The Formation and Development of Illicit Performance and Image Enhancing Drug Markets: Exploring Supply and Demand, and Control Policies in Belgium and the Netherlands : dissertation / Ven, Katinka van de. – Utrecht : Utrecht University Repository, 2016. – X, 246 p., fig., graf., ill, lit., tab.

Original title:

De Vorming en Ontwikkeling van Prestatie- en Uiterlijkbevorderende Drugsmarkten: een Onderzoek naar Vraag en Aanbod, en het Reguleringsbeleid van België en Nederland : proefschrift / Katinka van de Ven. – Utrecht : Universiteit Utrecht, 2016. – X, 246 p. : afb., fig., graf., lit., tab.

• Met Nederlandse samenvatting: p. III-IV

Contents:

- Introduction
- An analysis of the demand for PIEDs and PIED policies in Belgium and the Netherlands
- Theoretical perspectives on illicit drug markets: economic action, networks and cultures
- Methodology: Researching the PIED market
- Markets, cultures and PIEDs: The characteristics of suppliers operating in Belgium and the Netherlands
- ‘Muscling your way up’: Exploring the cultural contours of the PIED markets amongst bodybuilders
- The development and structure of Belgian and Dutch PIED dealing networks
- The Dutch paradise for home producers and the digital ‘gold rush’ in Belgium
- What are the ‘harms’?: Anti-doping, domestic policies and the PIED market
- Conclusion

Abstract:

This research explores the understudied phenomenon of performance and image enhancing drug (PIED) markets by examining the structure and formation of the market for PIEDs in the Netherlands and Belgium. Furthermore, this study aims to understand and analyse the actors that operate in the PIED dealing environment. In particular bodybuilding is adopted as a case study. Finally, this thesis examines how the PIED control system and its application influence these respective markets. Chapter one introduces the global PIED problem, the policy options currently available to deal with it, and its connection to anti-doping and sport. Chapter two begins by reviewing the literature on PIED use and its supply, and reflects on the anti-doping and PIED policies that seek to regulate this market. In chapter three the theoretical contours of this dissertation are developed. Chapter four describes the research methods which form the empirical bases of the findings chapters. Chapter five focuses on the general characteristics of PIED suppliers, and the ways in which the actions of PIED dealers are influenced by the market cultures in which they operate. Chapter six examines the importance of socio-cultural factors in the formation and development of PIED dealing networks within bodybuilding subcultures. Chapter seven analyses and describes the characteristics of the Belgian and Dutch PIED markets, and unravels the complex relationship between the two. Chapter eight explores the illegal production of steroids in the Netherlands and the flourishing Internet trade in Belgium. Chapter nine assesses the harms related to the production and distribution of PIEDs, and accounts for the effects that Belgian and Dutch PIED policies may have on this illicit market. Finally, in chapter ten, the main findings of this dissertation are summarized, future research endeavours are considered and policy implications are drawn from the analysis. This thesis illustrates that social systems of rules and values, and in particular the embeddedness of culture, are important factors in our efforts to comprehend illicit PIED markets. Specifically, ‘the beliefs, norms, ‘tools’, rules and behaviours appropriate to a cultural setting are key factors for understanding the structure of PIED markets and greater attention must be given to the role played by socio-cultural factors in influencing the market behaviour of criminal groups and individuals. Nevertheless, this thesis also demonstrates that it is imperative to examine the production, distribution and use of PIEDs, as embedded within a diverse combination of social, economic and cultural processes. Indeed, the structure and formation of illicit PIED markets are shaped by a variety of factors including the types of PIEDs dealt within them, the characteristics of the users, the social structures which sustain them, the cultural and economic context in which the markets exist, and market forces (e.g. technical innovations, drug policies).

Commission d'enquête sur le recours aux drogues et aux pratiques interdites pour améliorer la performance athlétique : [Dubin Report] / Charles L. Dubin. - Ottawa : La Commission ; Ministère des approvisionnements et services Canada, 1990. – XXXI, 714 p. : ill
ISBN 0660929767
ISBN 9780660929767

Cette commission a été créée à la suite de la disqualification du coureur Ben Johnson, gagnant de l'épreuve des 100 mètres aux Jeux Olympiques de Séoul, en 1988. Cette publication est le résultat d'une enquête approfondie sur l'usage des drogues dans les milieu sportifs canadiens. La Commission a en effet tenue des audiences publiques en 1989 dans le but d'enquèter sur l'usage des drogues par les athlètes, plus particulièrement sur celui des stéroides anabolisants, d'analyser leurs effets sur performances des utilisateurs ainsi que des risques qu'elles représentaient pour leur santé. Les conclusions et recommandations de la commission contribueront largement à réhabiliter l'image du sport au Canada et dans le monde entier.

Commission of inquiry into the use of drugs and banned practices intended to increase athletic performance : [Dubin Report] / Charles L. Dubin. - Ottawa : The Commission ; Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1990. – XXIX, 638 p. : ill
ISBN 0660136104
ISBN 9780660136103

In Canada, the federal government established the Commission of Inquiry Into the Use of Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance, headed by Ontario Appeal Court Chief Justice Charles Dubin. The Dubin Inquiry (as it became known), which was televised live, heard hundreds of hours of testimony about the widespread use of performance-enhancing drugs among athletes. The inquiry began in January 1989 and lasted 91 days, with 122 witnesses called, including athletes, coaches, sport administrators, IOC representatives, doctors and government officials.

Recommendations from the Dubin Report include:
(1) increased and improved drug testing at the national and international levels;
(2) third-party testing by the Sports Medicine Council of Canada;
(3) stricter sanctions, including suspension for at least the next world championship, after a violation;
(4) legal sanctions for steroid distribution and use;
(5) clearer demarcation on rights and responsibilities of Sport Canada and the sports governing bodies, with the former responsible for financing carded athletes and national teams, and the latter responsible for the selection and eligibility of such teams;
(6) change in emphasis by the sporting community, the media, and the public at large from winning medals to personal excellence;
(7) establishment of an independent arbitrator to deal with appeals; and
(8) ethics and morality modules in the National Coaching Certification Program.

Content:

PART ONE
Overview of Government and Sport in Canada
1. Government and Sport in Canada

PART TWO
Overview of Doping
2. Doping Definitions and Policies
3. Banned Substances and Practices
4. Doping Control Procedures

PART THREE
The Sports and Events Examined
5. Weightlifting
6. The Canadian Track and Field Association
7. Doping Control Policy and Practice in Track and Field before September 1988
8. The Throwing Events
9. Canada's Olympic Sprint Team, 1988
10. The Disqualification at the Seoul Olympics
11. The Use of Performance-Enhancing Drugs
12. The Positive Test
13. "Estragol" [furazabol]
14. Other Track Athletes
15. Athlete Reserve Fund

PART FOUR
Use and Control of Banned Substances
16. Extent of Use of Banned Substances
17. Supply and Distribution of Banned Substances
18. Food and Drugs Act
19. Medical Profession
20. Drug-Testing Issues
21. Doping Control Initiatives before 1988
22. Doping Control Initiatives since 1988

PART FIVE
Rights and Ethical Considerations
23. Athletes and Coaches against Drugs
24. Athletes'Rights
25. Ethics and Morality in Sport

PART SIX
Conclusions and Recommendations
26. Conclusions and Recommendations

In Canada, the federal government established the Commission of Inquiry Into the Use of Drugs and Banned Practices Intended to Increase Athletic Performance, headed by Ontario Appeal Court Chief Justice Charles Dubin. The Dubin Inquiry (as it became known), which was televised live, heard hundreds of hours of testimony about the widespread use of performance-enhancing drugs among athletes.

The inquiry began in January 1989 and lasted 91 days, with 122 witnesses called, including athletes, coaches, sport administrators, IOC representatives, doctors and government officials.
The Dublin Inquiry recommended that the Athlete (the Applicant) Tony Sharpe and other named athletes be suspended for life from federal funding. However the Athlete was not suspended from competition as an athlete.

The negative public attention drawn to the actions of the Applicant has had both damaging and stigmatizing effects on his personal reputation and dignity, including being rejected from university programs and post graduate opportunities. In 1993 the Applicant began working at Xerox Canada in sales. After six years he moved from Xerox to a position in sales with Bell Canada where he worked for nearly eight years until cutbacks ended his career.

In 2006 the Applicant re-committed himself to training, mentoring and involving himself in sport. He incorporated a company called “Need 4 Speed” which advocates a “sport for life” mentality of using sport to prepare young athletes for the rest of their lives. Through Need 4 Speed the Applicant has worked with many provincial and national youth and junior champions from a variety of sports. He also runs an SAT prep course for his senior athletes to assist them in obtaining university scholarships.

The Dubin Report also outlines enumerate factors (The Dubincriteria) to be weighed in determining whether the lifetime withdrawal of access to direct federal funding should be lifted.
Therefore the Applicant filed an application for reinstatement in July 2012 to Sport Canada and he was heard for the arbitrator.

After the statements made by the Applicant and sustained by recommendations the arbitrator concludes that the Applicant (now 51 years old) has made an important contribution to Canadian track and field. The Applicant is a talented and well accomplished athlete and coach. These are favourable accomplishments that could be applied more broadly if the Applicant became entitled to direct federal funding.

Consideration to all of the written and oral evidence the arbitrator is satisfied that the Applicant has met the Dubin criteria necessary for reinstatement to the program of federal funding. The Dubin criteria, weigh substantially in favour of reinstatement and it is in the public interest to grant the Application.

Therefore the arbitrator decides on 30 July 2012 to grant the Application and direct that the Applicant’s lifetime withdrawal of access to direct federal funding should be lifted forthwith.

Doping- och antidopingforskning : En inventering av samhälls- och beteendevetenskaplig forskning och publikationer 2004-2007 / David Hoff
Riksidrottsförbundets : Stockholm

This is a survey of the social and behavioral research on doping in 2004-2007. The purpose of the study is to systematize and thematic research in doping and the anti-doping field to analyze the state of research on the basis of social science perspectives. The report intends to try to give the full picture of the state of knowledge on doping area. The development of doping research 2004-2007 studied also in comparison with the research 1994-2004.
The research included in the survey are primarily international publications in research journals ("peer-review journals"), but also Scandinavian items. The inventory was made via conventional information retrieval tools, provided by the library at the University of Kalmar. The most important databases has been the "Social Science Citation Index" and "ELIN Kalmar".
The survey is limited to articles in English (or articles with English abstracts), or articles published in any of the Scandinavian languages.
The report goes first through the main directions of research from 1994-2004 to compare these with the current research trends (2004-2007). Then the recognized the social and behavioral research from 2004-2007 in themes whose aim is to include the most important and influential research results: doping at gyms, doping among young people, doping, sport and doping and supplements. The final chapter discusses the research findings in a broader sociological context.

The independent commission report #1 : final report / Richard H. McLaren, Richard W. Pound and Günter Younger. - WADA : Montreal, 2015

On December 3, 2014, the German television channel ARD aired the documentary “Top Secret Doping: How Russia makes its Winners”, alleging the existence of a sophisticated and well established system of state-sponsored doping within the All Russia Athletics Federation (ARAF), the governing body for the sport of athletics in Russia, recognized as such by the responsible international federation (IF), the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF).
Implicated in the documentary were Russian athletes, coaches, national and international sport federations, the Russian Anti-Doping Agency (RUSADA) and the Moscow WADA-accredited laboratory. Witness statements and other evidence allegedly exposed high levels of collusion among athletes, coaches, doctors, regulatory officials, and sports agencies to systematically provide Russian athletes performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) in order to achieve the state’s main goal, as alleged in the ARD documentary: producing winners.

The investigation has confirmed the existence of widespread cheating through the use of doping substances and methods to ensure, or enhance the likelihood of, victory for athletes and teams. The cheating was done by the athletes’ entourages, officials and the athletes themselves.
Evidence of extensive doping use is supported and confirmed by audio and video evidence, scientific evidence, corroborative statements, cyber analysis and related reporting documents. Numerous statements corroborate the original allegations and further detail the extensive use of doping substances and blood doping within Russian athletics.
In addition, evidence exists that confirms that coaches have attempted to manipulate or interfere with doping reports and testing procedures. They are also the source and counselling of athletes’ use of PEDs. The coaches are supported in their doping efforts by certain medical professionals. Moreover, it is particularly alarming that there appears to be a collective disregard for the athletes’ current or future state of health.

Drug Games: The International Politics of Doping and the Olympic Movement, 1960-2007 / Thomas Mitchell Hunt. - University of Texas: Austin, 2007

The widespread use of performance-enhancing drugs among elite athletes is the most important policy problem in modern Olympic history. Although several works have addressed the subject (a few of which are admittedly excellent), they have been limited either temporally or by a lack of access to archival sources of information. Based on research in both American and foreign archives, this dissertation complements earlier, path-breaking works by tracing the evolution of Olympic doping policy from 1960 to the present.
Olympic policymakers first seriously considered the subject of doping after suspicions arose that the death of Danish cyclist Knud Jensen at the 1960 Rome Olympic Games was triggered by the use of amphetamines. For most of the next decade, these officials attempted to define the doping problem and struggled to formulate a program for its solution. An international politics of doping consequently developed, under which the various bodies of the Olympic governance structure failed, due to their divergent interests and jurisdictions, to implement a coordinated plan. Until recently, administrators working at all levels of this organizational system tended to formulate doping policies with the idea of dampening the effects of public controversy. In addition, the influence of the Cold War on the Olympics exacerbated the situation, as national governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain, believing that success in the Olympic medals race was essential to their images abroad, condoned the use of ergogenic aids among elite competitors. It was not until Canadian track star Ben Johnson tested positive for an anabolic steroid after setting a new world record in the one-hundred meter sprint at the 1988 Seoul Games that a different policy direction was initiated. The involvement of national governments after the scandal led eventually to the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency in November 1999. The consolidation of regulatory authority in this agency has transformed the issue of doping in the Olympics from a combined political and scientific problem to one based more appropriately on the latter.

If elite sport has developed as a “vast, loosely coordinated experiment upon the human organism,” then the efforts to regulate doping within that experimentation have been decidedly dysfunctional. Since the subject first became an issue of public concern in the 1960's, Olympic policymakers, whichever the individual organization to which they belonged, confronted doping issues on ad-hoc bases with little long-term planning; substantive measures were, as a consequence, rarely undertaken outside times of crisis. This was in part due to the diffuse governance system under which the Olympic movement operated; regulatory power over doping was divided among several levels of international and national federations, national Olympic committees, and organizing bodies for individual competitions. At the same time, failures among public and private policymakers to recognize the salience of the doping issue and to fulfill responsibilities for its effective regulation ensured that this structure remained intact for multiple decades.
To be fair, there were successes in the struggle to curtail performance-enhancing drugs in the Olympics; at the same time, not every individual in the Olympic community was personally culpable for the movement’s failures. Few would argue, as an example, that Dick Pound was willing to overlook controversial subjects for individual or organizational gain. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Olympic leaders with Pound’s integrity remained far too few for much too long. During his presidency of the IOC, for instance, Avery Brundage was too enmeshed in notions of amateurism to spend much time on “insignificant” matters like doping; his successor, Lord Killanin, bumbled his John Hoberman, Mortal Engines: The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport (New York: Free Press, 1992) way through eight years of leadership, accomplishing little; perhaps worst of all, Juan Antonio Samaranch chose to largely ignore the issue in pursuit of ever more lucrative economic rewards. Even during the last several years, those willing to take a stand against the status quo were often punished; it was no accident that Dick Pound finished third in the 2001 IOC presidential election. If one wished to dampen the prospects for success in the battle against doping, organizational decentralization, venality, and individual indifference therefore provided a potent mixture.
Even when progress was made, plans for reform were usually prepared only after the occurrence of some “focusing event” that frightened policymakers into action. This shortcoming was perhaps best articulated at a November 2000 meeting of the WADA Foundation Board by member Paul Henderson, who observed, “No good lesson was ever learnt except through the eyes of disaster.”2 Although the use of performance-enhancing drugs in the Olympics was known to occur prior to 1960, serious dialogue regarding the subject did not begin until the death of Knud Jensen in that year’s Rome Olympic Games.
While regulations against doping were gradually instituted over the next decade, the powers to enforce them remained dispersed among the various components of the movement’s governance system. Despite periodic efforts at reform, this framework was maintained until public authorities threatened to intervene after Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson tested positive for an anabolic steroid at the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul, South Korea. Even then, it took policymakers over a decade to implement a more integrated regime through the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency in November 1999. To their credit, anti-doping authorities, freed from the problems created by the previously fragmented regulatory system with the creation of WADA and the ratification of the World Anti-Doping Code, began to plan in advance for the scientific advances that will collectively constitute the future of doping. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, for example, several conferences were held regarding the possible applications of genomics to athletic enhancement. Speaking to the anticipated benefits of this early start, WADA member Theodore Friedmann thus asserted, “There is a much greater level of awareness, and that’s the starting point. The World Anti-Doping Code even included a provision that “the use of genetic transfer technology to dramatically enhance sport performance should be prohibited as contrary to the spirit of sport even if it is not harmful.
The tragedy is that however admirable, these developments are too late to definitively “win” the war against doping in the Olympics. The fact is that we live in a performance-enhanced society. Examples of this abound: the stimulant Dexedrine was used by military pilots in the Gulf War of 1990, college students regularly take amphetamine-based psychiatric drugs in pursuit of higher grade-point averages and an increasing number of non-elderly individuals are prescribed testosterone and human growth hormone to counteract the effects of aging. In the Olympics, this “medicalized” environment has led to acceptable forms and levels of “soft doping.” Under current WADA guidelines, for example, a competitor’s testosterone to epitestosterone ratio must exceed 4.0 before a urine sample is submitted to isotopic ratio mass spectrometry.
Because this ratio far exceeds that which is ordinarily found in the human body, athletes are consequently allowed to “cheat” within arbitrarily-constructed limits.6 The genetic revolution will only make matters worse; alluding to novelist Aldous Huxley’s gloomy vision of the human future, Pound thus stated, “The drug problem is the devil we know . . . and here we are at the beginning of a brave new world.
The dilemmas presented by these prospects were perhaps best put in March 2002 by Joseph Glorioso, director of the Pittsburgh Human Gene Therapy Center, in a question that cut to the heart of the future of doping. “How do we distinguish enhancement from treatment?” he wondered. Elucidating the answer will be the central challenge for future Olympic policymakers.

Doping in sport is nothing new, but it has grown, expanded geographically and become more visible in recent years. It is a true scourge for many competitive sports and jeopardises the health of millions of young athletes throughout the world.
Since the 1960s, the Council of Europe has realized the extent of this problem and decided to fight it. The Anti-Doping Convention, opened for signature on November 16, 1989 in Strasbourg and entering into force on March 1, 1990, demonstrates this commitment. It expresses the Contracting Parties’ political will to fight against doping in sport in an active and coordinated manner.
The main objective of the Convention is to promote the harmonization, at national and international levels, of the measures to be taken against doping.
The Convention does not claim to create a uniform model of anti-doping, but sets a certain number of common standards and regulations requiring that the Parties adopt legislative, financial, technical, educational and other measures. Its spirit derives from the political desire to help safeguard the ethics of sport and to preserve the integrity of clean sport.
By joining the principles and objectives of the Convention, the contracting Parties undertake, in their respective constitutional provisions, to set up a national anti-doping policy to:
– create a national coordinating body;
– reduce the trafficking of doping substances and the use of banned doping agents;
– reinforce doping controls and improve detection techniques;
– support education and information programs;
– guarantee the efficiency of sanctions taken against offenders;
– collaborate with national and international sports organisations;
– and use accredited anti-doping laboratories.
A monitoring system was created under the Convention and the Monitoring Group of the Anti-Doping Convention set up under Article 10 of the Convention is the body responsible for monitoring the application of the Convention. Parties to the Convention are under the obligation to provide the Council of Europe with information on legislative and other measures taken for the purpose of complying with the terms of the Convention, in accordance with Article 9. In order to facilitate this process, a questionnaire was prepared, requesting national reports from the Parties on the implementation of the Convention.
This report, reflecting the data of Netherlands for the year 2010, has been compiled for the purpose of monitoring of the convention by its Committee and is published for transparency. Comments may be sent to the secretariat of the Council of Europe, Sport department (sport@coe.int).