The Critical Power Model as a Potential Tool for Anti-doping / Michael J. Puchowicz, Eliran Mizelman, Assaf Yogev, Michael S. Koehle, Nathan E. Townsend and David C. Clarke. - (Frontiers in Physiology 9 (2018) 643 (6 June) : 1-21). - https://doi.org/10.3389/fphys.2018.00643. - https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fphys.2018.00643/full Abstract Existing doping detection strategies rely on direct and indirect biochemical measurement methods focused on detecting banned substances, their metabolites, or biomarkers related to their use. However, the goal of doping is to improve performance, and yet evidence from performance data is not considered by these strategies. The emergence of portable sensors for measuring exercise intensities and of player tracking technologies may enable the widespread collection of performance data. How these data should be used for doping detection is an open question. Herein, we review the basis by which performance models could be used for doping detection, followed by critically reviewing the potential of the critical power (CP) model as a prototypical performance model that could be used in this regard. Performance models are mathematical representations of performance data specific to the athlete. Some models feature parameters with physiological interpretations, changes to which may provide clues regarding the specific doping method. The CP model is a simple model of the power-duration curve and features two physiologically interpretable parameters, CP and W0. We argue that the CP model could be useful for doping detection mainly based on the predictable sensitivities of its parameters to ergogenic aids and other performance-enhancing interventions. However, our argument is counterbalanced by the existence of important limitations and unresolved questions that need to be addressed before the model is used for doping detection. We conclude by providing a simple worked example showing how it could be used and propose recommendations for its implementation.
iNADO Update (2018) 5 (2 August) Institute of National Anti-Doping Organisations (iNADO) _________________________________________________ Contents: - Upcoming iNADO Webinars - Save the Date - iNADO Workshop 2019 - 2019 Prohibited List Recommendations by the Dutch Doping Authority (incl. Salbutamol) - Job Vacancy at Drugfree Sport New Zealand: Programme Manager - Testing - What is the Status of Anti-Doping Programmes in Latin America? - Innovative Education Tools (Mobile App, Augmented and Virtual Reality). ASADA is ready to share these with Other ADOs. - Reminder: iDCOs Applications for 2nd European Games Minsk 2019 - Latvian NADO gains Independence and becomes Anti Doping Bureau of Latvia - The Athlete as Ambassador for Clean Sport: Also a Place for the Cheaters? - Azerbaijan Anti-Doping Agency: New Website and 13 New Sanctions published - Athlete Performance as (indirect) Evidence of Doping: Scientific Study - New at the Anti-Doping Knowledge Centre
CAS 2017/A/5099 Artur Taymazov v. International Olympic Committee (IOC) Related case: IOC 2016 IOC vs Artur Taymazov March 31, 2017 Wrestling Doping (turinabol; stanozolol) Automatic disqualification of results Application of the principle nulla poena sine culpa Burden of proof regarding fault or negligence Proportionality of the sanction Application of automatic disqualification of results in exceptional cases 1. Art. 8.1 of the IOC Anti-Doping Rules (ADR) provides for the so-called automatic disqualification of results following an in-competition positive doping control. Automatic disqualification of results of a competition in consequence of a positive in-competition test for a substance prohibited in that competition does not engage any consideration of fault or negligence or proportionality at all. 2. An anti-doping rule violation is in the language of the World Anti-Doping Code (WADC) a ‘violation’; and ‘automatic disqualification’ takes its place in a provision entitled ‘Sanctions’. Therefore, concepts relevant to crime and punishment are not entirely to be ignored to the detriment of the athlete. It is still incumbent on the relevant sports’ governing body to prove that a violation, as defined in the relevant regulations, has occurred and to place upon the athlete who has committed such violation only the prescribed consequences. Both the violation and its consequences are expressly and clearly provided for in the IOC ADR (and in the WADC, its source). There can be no departure from the presumption of innocence. The athlete is not presumed, but must be proven, to have committed an anti-doping rule violation. Therefore, there is no infringement of the principle nulla poena sine culpa. 3. Where the concepts of fault and negligence are material to the outcome of an appeal, the burden lies on the athlete to disprove their occurrence. Such burden cannot be discharged by reliance on a record of multiple clean tests or by the mere assertion by his or her counsel. At the very least an athlete must give evidence, preferably orally before the CAS panel, of the steps he or she took to discharge the “personal duty to ensure that no prohibited substance enters his or her body” (WADC Art 2.2.1). It is the athlete who holds the key cards where the cause as distinct from the correctness of the adverse analytical finding is in issue, since he (or she) either knows, or ought to know what he or she has ingested, and the sport’s governing body is unlikely to have either actual or constructive knowledge of this pivotal fact. 4. Disqualification is not only a proportionate penalty, but an inevitable one. Certain substances are prohibited under the WADC precisely because they are considered to have performance-enhancing properties. To allow an athlete to retain a medal in circumstances where such substances were present in his system would be unfair to his ‘clean’ competitors. 5. Art. 8.1 of the IOC ADR applies to all cases within its reach, whether admitted to be standard or said to be exceptional. _________________________________________________ Mr Artur Taymazov is a Uzbek Athlete competing in the Men’s 96-120 kg Freestyle wrestling event at the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games. In 2016, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) decided to perform further analyses on certain samples collected during the 2008 Olympic Games. These additional analyses were performed with analytical methods which were not available in 2008. As a result in July 2016 the IOC reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete after his 2008 A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substances stanozolol and dehydrochlormethyltestosterone (turinabol). The IOC Disciplinary Commission decided on 31 March 2017 that the Athlete committed an anti-doping rule violation and to disqualify his results including withdrawn of his gold medal and medallist pin. Hereafter in April 2017 the Athlete appealed the IOC decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The Athlete requested to set aside the IOC decision of 31 March 2017 and argued that he bears no Fault of Negligence in this case. The IOC requested the Panel to dismiss the Athlete’s appeal and contended that the Athlete was sanctioned as a result of valid positive in-competition doping test. The automatic disqualification was proportional and the Athlete failed to establish that there was no Fault or Negligence in this case. The Panel holds that the submissions of the Athlete, powerfully expressed though they were, were based on a fundamental misconception: that is to say, that automatic disqualification of results of a competition in consequence of a positive in-competition test for a substance prohibited in that competition engages any consideration of fault or negligence or proportionality at all. In the Panel’s view, that position is misconceived. All such considerations may be highly germane where periods of ineligibility (or other sanctions) are at stake, but this Panel is not concerned whether such sanctions are appropriate. The Panel finds that there was contrary to the Athlete’s submission, no infringement of the principle nulla poena sine culpa (enshrined in Article 7, no punishment without law) rather than Article 6 (a fair trial) of the ECHR and indubitably a principle of the lex ludica. Both the violation and its consequences are expressly and clearly provided for in the IOC ADR (and in the WADC, its source). There can be no departure from the presumption of innocence. The IOC was obliged to establish the ADRV and did so. The Athlete was not presumed, but proven, to have committed an ADRV. As to due process, the Athlete has accepted the re-test results and has not contended that the fact that the analysis was carried out in 2016 rather than in 2008 somehow and (if so, in what way) prevented him from challenging that analysis. As to whether, and to what extent, such delay would have prevented him from obtaining evidence which showed that the admitted presence of the prohibited substance in his sample was the result of circumstances for which he bore no or no significant responsibility (and therefore was guilty of no or no significant fault) the Panel need not consider. Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 4 December 2017 that: 1.) The appeal filed by Mr. Artur Taymazov against the International Olympic Committee concerning the decision of the IOC Disciplinary Commission dated 31 March 2017 on 21 April 2017 is dismissed. 2.) The decision rendered by the IOC Disciplinary Commission on 31 March 2017 is upheld. 3.) (…). 4.) (…). 5.) All other motions or prayers for relief are dismissed.
CAS 2016/A/4534 Maurico Fiol Villanueva v. Fédération Internationale de Natation (FINA) Related case: FINA 2016 FINA vs Mauricio Fiol Villanueva March 14, 2016 Aquatics (swimming) Doping (stanozolol) Mechanism of proof by an athlete of his/her absence of intent to commit an anti-doping rule violation (ADRV) Inconclusive evidentiary value of results of polygraph tests 1. Pursuant to art. 10.2.1.1 of the FINA Doping Control Rules, an athlete found to have committed an ADRV that does not involve a Specified Substance is subject to an ineligibility period of four years, unless the athlete can establish that the ADRV was not intentional. Neither the World Anti-Doping Code nor the applicable FINA Doping Control Rules, however, explicitly require an athlete to show the origin of the substance to establish that the ADRV was not intentional. Accordingly, while the determination of the origin of the prohibited substance undoubtingly represents a crucial element in the analysis of an athlete’s degree of Fault, a narrow corridor remains open for the athlete to establish his/her absence of intent to cheat despite being unable to identify the source of the prohibited substance causing the ADRV. 2. While other CAS panels may have previously found polygraph evidence to be admissible, such evidence is of limited value. Moreover, the cost involved is disproportionate to any probative value of such test. _________________________________________________ On 14 March 2016 the International Swimming Federation (FINA) Doping Panel decided to impose a 4 year period of ineligibility on the Peruvian swimmer Maurico Fiol Vilaueva after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance Stanozolol. Hereafer in April 2016 the Athlete appealed the FINA decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The Athlete requested the Panel to set aside the FINA Decision of 14 March 2016 and to impose a proportional reduced sanction. The Athlete denied the intentional use of the substance nor that he was reckless or negligent to his obligations to avoid and anti-doping violation. Neither did he know that there was a significant risk that his conduct might constitute or result in an anti-doping violation and manifestly disregarded that risk. The Athlete raised the theory that the source of the prohibited substance was contaminated horse meat consumed in Peru. Further the Athlete argued that he gave a prompt admission, accepted the test results, limited his arguments to the issue of the sanction and he cooperated with the doping control process throughout the proceedings before FINA and CAS. FINA contended that the Athlete failed to establish that the violation was not intentional nor did he establish how the substance entered his system and therefore must be sanctioned with a 4 year period of ineligibility. FINA rejected the Athlete’s polygraph evidence, his hair sample as evidence, his theory regarding his consumption of contaminated horse meat and his arguments for a further reduction of the sanction. The Panel holds that the following are the main issues which arise in this appeal: (i) In order to establish absence of intent for the purposes of DC, is it necessary for the Athlete to establish the source of the prohibited substance present in his sample? (“Proof of Source”) (ii) If it is necessary, has the Athlete established the source of the Stanozolol present in his sample? (“Source of Stanozolol”) (iii) If it is not necessary, has the Athlete established his lack of intent? (“Proof of Lack of Intent”) (iv) What is the meaning of FINA DC 10.6.3? (“FINA 10.6.3”) (v) Is the Athlete entitled to a reduction thereunder? (“Reduction for Admission”) (vi) Is the sanction of 4 years ineligibility on the Athlete disproportionate? (“Proportionality”). The Panel establish that there was no evidence upon which the Athlete could rely to discharge his burden of proving lack of intent. Also the absence of evidence as to the source of the Stanozolol closed off one avenue. All that was left were his protestations of innocence, the character evidence given by his coach, the lie detector test, the hair sample analysis and his bare assertion that his recent improvements in terms of times for his events achieved prior to the Pan-Am Games were the product of superior conditioning. The Panel notes that CAS Panels have in the past considered the suitability of polygraph evidence and in doing so, have never found it dispositive. Considering the Athlete’s other arguments in this case the Panel is unable to allow the Athlete a reduction of the sanction in accordance with the FINA DC or the WADC 2015. Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 16 March 2017 that: 1.) The appeal filed by Mr. Mauricio Fiol Villanueva on 4 April 2016 is dismissed. 2.) (…). 3.) (…). 4.) All other motions or prayers for relief are dismissed.
CAS 2016/A/4502 Patrick Leeper v. International Paralympic Committee (IPC) Paralympic athletics (track and field) Doping (benzoylecgonine) Relationship between the right of appeal against decisions and the recognition of decisions Right of appeal against settlement agreements Right of appeal against first instance settlement agreements only Parties bound by the settlement agreement Applicability of recognition under Article 15.1 IPC Code to settlement agreements Application of Article 10.5.2 IPC Code/WADC to social/recreational drugs 1. The IPC Code provides some provisions in order to prevent the IPC to be bound by a decision that it does not want to be bound by: (a) a right to appeal against (certain) decisions under Article 13 of the IPC Code and (b) the rules of Article 15 regarding recognition of decisions. From the wording and structure of Article 15 of the IPC Code (according to which (non-)recognition of decisions is “subject to the right of appeal”) and from the fact that Article 15 of the IPC Code only refers to “final adjudications” (i.e. adjudications that – because of their finality – are no longer subject to a right of appeal) it follows that under the IPC Code appeals take precedence over recognition of decisions, and that both articles are mutually exclusive. However, in circumstances where the requirements for recognition of decisions of Article 15.1 of the IPC Code are not met the IPC is not necessarily obliged to appeal the decision in question. Lastly, whatever can be the object of an appeal under Article 13.2 of the IPC Code must also be the object of (non-)recognition; this is because both provisions (Article 13.2 and Article 15.1 IPC Code) pursue a similar goal, i.e. to review decisions taken by an anti-doping organization in light of the principles of the IPC Code/WADC and squash the effects of such decision in case of non-compliance. 2. Given that Article 7.10 of the IPC Code, which addresses “notification of Results Management Decisions”, stipulates that an anti-doping organization which has agreed with an athlete to the imposition of a sanction without a hearing, shall give notice thereof to other anti-doping organizations with a right to appeal, it can be concluded that the term “Results Management Decisions” in Article 7.10 of the IPC Code has to be understood in a broad sense. It follows from the above that also in the context of appeals under Article 13.2 of the IPC Code, the term “appealable decision” must, in principle, be construed in a broad sense, encompassing also agreements between an anti-doping organization and an athlete with respect to consequences in relation to an alleged anti-doping rule violation. 3. The structure of the IPC Code allows the conclusion that the IPC Code intends to differentiate between a results management stage, including results management hearings, and an appeal stage, and that the right of appeal is only applicable to decisions emanating from the results management stage. Consequently, any decision taken at the appeal stage – e.g. a settlement agreement concluded between an athlete and an anti-doping organization which is designed to terminate pending CAS appeal proceedings and therefore to substitute for the appeal decision before the CAS (rather than to substitute the first instance results management decision) – is not subject to appeals within the meaning of Article 13 or Article 15.1 of the IPC Code. 4. There are no procedural reasons for which a third party would be bound by a private agreement reached outside state or arbitration proceedings, e.g. a settlement agreement. 5. Article 15.1 of the WADC/IPC Code obliges the signatories of the WADC to recognise “testing, hearing results or other final adjudications” of other signatories. Whereas the term “adjudication” used in Article 15.1 of the IPC Code is not a defined term within the meaning of the IPC Code or the WADC, when looking at the language used, the grammar and the syntax as well as taking into account the intentions of the IPC in drafting the provision it first can be noted that Article 15.1 of the IPC Code does not refer to “decisions” as the object of recognition. Instead, the provision refers to parts of the decision-making process, such as “Testing” and “hearing results”. The provision, thus, makes it clear that the term “adjudication” must be construed in a broad sense and not only the final outcome of the results-management process or specific forms of decision-making may be the object of recognition, but also separate parts thereof. E.g. also a private agreement between an athlete and an anti-doping organization has to be considered as a “final adjudication” and the IPC cannot refuse recognition of the settlement agreement on the pure fact that the decision takes the form of an agreement. 6. The 2015 WADC does not advocate a dual approach when dealing with the consequences of social/recreational drug use depending on the kind of drug consumed by the athlete (e.g. cannabinoids or cocaine). To the contrary in principle there are good reasons to also apply Article 10.5.2 of the IPC Code/WADC regarding reduction of the period of ineligibility based on No Significant Fault or Negligence to cases where an athlete has knowingly ingested cocaine outside competition (but tested positive in-competition), thereby taking a harmonized approach with respect to recreational drug use. However, in circumstances where the use of cocaine was influenced by an athlete’s addiction to alcohol and happened while the athlete was drunk it is not right to say that the degree of fault displayed by the athlete was “light” or “minimal”. Instead, the degree of negligence displayed would have to be qualified as “normal”. _________________________________________________ On 6 November 2015 the American Arbitration Association (AAA) decided to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the Paralympic Athlete Patrick Leeper after his sampel tested positive for the prohibited substance cocaine. Hereafter in November 2015 the Athlete appealed the AAA decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS) case CAS 2015/A/4323. Here the Athlete requested a stay of the proceedings to allow the him and USADA the opportunity to attempt to negotiate a settlement agreement concerning the Sanction. Thereafter, the Athlete and USADA settled their dispute and agreed – among other things – that USADA would impose a 1 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete and that the he would accept 1 year ban, and withdraw his appeal. USADA and the Athlete executed the settlement agreement on 15 January 2016. On 16 February 2016, the Athlete informed the CAS of the Settlement Agreement and requested that CAS terminate the arbitration. On the other hand when informed the International Paralympic Committee (IPC) decided on 22 February to reject this Settlement Agreement. Hereafter in March 2016 the Athlete filed an appeal against the IPC decision with CAS (case CAS 2016/A/4502). The Athlete requested the Panel to set aside the IPC decision of 22 February 2016 and to recognize the Settlement Agreement of 15 January 2016. The IPC contended that the Athlete has changed his explanation for his positive test, now accepting that the explanation provided to the AAA panel was entirely false and fabricated. Instead, the Athlete stated that he had in fact used cocaine intentionally a few days before his positive test, while drunk, and that his behaviour had been caused by his longstanding alcoholism. The IPC argued that aside from the Athlete’s own account, no supporting evidence was provided for his new explanation. The IPC had and continues to have grave concerns as to the highly unorthodox procedure adopted in the Athlete’s case (for which no explanation has ever been forthcoming, either from USADA or the Athlete). As a result on 22 February 2016 the IPC rejected the Settlement Agreement and confirmed that it would recognise only the undisturbed AAA Decision and not the later Settlement Agreement. The Panel is of the view that there was no right to appeal the Settlement Agreement. In coming to this conclusion the Panel first and foremost looked at Article 13.2 IPC Code. This provision establishes whether decisions are subject to appeal before CAS or not. Agreements executed between an ADO and an athlete at the appeal stage before the CAS are not expressly mentioned in Article 13.2 IPC Code. The Panel finds that the Settlement Agreement is not the outcome of an arbitration agreement or a consent award, but of a private agreement reached outside state or arbitration proceedings. Consequently, the Panel sees no reason on what procedural ground the Settlement Agreement could bind also the IPC. This is all the more true, since the IPC was not a party involved in the previous proceedings before the CAS (CAS 2015/A/4323) which was withdrawn by the Athlete. In the case at hand it is undisputed between the Parties that the cocaine consumption by the Athlete was not intentional within the meaning of Article 10.2.3 IPC Code/WADC. Consequently, the maximum period of ineligibility in the case at hand is two years. However, it is disputed between the Parties if and to what extent a further reduction of the otherwise applicable period of ineligibility applies in light of the circumstances of this case. Establishing the Athlete’s degree of fault in this case the Panel holds that the period of ineligibility imposed on the Athlete in the Settlement Agreement was clearly dictated first and foremost by the (understandable, however not justifiable) desire to allow the Athlete to compete at the Paralympics. Considering all aspects of this case the Panel finds that the IPC was in its right according to Article 15.1 IPC Code/WADC not to recognize the Settlement Agreement. Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 12 August 2016 that: 1.) The appeal filed by Mr Patrick Leeper against the International Paralympic Committee on 14 March 2016 is dismissed. 2.) The International Paralympic Committee has no obligation to recognize the Settlement Agreement between Mr Patrick Leeper and the United States Anti-Doping Agency dated 15 January 2016. (…) 5.) All other motions or prayers for relief are dismissed.
iNADO Quarterly Report 2/2018 / Institute of National Anti-Doping Organisations (iNADO). - Bonn : iNADO, 2018 (See attached pdf-file for more information) This communication goes to iNADO’s 67 Members. iNADO is happy to answer any questions on your Institute’s activities. Please send your questions to email@example.com _________________________________________________ Contents: - Interim Operational Leadership at iNADO - NADO Finances - iNADO Attendance at Anti-Doping Conferences/Meeting - NADOs Visited - iNADO Webinars - iNADO Board Meetings - iNADO Public Statements - iNADO Updates - iNADO Member Communications - Added Documents to iNADO Website - Other iNADO Projects and Activities
IAAF Taskforce Report to the IAAF Congress about the Russian Athletics Federation (RusAF) - 27 July 2018
IAAF Taskforce report to IAAF Congress, 27 July 2018 / Rune Andersen. - International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF). - Monaco : IAAF, 2018 ____________________________________________________ The IAAF Council noted significant progress by the Russian Federation in meeting the outstanding requirements, and in some cases going above and beyond what was required, but has decided that the Russian federation’s suspension will remain in force until its next meeting in December. Chair of the Russia Taskforce, Rune Andersen, outlined in his report to Council the three main requirements still outstanding: - Payment of the costs incurred by the IAAF as a result of the Russian crisis, including the costs of the Taskforce and the costs of the various CAS cases. RusAF has made a written commitment to pay all of those costs once they are finalised. - Reinstatement of RUSADA by WADA, which depends upon: - The Russian authorities acknowledging the findings of the McLaren and Schmid Commissions that officials from the Russian Ministry of Sport orchestrated the doping conspiracy and cover-up described in their reports; and - The Russian authorities providing access to the data from testing of samples at the Moscow lab from 2011 to 2015, so that the IAAF and other sports concerned can determine whether the suspicious findings reported in the Moscow lab’s LIMS database should or should not be pursued as adverse analytical findings. The Taskforce explained that it understood WADA was communicating with the Russian authorities to try to resolve these points before the meeting of the WADA ExCo in September 2018, where it hopes there will be a breakthrough. If these points are resolved before the Council’s next meeting, in Monaco in December 2018, then the Taskforce would hope and expect to be able to recommend that RusAF be provisionally reinstated at that time. If not, if those points remain unresolved, then the Taskforce will not be able to make that recommendation but instead would have to consider other options.
CAS 2018/A/5570 Denislav Dimitrov Ivanov v. International Judo Federation (IJF) On 4 Januari 2018 the International Judo Federation (IJF) decided to impose a 4 year period of ineligibility on the Bulgarian Judoka Denislav Dimitrov Ivanov after he tested positive for the prohibited substance GW1516 (Peroxisome Proliferator Activated Receptor δ (PPARδ) agonists). Hereafter in Januari 2018 the Athlete appealed the IJF decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The Athlete denied the intentional use of the substance and argued that the positive test was possibly caused by the medication he used for his treatment, contaminated supplements or a protein drink he took in a fitness centre. The IJF contended that the Athlete did not challenge the anti-doping violation; in fact he admitted the violation; de sanction of 4 years was justified while the Athlete failed to establish that it was not intentional. The Sole Arbitrator holds that the Athlete did not provide any evidence or documentation that dietary/food additives or vitamins contaminated with GW1516 could cause the adverse analytical finding in the present case. It follows that the Sole Arbitrator finds the Athlete's assertion unsubstantiated. Accordingly, the Sole Arbitrator finds that the Athlete has not met his burden of proof, and the violation must be deemed to be intentional. The Athlete must therefore be sanctioned with a 4 year period of ineligibility under the 2017 IJF ADR. Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 17 May 2018 that: 1.) The appeal filed on 2 4 January 2018 by Mr Denislav Dimitrov Ivanov against the decision rendered by the International Judo Federation Executive Committee on 4 January 2018 is dismissed. 2.) The decision rendered by the International Judo Federation Executive Committee is upheld. 3.) Mr. Denislav Dimitrov Ivanov is sanctioned with a four (4) year period of ineligibility, starting from 15 October 2017. 4.) All competitive results of Mr Denislav Dimitrov Ivanov from and including 15 September 2017 to 15 October 2017 are disqualified, with all resulting consequences, including forfeiture of any titles, awards, medals, profits, prizes, and appearance money. 5.) Mr Denislav Dimitrov Ivanov is ordered to pay a total amount of CHF 2,000 (two thousand Swiss Francs) to the International Judo Federation as a contribution to its legal costs and other expenses that it has incurred in these proceedings. 6.) All further and other requests for relief are dismissed.
In January 2018 the National Doping Control Commission of Chile (CNCD) has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete Sebastian Andre Valdivia Floresafter his sample tested positive for the prohibited substances 19-norandrosterone and 19-noretiocholanolone (Nandrolone). After notification a provisional suspension was ordered. The Athlete filed a statement in his defence and he was heard for the Disciplinary Panel of the Tribunal de Expertos en Dopaje (TED). The Athlete accepted the test results, admitted the violation, denied the intentional use of the substances. He assumed that his consumption of meat or his use of the product Tribulus Terrestris testosterone booster might have caused the positive test results. He argued that he was tested before without issues and didn't have the resources to buy expensive substances as Nandrolone. The Panel finds that the Athlete failed to provide evidence in support of his arguments and assertions. Also the Panel considers that he admitted the violation and gave an explanation how the substance entered his system. Therefore on 6 June 2018 the TED Disciplinary Panel decides to impose a 30 month period of ineligibility on the Athlete starting on the date of the provisional suspension, i.e. on 25 January 2018.
In March 2018 the National Doping Control Commission of Chile (CNCD) has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the minor tennis player after her sample tested positive for the prohibited substance Canrenone. After notification a provisional suspension was ordered. The Minor Athlete filed a statement in her defence and she was heard for the Disciplinary Panel of the Tribunal de Expertos en Dopaje (TED). The Athlete's parents requested to set aside the allegations against their daughter. They contended that the Athlete's medication provided by her doctor and pharmacy could not be the source of the positive test as the medication was checked for prohibited substances. Also the substance Canrenone is not available in Chile. The Panel holds that the Athlete's parents didn't provide evidence in support of their allegations and arguments. The Panel finds that the violation was not intentional as the CNCD did not provide evidence to the contrary. The Panel considers that Minor Athlete was inexperienced, had not received anti-doping education and that the substance in question does not enhance sport performance for establishing No Significant Fault or Negligence. Therefore on 6 June 2018 the TED Disciplinary Panel decides to impose a 6 month period of ineligibility on the Minor Athlete starting on the date of the provisional suspension, i.e. on 6 March 2018.