Facts
The Swedish Sport Confederation (Riksidrottsförbundet, RF) charged Pontus Dolfei, the athlete, for a violation of the Anti-Doping Rules. The athlete had tested positive for Cocaine (S6a) and THC (S8) on October 5, 2014. Which are prohibited substances according the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) 2014 prohibited list.

History
The athlete had been provisionally suspended since November 10, 2014.

Decision
The sanction is a period of ineligibility of 30 months from November 10, 2014 until May 9, 2017.

The use of legislation in relation to controlling the production, movement, importation, distribution and supply of performance enhancing drugs in sport (PEDS) / Barrie Houlihan and Borja García. - Institute of Sport and Leisure Policy School of Sport, Exercise and Health Sciences Loughborough University: Loughborough, 2012

The revised World Anti-Doping Code which entered into force on 2009 marked an important development in the fight against doping in sport. Among the many changes introduced one of the most significant was the expansion of the scope of anti-doping activity beyond the use of substances by athletes to incorporate a concern to address issues associated with the production, movement, importation, distribution and supply of performance-enhancing drugs. Such a broadening of the remit of anti-doping activity not only involves National Anti-Doping Organisations (NADO's) in a series of relationships with other non-sport anti-drugs organisations, but also involves the introduction of new laws and/or amendments to existing legislation.
UNESCO States Parties to the International Convention against Doping in Sport have adopted a variety of responses to the implementation of the revised Code and particularly to the requirements of Article 8 of the UNESCO Convention which notes that ‘States Parties shall, where appropriate, adopt measures to restrict the availability of prohibited substances and methods in order to restrict their use in sport by athletes, unless the use is based upon a therapeutic use exemption. These include measures against trafficking to athletes and, to this end, measures to control production, movement, importation, distribution and sale.’

The independent commission report #1 : final report / Richard H. McLaren, Richard W. Pound and Günter Younger. - WADA : Montreal, 2015

On December 3, 2014, the German television channel ARD aired the documentary “Top Secret Doping: How Russia makes its Winners”, alleging the existence of a sophisticated and well established system of state-sponsored doping within the All Russia Athletics Federation (ARAF), the governing body for the sport of athletics in Russia, recognized as such by the responsible international federation (IF), the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF).
Implicated in the documentary were Russian athletes, coaches, national and international sport federations, the Russian Anti-Doping Agency (RUSADA) and the Moscow WADA-accredited laboratory. Witness statements and other evidence allegedly exposed high levels of collusion among athletes, coaches, doctors, regulatory officials, and sports agencies to systematically provide Russian athletes performance enhancing drugs (PEDs) in order to achieve the state’s main goal, as alleged in the ARD documentary: producing winners.

The investigation has confirmed the existence of widespread cheating through the use of doping substances and methods to ensure, or enhance the likelihood of, victory for athletes and teams. The cheating was done by the athletes’ entourages, officials and the athletes themselves.
Evidence of extensive doping use is supported and confirmed by audio and video evidence, scientific evidence, corroborative statements, cyber analysis and related reporting documents. Numerous statements corroborate the original allegations and further detail the extensive use of doping substances and blood doping within Russian athletics.
In addition, evidence exists that confirms that coaches have attempted to manipulate or interfere with doping reports and testing procedures. They are also the source and counselling of athletes’ use of PEDs. The coaches are supported in their doping efforts by certain medical professionals. Moreover, it is particularly alarming that there appears to be a collective disregard for the athletes’ current or future state of health.

Drug Games: The International Politics of Doping and the Olympic Movement, 1960-2007 / Thomas Mitchell Hunt. - University of Texas: Austin, 2007

The widespread use of performance-enhancing drugs among elite athletes is the most important policy problem in modern Olympic history. Although several works have addressed the subject (a few of which are admittedly excellent), they have been limited either temporally or by a lack of access to archival sources of information. Based on research in both American and foreign archives, this dissertation complements earlier, path-breaking works by tracing the evolution of Olympic doping policy from 1960 to the present.
Olympic policymakers first seriously considered the subject of doping after suspicions arose that the death of Danish cyclist Knud Jensen at the 1960 Rome Olympic Games was triggered by the use of amphetamines. For most of the next decade, these officials attempted to define the doping problem and struggled to formulate a program for its solution. An international politics of doping consequently developed, under which the various bodies of the Olympic governance structure failed, due to their divergent interests and jurisdictions, to implement a coordinated plan. Until recently, administrators working at all levels of this organizational system tended to formulate doping policies with the idea of dampening the effects of public controversy. In addition, the influence of the Cold War on the Olympics exacerbated the situation, as national governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain, believing that success in the Olympic medals race was essential to their images abroad, condoned the use of ergogenic aids among elite competitors. It was not until Canadian track star Ben Johnson tested positive for an anabolic steroid after setting a new world record in the one-hundred meter sprint at the 1988 Seoul Games that a different policy direction was initiated. The involvement of national governments after the scandal led eventually to the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency in November 1999. The consolidation of regulatory authority in this agency has transformed the issue of doping in the Olympics from a combined political and scientific problem to one based more appropriately on the latter.

If elite sport has developed as a “vast, loosely coordinated experiment upon the human organism,” then the efforts to regulate doping within that experimentation have been decidedly dysfunctional. Since the subject first became an issue of public concern in the 1960's, Olympic policymakers, whichever the individual organization to which they belonged, confronted doping issues on ad-hoc bases with little long-term planning; substantive measures were, as a consequence, rarely undertaken outside times of crisis. This was in part due to the diffuse governance system under which the Olympic movement operated; regulatory power over doping was divided among several levels of international and national federations, national Olympic committees, and organizing bodies for individual competitions. At the same time, failures among public and private policymakers to recognize the salience of the doping issue and to fulfill responsibilities for its effective regulation ensured that this structure remained intact for multiple decades.
To be fair, there were successes in the struggle to curtail performance-enhancing drugs in the Olympics; at the same time, not every individual in the Olympic community was personally culpable for the movement’s failures. Few would argue, as an example, that Dick Pound was willing to overlook controversial subjects for individual or organizational gain. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Olympic leaders with Pound’s integrity remained far too few for much too long. During his presidency of the IOC, for instance, Avery Brundage was too enmeshed in notions of amateurism to spend much time on “insignificant” matters like doping; his successor, Lord Killanin, bumbled his John Hoberman, Mortal Engines: The Science of Performance and the Dehumanization of Sport (New York: Free Press, 1992) way through eight years of leadership, accomplishing little; perhaps worst of all, Juan Antonio Samaranch chose to largely ignore the issue in pursuit of ever more lucrative economic rewards. Even during the last several years, those willing to take a stand against the status quo were often punished; it was no accident that Dick Pound finished third in the 2001 IOC presidential election. If one wished to dampen the prospects for success in the battle against doping, organizational decentralization, venality, and individual indifference therefore provided a potent mixture.
Even when progress was made, plans for reform were usually prepared only after the occurrence of some “focusing event” that frightened policymakers into action. This shortcoming was perhaps best articulated at a November 2000 meeting of the WADA Foundation Board by member Paul Henderson, who observed, “No good lesson was ever learnt except through the eyes of disaster.”2 Although the use of performance-enhancing drugs in the Olympics was known to occur prior to 1960, serious dialogue regarding the subject did not begin until the death of Knud Jensen in that year’s Rome Olympic Games.
While regulations against doping were gradually instituted over the next decade, the powers to enforce them remained dispersed among the various components of the movement’s governance system. Despite periodic efforts at reform, this framework was maintained until public authorities threatened to intervene after Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson tested positive for an anabolic steroid at the 1988 Summer Olympics in Seoul, South Korea. Even then, it took policymakers over a decade to implement a more integrated regime through the creation of the World Anti-Doping Agency in November 1999. To their credit, anti-doping authorities, freed from the problems created by the previously fragmented regulatory system with the creation of WADA and the ratification of the World Anti-Doping Code, began to plan in advance for the scientific advances that will collectively constitute the future of doping. During the first decade of the twenty-first century, for example, several conferences were held regarding the possible applications of genomics to athletic enhancement. Speaking to the anticipated benefits of this early start, WADA member Theodore Friedmann thus asserted, “There is a much greater level of awareness, and that’s the starting point. The World Anti-Doping Code even included a provision that “the use of genetic transfer technology to dramatically enhance sport performance should be prohibited as contrary to the spirit of sport even if it is not harmful.
The tragedy is that however admirable, these developments are too late to definitively “win” the war against doping in the Olympics. The fact is that we live in a performance-enhanced society. Examples of this abound: the stimulant Dexedrine was used by military pilots in the Gulf War of 1990, college students regularly take amphetamine-based psychiatric drugs in pursuit of higher grade-point averages and an increasing number of non-elderly individuals are prescribed testosterone and human growth hormone to counteract the effects of aging. In the Olympics, this “medicalized” environment has led to acceptable forms and levels of “soft doping.” Under current WADA guidelines, for example, a competitor’s testosterone to epitestosterone ratio must exceed 4.0 before a urine sample is submitted to isotopic ratio mass spectrometry.
Because this ratio far exceeds that which is ordinarily found in the human body, athletes are consequently allowed to “cheat” within arbitrarily-constructed limits.6 The genetic revolution will only make matters worse; alluding to novelist Aldous Huxley’s gloomy vision of the human future, Pound thus stated, “The drug problem is the devil we know . . . and here we are at the beginning of a brave new world.
The dilemmas presented by these prospects were perhaps best put in March 2002 by Joseph Glorioso, director of the Pittsburgh Human Gene Therapy Center, in a question that cut to the heart of the future of doping. “How do we distinguish enhancement from treatment?” he wondered. Elucidating the answer will be the central challenge for future Olympic policymakers.

Doping in sport is nothing new, but it has grown, expanded geographically and become more visible in recent years. It is a true scourge for many competitive sports and jeopardises the health of millions of young athletes throughout the world.
Since the 1960s, the Council of Europe has realized the extent of this problem and decided to fight it. The Anti-Doping Convention, opened for signature on November 16, 1989 in Strasbourg and entering into force on March 1, 1990, demonstrates this commitment. It expresses the Contracting Parties’ political will to fight against doping in sport in an active and coordinated manner.
The main objective of the Convention is to promote the harmonization, at national and international levels, of the measures to be taken against doping.
The Convention does not claim to create a uniform model of anti-doping, but sets a certain number of common standards and regulations requiring that the Parties adopt legislative, financial, technical, educational and other measures. Its spirit derives from the political desire to help safeguard the ethics of sport and to preserve the integrity of clean sport.
By joining the principles and objectives of the Convention, the contracting Parties undertake, in their respective constitutional provisions, to set up a national anti-doping policy to:
– create a national coordinating body;
– reduce the trafficking of doping substances and the use of banned doping agents;
– reinforce doping controls and improve detection techniques;
– support education and information programs;
– guarantee the efficiency of sanctions taken against offenders;
– collaborate with national and international sports organisations;
– and use accredited anti-doping laboratories.
A monitoring system was created under the Convention and the Monitoring Group of the Anti-Doping Convention set up under Article 10 of the Convention is the body responsible for monitoring the application of the Convention. Parties to the Convention are under the obligation to provide the Council of Europe with information on legislative and other measures taken for the purpose of complying with the terms of the Convention, in accordance with Article 9. In order to facilitate this process, a questionnaire was prepared, requesting national reports from the Parties on the implementation of the Convention.
This report, reflecting the data of Netherlands for the year 2010, has been compiled for the purpose of monitoring of the convention by its Committee and is published for transparency. Comments may be sent to the secretariat of the Council of Europe, Sport department (sport@coe.int).

Performance Enhancing Drugs Pose a Significant Health Risk for Athletes, Children and Youth : Final Report of the Task Force on the Use of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Football / Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport: 2011

Doping poses a threat to sport worldwide, including Canadian sport. It undermines the principles of open, fair and safe competition. It devalues these principles of sport in general and puts the athlete under unreasonable pressure. It seriously affects the image of sport and poses a serious threat to individual health. Young athletes participating in amateur sport are no exception. At the international, national, and university sport level, the fight against doping must take into account detection and deterrence, prevention, and health and education dimensions.
To that end, and in response to the unprecedented positive results of urine and blood doping control out-of-season testing conducted on CIS football players in the spring and early summer of 2010, the Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport convened a Task Force of experts to examine the issue of performance-enhancing drug use in football. The Task Force was motivated by a unanimous concern regarding the use of performance enhancing drugs in the sport of tackle football.
The Task Force membership would like to recognize the University of Waterloo and its Athletic Director, Mr. Bob Copeland, for the leadership they have demonstrated in their efforts to better understand how this situation occurred and to develop an action plan to deter the use of performance enhancing substances by future football players and the student-athlete population at large.
The University of Waterloo immediately commissioned a review of their football program in relation to the use of banned substances, led by retired Waterloo Regional Police Service Chief Larry Gravill and University of Waterloo Professor Emerita, Dr. Mary Thompson. Their final report was considered during this Task Force’s deliberations and is referenced in this document. Mr. Copeland also chaired the Ontario University Athletic (OUA) Performance Enhancing Drugs Education Task Force.

Their work has informed and complements the work contained within this report. The Task Force on the Use of Performance Enhancing Drugs in Tackle Football is optimistic that the recommendations contained within this report will influence the development and implementation of innovative doping prevention programs which transcend the student-athlete population from high school through college and university football.
Further recommendations as they relate to intelligence and investigations work will enhance doping control sample collection procedures to target athletes and increase the effectiveness of testing programs. And finally, the Task Force is hopeful that this document will generate positive discussion and dialogue across government departments, including Health Canada and Sport Canada, with all orders of government including provincial and
territorial education ministries, with sport authorities, and corporate Canada, in an effort to discover new ways of educating athletes about the serious health consequences of using performance enhancing substances and to deter and prevent doping.
The Task Force undertook a comprehensive examination and reached consensus on issues in six main areas:
Testing and Analysis, Education, Intelligence, Policy/Sanctions, Partner Engagement and Costs/Funding.

Recommendations for action are presented in each section of this report.
Some key recommendations include:
• Anti-doping and ethical decision making education should be incorporated in the provincial and territorial curriculum to target young athletes in and out of the sport of football. And, health education that focuses on body image and performance enhancing drug use should be included for all students;
• Performance enhancing drug education should be mandatory for coaches, strength and conditioning personnel, and other administrators;
• Significantly increase testing from the current level of 2-3% to 30% of the total number of football players;
• Establish a ‘report doping in sport’ hotline and associated web-based reporting tool supported by an effective communications plan to promote the resource;
• Further consequences, beyond player ineligibility (CADP Sanctions) should be applied to teams and institutions; and
• Development of transparent cost sharing agreements between anti-doping organizations, government, corporate sponsors, institutions, sport organizations and professional football should be considered.

Blog Symposium: The impact of the revised World Anti-Doping Code on the work of National Anti-Doping Agencies / Herman Ram. - Asser international sports law blog

The 2015 World Anti-Doping Code is not a new Code, but a revision of the 2009 Code. In total, 2.269 changes have been made. Quite a number of these changes are minor corrections, additions and reformulations with little or no impact on the work of NADOs. But the number of truly influential changes is still impressive, which makes it hard to choose.

Luckily, WADA has identified the – in their view – more significant changes in a separate document and I have used this document to bring some order in a number of comments that I want to make on the impact of those revisions on our daily work.

Part of what follows is based on our experiences with the implementation of the revised Code so far, but quite a bit of what follows cannot be based on any actual experience, because the revised Code has only been in place for seven months, and only a rather small number of disciplinary procedures in relatively simple cases have come to a final decision under the revised rules. As a result, and because I am not in the business of predicting the future, on this occasion I have decided to share some of my expectations with you. Only the future can tell whether I am right on those issues.

Facts
The Canadian Centre for Ethics in Sport (CCES) has repored an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete Bruce Jordon after his sample tested positive for the prohibited substance Methylhexaneamine (dimethylpentylamine).

After notification the Athlete failed to respond to the CCES communications nor did he accept the provisional suspension.
Consequently the SDRCC decides on 27 March 2013 to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete starting on the date of the decision.

TAS 2015/A/1 Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority, on behalf of Australian Canoeing and the Australian Sports Commission v, Tate Smith

CAS (Oceania Registry) A1/2015 Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA), on behalf of Australian Canoeing (AC) and the Australian Sports Commission (ASC) v. Tate Smith

• Canoeing
• Doping (stanozolol)
• Burden of proof
• Adverse inference

1. In accordance with Article 3.1 of the WADA Code, the athlete bears the onus of proof to establish first how the substance was ingested and second that he was neither negligent nor at fault. He must establish his case on the balance of probabilities as understood in Australian civil law, as the law of the dispute is the law of New South Wales, and constant CAS jurisprudence.

2. The fact that three other team members were tested at the same time as the athlete concerned and that no Adverse Analytical Findings were recorded permits of an inference that the prohibited substance was either not present in the training waters or, if it was, could not penetrate their skins.

In December 2014 and in January 2015 the Australian Sports Anti-Doping Authority (ASADA) has reported anti-doping rule violations against the Athlete Tate Smith after his samples - provided in July 2014 - tested positive for the prohibited substance Stanozolol. After notification the Athlete filed a statement in his defence and he was heard for the Oceania Registry Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)

The Athlete denied the intentional use of the substance and asserted that there were three posible explanations on how the substance had entered his system:

• drinking local water;
• wet hands causing contaminated water to enter the sample;
• absorption of the substance through the skin.

Here the Sole Arbitrator received no direct evidence of the presence of Stanozolol. Material relied on to establish the presence of Stanozolol was, according to some experts, to be found in a report published in 2011 (the Deshmukh Report) which established the presence of Stanozolol in the Danube river, approximately 110 kms from the subject site.

The Sole Arbitrator finds that the connection between the presence of Stanozolol in the first half of 2010 (and not at all in the second half) in the Danube, and its presence nearly six years later in Szolnok 110 kms away is so slim as to be negligible. Of course, it cannot be established conclusively that there were no prohibited substances in the water over which the Athlete trained but the evidence does not go beyond establishing the presence as anything other than a bare possibility.

In all the circumstances, the Sole Arbitrator is of the opinion that the Athlete has failed to discharge the onus upon him to establish how Stanozolol entered his system and hence concludes that ASADA’s application must succeed.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 2 October 2015 that:

1.) On or about 22 July 2014, the Respondent committed the anti-doping rule violations of Presence and Use of a Prohibited Substance in breach of Article 7 of the Bylaw (which incorporates by reference Article 2 of the WADA Code) and Article 6.1 of the Policy.

2.) In accordance with Article 17 of the Bylaw (which incorporates by reference Article 10 of the WADA Code) and Article 19.2 of the Policy, a period of ineligibility be imposed upon the Respondent for a period of two (2) years, backdated to commence on 8 September 2014.

3.) All competitive results obtained by the Respondent from 22 July 2014 shall be invalidated with all resulting consequences including forfeiture of any medals, points or prizes.

(…)

6.) All other requests for relief are dismissed.

Facts
Drug Free Sport New Zealand (DFSNZ) alleged Damon Tafatu, the athlete, for a violation of the Anti-Doping Rules. During a match on November 3, 2012, a sample was taken for doping test purposes. Analysis of the sample showed the presence of dimethylpentylamine which is a prohibited substance according the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) 2012 prohibited list. It is regarded as a specified substance.

History
The athlete requested a B sample analysis, this analysis confirmed the findings of the A sample. The athlete admitted the violation and elected to participate in the proceedings to make submissions on the appropriate penalty. He had declared on the DFS doping control form that he had taken two substances on that day: “Pre Workout Jacked 3D 1 scoop” and “Super Pump Max 1 scoop”. But it turned out that another product he had not mentioned (1MR) was the cause for the positive test, he had not regarded this product as a supplement. He claimed he had no intention to enhance his sport performance.
There were are too many inconsistencies in the athlete’s evidence, to enable the Tribunal to accept on the balance of probabilities that the 1 MR was the source, that he took Jack3d Micro and not Jack3d on the day of the competition, or even that the substance tested by DFS was the substance which he took. These ‘inconsistencies’ mean that his evidence cannot be relied upon to satisfy how the prohibited substance had entered the athlete’s body. Also the athlete had mentioned the taking of supplements to give him a lift because he was disappointed in his results. The athlete had claimed in his submissions that he had received poor education on doping issues, but this was not acknowledged by the tribunal.

Decision
- The sanction is a period of ineligibility of two years and commences from December 5, 2012.
- His results obtained on November 3, 2012, are disqualified as well as are his results in any other competition held between that date and the date of this decision.