF Rules for eight years beginning on the date of this Award, including from participating in U.S. Olympic, Pan American or Paralympic Games team and having access to the training facilities of the United States Olympic Committee (USOC) Training Centers or other programs and activities of the USOC including, but not limited to, grants, awards, or employment pursuant to the USOC Anti-Doping Policies.

The administrative fees and expenses of the American Arbitration Association and the compensation and expenses of the arbitrators shall by borne entirely by USADA.

George Hartman (“The Respondent”) is a member of the United States Judo Association (“USA Judo”). In 2005, Respondent was ranked number two in the United States under the 100kg weight category. Respondent has been in the USADA’s Out-of-Competition testing pool since November of 2004.

Respondent tested positive for testosterone in a March 2,2005 Out-of-Competition drug test. He admits being administered testosterone, but argues that his testosterone treatment was medically necessary as a result of his disability. Respondent requested that his two-year period of ineligibility be reduced under the Exceptional Circumstances provision of the World Anti Doping Code ("Code") Article 10.5. In addition, Respondent requested protection under the Americans with Disability Act ("ADA").
The Panel finds that Respondent failed to sustain his burden of proof that he suffers from a disability. As a consequence, the Panel imposes a two-year period of ineligibility, along with other sanctions as required by the Code.

In this case involves respondent's first alleged anti-doping violation:
- assisted or incited others to use prohibited substances or prohibited technique thereby committing a doping offense in violation of the World Anti-Doping Agency Code or International Amateur Athletic Federation ("IAAF") rules and regulations
- traded, trafficked, distributed or sold prohibited substances in violation of the applicable WADA and IAAF rules and regulations
- engaged in covering up his rule violations during these proceedings thereby violating additional rules.

Respondent is related to BALCO/Victor Conte, evidence is provided. Respondent administered the drugs Modafinil and Repoxygen (EPO) to other Athletes. Modafinil especially to his wife Zhanna Block in out of competition periods.

Decision and award: respondent had committed a doping violation under each rules: Article 7.2 of IAAF rule 19 and violated IAAF Anti-Doping Rules 32.2(h), 56.3, and 56.4.
The sanction is a ten year period of ineligibility commencing January 1, 2009 and ending on January 1, 2019.
Respondent is prohibitted from participating in and having access to the training facilities of the USOC training Centers or other programs and activities of the USOC.

Related cases:

• AAA 2017 No. 01 17 0003 6197 USADA vs Jeffrey Brown
  September 30, 2019
• CAS 2019_A_6530 Jeffrey Brown vs USADA | Alberto Salazar vs USADA
  September 15, 2021

Mr. Alberto Salazar is an American track coach and former world-class long-distance runner and the head coach of the Nike Oregon Project (NOP) in Portland, Oregon.

In June 2017 the United States Anti-Doping Agency (USADA) has reported multiple anti-doping rule violations against Mr. Salazar:

1.) Possession of prohibited substances and/or methods including testosterone and prohibited intravenous (IV) infusions and related equipment (such as needles, IV bags and/or syringes, storage containers and other infusion equipment and devices).
2.) Trafficking and/or attempted trafficking of testosterone and prohibited IV infusions.
3.) Administration and/or attempted administration of testosterone and prohibited IV infusions.
4.) Assisting, encouraging, aiding, abetting, covering up, and other complicity involving one or more anti-doping rule violations and/or attempted anti-doping rule violations (“Complicity”).
5.) Tampering and/or attempted tampering.

Also charged is Dr. Jeffrey Brown, a physician and a consultant for the Nike Oregon Project. Here USADA reported multiple anti-doping rule violations against Dr Brown for trafficking, administration, complicity and tampering.

After notification Mr. Salazar filed a statement with evidence in his defence and he was heard for the Tribunal of the American Arbitration Association (AAA).

In this case against Mr. Salazar the Panel has reviewed and examined approximately 1,562 exhibits, heard seven full days of testimony, which are documented in 2,543 pages of hearing transcript, reviewed and carefully considered the parties’ prehearing and post-hearing briefs, which consist of 1,154 pages, reviewed and ruled on various motions and issues that arose between the parties, which are articulated in the 14 Procedural Orders issued by the Panel, and the Panel was required to spend thousands of hours on this matter.

USADA contended with evidence and witness statements that Mr. Salazar was involved in the infusions/injections of L-carnite administered to the Athlete Steve Magness and NOP athletes; possession and use of testosterone gel and tampering together with his attorneys during the investigation and arbitration. During the proceedings USADA did not pursue the Administration or Attempted Administration of Testosterone for personal use.

The Panel finds that USADA has met its burden of proof to show that there was:
1.) A Prohibited Method, an infusion over the applicable limit;
2.) Mr. Magness was an Athlete; and
3.) Mr. Salazar, specifically and aggressively, facilitated and otherwise participated in Mr. Magness’ Use of the Prohibited Method.
Accordingly the Panel finds that Mr. Salazar has committed a anti-doping rule violation of the Rules.

A majority of the Panel finds that USADA has not met its burden of proof with respect to the Attempted administration charge in the matter of the NOP Athletes. Neither with respect to Mr. Salazar committing a Complicity anti-doping rule violation regarding to the Athlete Steve Magness infusion nor to the NOP Athletes.

A majority of the Panel finds that Mr. Salazar did deliberately engage in intentional conduct to alter results or prevent normal procedures from occurring. He was clearly operating under the impression that the NOP Athletes could be asked about infusions and a majority finds he tried to prevent the normal procedure from occurring by instructing the NOP Athletes that no declaration of use of LCarnitine was required and that they should deny they had the L-carnitine infusion when asked about infusions when getting drug tested in or out of competition.

The Panel is concerned that Mr. Salazar conducted a Testosterone Experiment on two non-Athletes, i.e. his own sons, at a reputable and well known training facility, by a very experienced and well known Athlete Support Person, with no actual justification and involving the administration of a controlled substance in potential violation of federal laws. While the Panel accepts Mr. Salazar’s contention that the experiment was designed to protect athletes of the NOP, it could have also been conducted as part of a nefarious attempt to “beat” the testing system and thus is susceptible to creating an appearance of cheating that one could argue would bring the experiment much closer to being “in connection with” an Athlete, Competition or training.

Also regarding the Testosterone Experiment the Panel concludes that Mr. Salazar as Athlete Support Person is strictly prohibited from trafficking in Testostereone by giving it to third parties and committed the anti-doping rule violation for Trafficking. Further the Panel finds that there is insufficient evidence that there was Complicity regarding the Testosterone Experiment and the Panel declines to find a violation here for Tampering based on Mr. Salazar’s conduct in the investigation and arbitration.

Therefore on the basis of the foregoing facts and legal aspects the Panel decides on 30 September 2019:

1.) Respondent has committed the following anti-doping rule violations: Administration, Tampering and Trafficking.
2.) The following sanction shall be imposed on Respondent: a period of Ineligibility (as defined in the World Anti-Doping Code) of four years from the date of this Award, with all attendant consequences.
3.) The parties shall bear their own attorneys’ fees and costs associated with this arbitration.
4.) The administrative fees and expenses of the American Arbitration Association, and the compensation and expenses of the Panel, shall be borne entirely by USADA and the United States Olympic Committee.
5.) This award is in full settlement of all claims and counterclaims submitted to this Arbitration. All claims not expressly granted herein are hereby denied.
6.) This award may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall be deemed an original, and all of which shall constitute together one and the same instrument.

Annual Report 2021-2022 / Anti-Doping Agency of Kenya (ADAK). - Nairobi : ADAK, 2022