CAS 98/213 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) / C. & Federazione Ciclistica Italiana (FCI)

• Cycling
• Doping (testosterone)
• Jurisdiction of CAS
• Endogenous substance

1. By applying for a licence and by participating in races belonging to the international calendar of the UCI, athletes agree to comply with and to be bound by all provisions of the Regulations applying thereto, i.e. the UCI rules including the AER.

2. For endogenous steroids, a sample is deemed positive if the T/E ratio is higher than 6, unless it can be proven that this ratio is due to physiological or pathological condition.

3. Pursuant to the UCI Regulations, a sanction, in order to be effective, must be served during the period of normal activity. As a consequence, a suspension falling to a considerable extent within a “dead period”, which means a period where the athlete does usually not compete, cannot be regarded as an effective sanction.

In Juni 1998 the Italian Cycling Federation (FCI), initiated by the International Cycling Union (UCI), has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Italian Athlete C. after his A and B samples, provided in April and May 1998, tested positive for the prohibited substance testosterone with a T/E ratio above the WADA threshold. Thereupon the Athlete underwent an endocrinological examination which showed that the Athlete did not have naturally elevated T/E ratio.

On 31 August 1998 the FCI Disciplinary Commission decided to impose on the Athlete C. a 6 month period of ineligibility and a CHF 2’000,-- fine without specification of the starting and or ending of the suspension.

Hereafter the UCI appealed in October 1998 the FCI decision of 31 August 1998 with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The UCI requested the CAS Panel for disqualification of two competition results and to impose a sanction on the Athlete of at least 9 months including a higher fine.

The Panel – with the approval of the UCI – decides to consider the different positive results as one single offence. The Panel thus holds that the analysis of the A-samples, confirmed by the analysis of the B-samples, revealed the presence of prohibited substances, which as such constitutes an infringement of the UCI Rules.

With regard to the sanction, the Panel only partially agreed and therefore modifies the decision of the FCI.
The Panel notices that the discussion about the dead period is a consequence of the particular sanction system of the UCI, which provides for a minimal duration of suspension of less than one year. The discussion could be avoided if the UCI would harmonize its sanctions with other sport federations and provide for minimum suspension of at least twelve months.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 24 February 1999:

1.) The appeal by the UCI is partially upheld.

2.) The decision of the Federazione Ciclistica Italiana (FCI) dated 31 August 1998 is partially modified:

a.) The disqualification from the “Giro del Trentino” 1998 is cancelled.

b.) The Athlete C. is sanctioned as follows:
- disqualification from the “Tour de Romandie” 1998;
- suspension for nine months from 6 September 1998 to 5 June 1999;
- fine of CHF 2’000.-- (two thousand Swiss francs).

(...)

CAS 98/212 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) / M. & Federazione Ciclistica Italiana (FCI)

• Cycling
• Doping (nandrolone)
• Determination of the competent appeals tribunal
• Endogenous substance
• “Effective” sanction
• Probation

1. Quantities up to 2 ng/ml are not considered to constitute a doping offence. The laboratories do normally not report concentrations below 2 ng/ml to the Federation. There is uncertainty among experts as to the maximum concentration of Nandrolone produced by a human body. Consequently, the mere finding of Nandrolone in a concentration between 2 and 5 ng/ml may constitute a doping offence, but requires further investigations in order to confirm the result of the analysis. However, within the “grey zone” the likelihood that Nandrolone is produced endogenously, is decreasing exponentially. The probability of an endogenous production of Nandrolone in quantities beyond 5 ng/ml was held to be very unlikely. Therefore quantities beyond 5 ng/ml are very likely to be confirmed by further investigations and may be regarded as sufficient evidence to constitute a doping offence.

2. Pursuant to the UCI Rules, a sanction, in order to be effective, must be served during the period of normal activity. As a consequence, a suspension falling to a considerable extent within a “dead period”, which means a period where the athlete does usually not compete, cannot be regarded as an effective sanction.

In May 1998 the Italian Cycling Federation (FCI), initiated by the International Cycling Union (UCI), has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Italian Athlete M. after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substances norandrosterone and noretiocholanolone (Nandrolone) in a low concentration.
On 31 August 1998 the FCI Disciplinary Commission decided to impose on the Athlete a 6 month period of ineligibility and a CHF 2’000,-- fine without specification of the starting and or ending of the suspension.

Hereafter in September 1998 the Athlete M. appealed the decision of the FCI Disciplinary Commission both with the FCI Appeal Commission and with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).
Also the UCI appealed in October 1998 the FCI decision of 31 August 1998 with CAS. Meanwhile in October 1998 the Athlete withdrew his appeal with CAS.
UCI requested the CAS Panel to impose a sanction on the Athlete of at least 6 months and to increase the fine.

The Panel finds that the Athlete M. was not able to give any reasonable explanation for the origin of the prohibited substances. He further failed to submit any evidence in order to support the motion that in his particular case the endogenous production of Nandrolone could reach or even exceed the threshold of 5 ng/ml. The Panel therefore held that the analysis of the A-sample, confirmed by the analysis of the B-sample, revealed the presence of prohibited substances in a concentration not only higher than 2 ng/ml but also beyond the unofficial “grey zone” and as such established an infringement of the AER.
With regard to the sanction, the Panel only partially agrees and therefore modifies the decision of the FCI.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 24 February 1999:

1.) The appeal by the UCI is partially upheld.
2.) The decision of the Federazione Ciclistica Italiana (FCI) dated 31 August 1998 is partially modified:
The Athlete M. is sanctioned as follows:
- disqualification from the “Settimana Bergamasca” 1998;
- suspension for nine months from 14 July 1998 to 13 April 1999;
the suspension is lifted by 21 January 1999 and M. is granted probation for the remaining period of suspension, i.e. two months and three weeks (according to Art. 95 UCI AER);
- fine of CHF 2’000.-- (two thousand Swiss francs).
(...)

CAS 98/208 N., J., Y., W. / Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA)

• Swimming
• Doping (Triamterene)
• (Non-) discrimination
• Burden of proof
• Strict liability

1. The burden of proof lay upon FINA to establish that an offence had been committed. This flows from the language of the doping control provisions as well as general principles of Swiss Law. The presumption of innocence operates in the athlete’s favour until FINA discharged that burden. The standard of proof required of FINA is high: less than criminal standard, but more than the ordinary civil standard.

2. It is the presence of a prohibited substance in a competitor's bodily fluid which constitutes the offence under the FINA rules, irrespective of whether or not the competitor intended to ingest the prohibited substance.

3. If the presence of a prohibited substance is established to the high degree of satisfaction required by the seriousness of the allegation, then the burden of proof shifts to the competitor to show why the maximum sanction should not be imposed. It is only at the level of sanction, not of finding of innocence or guilt, that the concept of shifting burden becomes relevant at all. And it is only at this juncture that questions of intent become relevant.

In January 1998 the International Swimming Federation (FINA) has reported anti-doping rule violations against the four Chinese Athlete’s N., J. Y. and W after their A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance triamterene.

Consequently and on 24 July 1998 the FINA Doping Panel decided to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the four Athletes. Hereafter in August 1998 the Athletes appealed the FINA decision of 24 July 1998 with the Court of Aribitration for Sport (CAS).

The CAS Panel finds that there was no evidence that ingestion of six tablets a day (paying all due regard to the contention that Actovegin tablets are not chemically formulated and can vary from tablet to tablet) since 22 December 1997 (the Athletes unchallenged evidence as to their own consumption) would produce the results shown in the “A” and “B” samples. The Athletes accordingly failed to discharge the burden that lies upon them.

In reaching the conclusion that the offence was committed, and that the Athletes had not discharged the burden which lay upon them to mitigate the maximum sanction of two years, the Panel have borne in mind that all the swimmers have denied on affidavit that they took Triamterene. The Panel has treated that evidence as if it had been given on oath. However, it is regrettable that the currency of such denial is devalued by the fact that it is the common coin of the guilty as well as of the innocent.

The Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 22 December 1998:

1.) The appeal filed by the Athletes N., J., Y., W. on 18 August 1998 is dismissed.

2.) The decision issued by the FINA Doping Panel on 24 July 1998 is confirmed.

(...)

TAS 98/203 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) / F. & Federazione Ciclistica Italiana (FCI)

• Cycling
• Doping (testosterone and metenolone)
• Double infringement

1.) When an athlete tested positive for the same substance or method several times in a short period of time and it is decided that these positive test results are caused by one anti-doping violation, these cases will be joined into one imposed sanction and into one imposed fine. On the other hand, when the athlete tested positive for two different substances and that these positive tests are the result from different doping acts, there is a double infringement. In both cases disqualification will be applied on all competition events where the athlete tested positive.

2.) The CAS summary proceedings is a guarantee of double degree of jurisdiction. Therefore, and provided that there is a domestic legal remedy in de legislation of the country in question, the UCI considers that CAS is the only court of appeal.

In August 1997 the International Cycling Union (UCI) reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Italian Athlete F. after his 2 samples provided at the Tour of Switzerland in June 1997 tested positive for the prohibited substances metenolone and testosterone with a T/E ratio above the threshold.

Also in October 1997 the UCI reported a second anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete after his sample provided at the Tour of Poland in September 1997 tested positive for methyltestosterone.

On 12 January 1998 the Italian Cycling Federation, Federazione Ciclistica Italiana (FCI), decided to impose a 6 month period of ineligibility and a CHF 2.000,- fine on the Athlete including 50 points loss.

On 8 April 1998 the FCI decided for the Athlete’s second violation to impose an additional 1 year period of ineligibility and a CHF 4.000,- fine including including 75 points loss. Here the Athlete admitted that he had used doping during the Tour of Switzerland but denied the use of doping during the Tour of Poland.

The Athlete appealed the FCI decision of 8 April 1998 and on 16 May 1998 the FCI Appeal Commission concluded that no double infringement occurred and decided to set aside the challenged sanctions and to impose on the Athlete a 8 month period of ineligibility and a CHF 3.500,- fine including 70 points loss.

Hereafter the UCI appealed the FCI Appeal Commission decision of 16 May 1998 with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The UCI requested the Panel to set aside the decision of the FCI decision and to uphold the FCI decisions of 12 January and 8 April 1998.

Considering the evidence and statements in this case the Panel concludes that the Athlete has committed two anti-doping violations for the use of the substances testosterone and metenolone during the 1997 Tour of Switzerland and for methyltestosterone during the 1997 Tour of Poland.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 20 November 1998:

• To set aside the decision of the FCI Appeal Commission of 16 May 1998;
• To uphold the FCI decision of 12 January 1998 (1997 Tour of Switzersland);
• To disqualify the Athlete’s results obtained at the 1997 Tour of Poland;
• To impose a 1 year period of ineligibility, including 5 months as suspended sanction, for the Athlete’s second violation (1997 Tour of Poland); and
• CHF 4.000,- fine.

CAS 98/192 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) / S., Danmarks Cykle Union (DCU) and Danmarks Idraets-Forbund (DIF)

• Cycling
• Doping (testosterone)
• Conflict between the rules of an International Federation and those of a National Olympic Committee

1. Rule 30 of the Olympic Charter assigns the international federations the responsibility to “establish and enforce, in accordance with the Olympic spirit, the rules concerning the practice of their respective sports and to ensure their application”. The mission of the NOC's, on the other hand, is to “fight against the use of substances and procedures prohibited by the IOC or the IFs”. This mission is focused upon political actions vis-à-vis the competent authorities of their respective countries.

2. The international federations enjoy the principal competence with regard to the fight against doping. The natural consequence of this is that their rules prevail over those which an NOC or national sports authority (for example an NF) might have enacted.

3. Pursuant to the UCI regulations, in case of endogenous steroids, a sample is deemed positive if the urine T/E ratio is above 6, unless this ratio is attributable to a physiological or pathological condition.

In August 1997 the Danish national cycling federation (DCU) - initiated by the International Cycling Union (UCI) - has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete S. after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance testosterone with a T/E ratio above the WADA threshold.

On 18 January 1998 the Doping Tribunal of the Danish NOC decided to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete under the Danish Rules starting on 13 December 1997.
The Athlete appealed this decision and on 4 May 1998. The Danish Commission for Appeals and Arbitration of the Danish NOC decided to uphold the imposed 2 year sanction.

After deliberations between the UCI. the DCU and the Danish NOC about the imposed sanction and respecting the UCI Rules the UCI filed an appeal in February 1998 with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

Pending the appeal of the Athlete S. with the Danish Commission for Appeals and Arbitration the UCI’s appeal with CAS was postponed and resumed after the Danish Commission for Appeals and Arbitration issued its decision on 4 May 1998.

The UCI argued that the imposed sanction of 2 years under the Danish Rules on the Athlete exceeds the maximum sanction prescribed in the UCI Rules and it requested the CAS Panel to impose an appropriate sanction under the UCI Rules. Also UCI disputed the fact that no disqualification from the Tour of Denmark or a fine was imposed on the Athlete.

The Panel concludes that the jurisdiction of the CAS is based on Art. 84 UCI. The Doping Tribunal of the Danish NOC acted as the “competent body” of the DCU with the knowledge and consent of the UCI. The DCU, in turn, exercised the original jurisdiction of the UCI as prescribed by the applicable provisions of the UCI Rules.

The UCI initiated the doping proceedings against the Athlete S. in accordance with UCI Rules, informed the DCU regarding applicable deadlines and requested to be kept informed of all measures taken by the DCU in the proceedings. Its good faith reliance upon the DCU's representations is evidenced in the exchange of information between the UCI and the DCU, on the one hand, and the DCU/Danish NOC and the Athlete S., on the other.

It is shown clearly in the UCI's timely filing of its appeal to the CAS in accordance with Art. 84 and its refusal to accept the jurisdiction of the Danish NOC with regard to the appeal by the Athlete S. to the Commission of Appeals of the Danish NOC.

The Panel dismissed the arguments filed by the Athlete and reduced the imposed sanction from 2 years to 9 months. The Panel has taken into consideration the fact that the UCI Rules prescribes a maximum suspension of one year for the first offence as opposed to the maximum suspension of two years prescribed in the Rules applied by the Danish NOC.

It cannot be overlooked, however, that the reduction in the sentence is also justified by the disadvantages suffered by the Athlete S. in formulating his defence as a result of the jurisdictional dissent between the UCI, the DCU and the Danish NOC.

Therefore on 21 October 1998 the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides:

1.) The 19 January 1998 Decision of the Doping Tribunal of the National Olympic Committee and Sports Confederation of Denmark (Danmarks Idreaets-Forbund) as modified by the Decision of the Commission of Appeals and Arbitration of 4 May 1998 shall be modified as follows:

(a) The term of the sentence shall be reduced from two years to nine months commencing on 12 December 1997. Accordingly, the term of suspension ends 11 August 1998.

(b) The Court of Arbitration for Sport imposes a fine on the Athlete S. in the amount of CHF 2’000.00 (two thousand Swiss Francs).

(...)

TAS 97/180, P. & consorts / Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA)

• Swimming
• Doping (metandienone)
• Burden of proof

1. According to FINA Rules, only the presence of a prohibited substance, such as steroids, constitutes a violation and results in a suspension for a minimum of four years plus a retroactive sanction resulting in the cancellation of any results obtained during the competitions which took place over a period of six months before the violation occurred. However, the sanction may be mitigated in proportion to the circumstances in the particular case.

2. As consequence of testing positive in a doping control, competitors have the onus to reverse the burden of proof. In the case of exculpatory evidence, strict demands need to be made for the evidence showing absence of guilt or weak guilt of the sanctioned athletes.

In October 1997 the International Swimming Federation (FINA) reported an anti-doping rule violation against the 3 Russian Athletes K., M. and P. after their samples tested positive for the prohibited substance Metandienone.

All 3 Athletes were members of the Russian Swimming team and as a consequence of the positive tests criminal investigations were conducted in Russia. Another Russian Athlete T. admitted that she had spiked the food of the Athletes with the prohibited substance because of her frustration about her exclusion of the national swimming team.

Considering the burden of proof the FINA Anti-Doping Commission found that the Athletes could not explain how the prohibited substance came into their body and could not reverse the burden of proof with their statements and evidence that the violation was committed intentionally.
On 24 December 1997 the FINA Anti-Doping Commission decided to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the Athletes K., M. and P.

In December 1997 the Court of Arbitration (CAS) dismissed the request of the three Russian Athlete to lift the suspension ordered by the FINA for their participation in the World Championships in January 1998.
Hereafter in February 1998 the three Russian Athletes appealed the FINA decision of 24 December 1997 with CAS.

The Athlete requested the Panel to set aside the decision of the FINA Anti-Doping Commission and to impose no sanction on the Athletes or a sanction reduced to a 6 month period of ineligibility.

The CAS Panel did not accept the evidence and statements produced by the Athletes about the Russian criminal investigation and the admission of the Athlete T. that she had spiked the food of the Athletes with the substance 13 days before the doping test.
The Panel also upholds the FINA conclusion that the Athletes failed to explain how the substance came unintentionally into their body. Considering the circumstances in this case the Panel holds that the imposed sanction wasn’t disproportional.

Therefore on 14 January 1999 the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides to dismiss the appeal of the Athletes K., M. and P. and confirms the decision of 16 December 1997 of the FINA Anti-Doping Commission.

TAS 97/175 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) / A.

• Cycling
• Doping (Bromantan and Clenbuterol)
• Authority UCI to agitate
• CAS competence
• Right to be heard
• Legal Status of the Prohibited List of substances

In July 1997 the International Cycling Union (UCI) has reported several anti-doping rule violations against the Uzbek Athlete A. after his samples tested positive for the prohibited substances bromantan and clenbuterol. The Athlete A. had provided these samples at 5 cycling competitions in France in 1997 and at one stage of the 1997 Tour de France.

On 28 August 1997 the Uzbekistan Cycling Federation decided to impose on the Athlete a 6 month period of ineligibility and a Sfr. 4000 fine. Hereafter in September 1997 the UCI appealed the Uzbek decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The UCI requested the CAS Panel to set aside the Uzbek decision and to impose a 1 year period of ineligibility including a Sfr. 4000 fine and disqualification of his results and points. Consequently, even if the UCI does not necessarily intervene in disciplinary proceedings, the UCI must be considered as a party, according of Article R47 CAS Code.

The Panel makes the following observations in this case:

1.) Even if the UCI doest not participate systematically in the proceedings provided in its Rule, the UCI nevertheless remains the initiator of the prosecution of the Athlete guilty of an anti-doping violation and therefore invites the National Federation to open proceedings. Consequently, even if it does not necessarily intervene in disciplinary proceedings, the UCI must be considered as a party, within the meaning of Article R47 of the Code.

2.) When an Athlete signs for his licence he is expressly bound to submit to CAS, as authority in the final instance, his arguments in anti-doping cases.

3.) The party considering itself a victim of a violation of its right to be heard or of any other procedural fault must invoke this at once in the arbitral proceedings. Failing to do this, the party is no longer entitled to complain in the appeal against the sentence.

4.) It is not because a particular product isn’t mentioned in the UCI list of prohibited substances at the moment of the facts that it possibly can not be qualified as a doping product.

Therefore on 5 April 1998 the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides to uphold the UCI appeal, to reform the Uzbek decision of 28 August 1997 and to impose a 1 year period of ineligibility and a CHF 4000 fine on the Athlete including disqualifation of his results and poinst.

CAS 95/142 L. / Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA)

• Doping of a swimmer (salbutamol)
• Special status of salbutamol in the FINA rules
• Omission to declare the use of such substance to the testing agent
• Damage claim for breach of contract and infringement of personality

1. The FINA Medical Rules provide for the application of the “strict liability” standard as an effective instrument in the fight against doping. The concept of “strict liability”, as it is used in doping cases, does not imply an intentional element. There is no link between sanction and intent.

2. The substance salbutamol has an exceptional status in the FINA doping list: it is not completely banned; its inhalation is explicitly permitted, subject to prior notification to the relevant authorities. Therefore, the mere presence of salbutamol is not conclusive proof of a doping offence.

3. The failure to mention salbutamol in the doping test form may create the assumption that there is a doping offence. In the present case, the swimmer had clearly established that he had suffered from asthma for many years; that from the beginning of his sports career, the relevant medical authorities had been repeatedly informed of his use of medication containing salbutamol; that in prior doping tests, the swimmer had declared his use of salbutamol and been found negative; and that there were no indications that he had taken salbutamol other than by inhalation. These specific and exceptional circumstances justify acceptance of the swimmer's numerous records, reports and notifications about his asthma treatment as a sufficient equivalent to the declaration in the test form. Accordingly, there is no doping offence in this case.

4. Dismissal of the damage claim: FINA did not commit a fault or act in bad faith when it began a doping procedure after salbutamol was identified because no medication containing salbutamol had been declared in the test control form.

In April 1995 the Féderation Internationale de Natation (FINA) has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Finnish swimmer Petteri Lehtinen after his sample tested positive for the prohibited substance salbutamol.

The Athlete and the Finnish Swimming Association submitted a statement about his asthma, prepared by the doctor who had been treating him, and a copy of the prescription on the basis of which he had purchased his medicine. The national Swimming Association informed FINA that it was not necessary to examine the Athlete's B-sample, because he was regularly taking Ventoline.

Also FINA's Medical Committee stated that the Committee maintained that the use of salbutamol for medicinal purposes was acceptable and it recommended sending the Athlete and the Finnish Swimming Association a “Warning Letter”.
However on 23 June 1995 the FINA Executive decided to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the Swimmer.

Hereafter in August 1995 the Swimmer appealed the decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS).

The Athlete requested the Panel to set aside the decision taken by the FINA Executive and confirmed by the FINA Bureau and, in addition, that the CAS enjoin FINA to pay him damages for a breach of contract, infringement on his personality and for loss of earnings due to the damage caused to his professional activity.

The CAS Panel concludes that the Athlete has not established that he suffered a financial loss nor that a possible loss was caused by the doping procedure. In addition, FINA has not committed any unlawful act by initiating a doping procedure when the Athlete failed to declare his taking of Ventoline on the doping test form.

Furthermore, the FINA Executive and the FINA Bureau did not act in bad faith or abusively when it decided against the Athlete and imposed the sanction provided in the FINA rules. Therefore, the necessary prerequisites to award damages are not present.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 14 February 1996:

1.) The appeal by Petteri Lehtinen of 11 August 1995 against the FINA Bureau's decision of 27 July 1995 is upheld.

2.) The decision taken by the FINA Executive on 23 June 1995 and confirmed by the FINA Bureau on 27 July 1995 imposing a two-year suspension on Petteri Lehtinen is quashed.

3.) The damage claims requested by Petteri Lehtinen are rejected.

(...)

6.) The award is immediately enforceable.

CAS 95/122 National Wheelchair Basketball Association (NWBA) / International Paralympic Committee (IPC)

• Doping of an athlete member of a team (dextropropoxyphene)
• Disqualification of a national basketball team from the
• Paralympics
• Principle of strict liability

1. Pursuant to the rules applicable in casu, the presence of a drug in the urine is sufficient to constitute an offence, irrespective of the route of administration.

2. If a competitor, member of a team, tests positive for doping during a tournament, does it mean that the match during which the infringement took place must be forfeited by that team or that the team must be disqualified from the entire tournament? Interpretation of a rule, the wording of which is controversial.

The Paralympic Athlete K competed in the USA Wheelchair Basketball Team at the 1992 Barcelona Paralympic Games.

In September 1992 the International Coordinating Committee of World Sports Organizations for the Disabled (ICC) reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Parathlete after his sample tested positive for the prohibited substance dextropropoxyphen.
Due to an injury the Athlete had used the painkiller Darvocet provided to him by his coach who had checked Darvocet on the list of banned drugs. However the coach did not know that one of the components in Darvocet is the prohibited substance dextropropoxyphene.

On 29 September 1992 the ICC decided that K. forfeit any medal with the recommendation to the IWBF to suspend him for six months.
As a consequence of the Athlete’s violation the ICC decided that the USA Basketball Team forfeit the match and to re-allocate their medals.

Hereafter in March 1995 the National Wheelchair Basketball Associaton (NWBA) appealed this decision with the Court of Arbitratio for Sport (CAS) against the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) as successor to the ICC.

The NWBA requested that the disqualification decision be reversed, and, in the alternative, either (a) that the USA wheelchair basketball team retain the 1992 Barcelona Paralympics championship, and that the USA team members retain the gold medals, or (b) that the USA wheelchair basketball team retain the 1992 Barcelona Paralympics championship, and that, with the exception of [K.], the USA team members retain the gold medals”.

The CAS Panel concludes that none of the NWBA’s filed contentions survive the Panel's analysis.
First, the ICC's reliance on Rule 1.1.4 was correct insofar as it declared the USA team to be the loser of the championship and therefore also of the gold medals.
Second, the ICC's conduct in administering its regime of penalties, while hesitant and confused, did not reach a level where it must be characterized as unfair or unreasonable; the result was the perfectly predictable consequence of a strict rule which the Panel can neither annul nor disregard.
That is also why the third contention must fail; as it stands, Rule 1.1.4 creates a regime that does not accommodate considerations of proportionality. Whether more flexible rules are desirable is a matter for debate within the appropriate governing bodies; they cannot be imposed by this Panel.

Therefore on 5 March 1996 the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides:

1.) Rejects each of the NWBA's alternative prayers for relief, and accordingly.
2.) Invites the Secretary General of CAS to dispose of the medals in his custody in accordance with the instructions of the IPC, and to release the cheque in the amount of US$ 2,000 to the IPC upon written certification by the latter that it will apply said amount to the cost of replacing the two missing medals.
3.) Makes no award of costs.

Avis consultatif TAS 94/128 Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI) et Comité National Olympique Italien (CONI)

Anti-Doping Rules
Conflict between the rules of an International Federation and those of a National Olympic Committee

In August 1994 the Italian Cycling Federation (FCI) initially decided to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on a cyclist following the guidelines of the Italian National Olympic Committee (CONI).
The cyclist appealed the decision and the sanction was reduced to a 3 month period of ineligibility.

The International Cycling Union (UCI) asserted that under the 1994 UCI Rules an anti-doping violation for using caffeine can only be sanctioned by a 3 month suspension.

In this matter the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) received in October 1994 the requests from UCI and CONI to render an advisory opinion about 4 questions.

The two questions of the UCI:

1.) Who is competent to regulate the anti-doping control: the international federation on the one hand or the National Olympic Committee (NOC) or another national sports body on the other?

2.) If the rule of the international federation conflicts with a rule issued or imposed by an NOC or national sports body, which of the two rules would prevail?

The two questions of CONI:

3.) Given that Italian federations are bound by Italian law to follow CONI anti-doping rules, and CONI is bound by Italian law to follow IOC anti-doping rules, what should CONI do if an Italian federation is part of an International federation whose anti-doping rules differ from those of the IOC.?

4.) Given that IOC anti-doping rules may change from time to time, in case a substance is moved from those sanctioned with a heavier penalty to those sanctioned with a lighter penalty, should the lighter penalty automatically apply when it enters into force also to previously sanctioned athletes?

On 5 January 1995 the CAS Panel rules:

1.) The UCI, the NOC or the national sports body are authorized to regulate doping. In this case it concerned a national competition under national Rules. In international competitions the UCI is authorized as International Federation and NOC and any other national sports body are subsidiair.

2.) In the case of an conflict, the Anti-Doping Rules of an International Federation prevail over the rules of an NOC or any other national sports body.

3.) CONI is legally bound to follow the IOC Anti-Doping Rules and to impose these on the Italian Federations.

4.) New IOC provisions are not applied automatically, except when the sports body has a clause in their statutes or regulations that such provisions are applied at once. In the situation that the IOC provision is applied automatically, the new provisions must also be applied to cases that occurred before these provisions came into force, if it lead to a more favourable result for the sanctioned athlete in anti-doping cases.