The Australian Football League (AFL) charged the Essendon Football Club (the club) with the following offence against the Australian Football League Player Rules: players were administered substances that were prohibited by the AFL Anti-Doping Code and the World Anti-Doping Code. The substances administered were:

• Actovegin;
• unspecified amino acids
• unspecified multi-vitamins;
• AOD-9604 creams;
• AOD-9604 injections;
• Cerebrolysin;
• Colostrum;
• Lactaway;
• Lube-all-plus;
• Melatonin;
• Melanotan II;
• TA-65;
• Thymosin Beta 4;
• Traumeel; and
• Tribulus.

The use of these substances by the players was not approved by the Club’s medical staff, with the exception of AOD-9604, which was the subject of some sort of informal approval.

Facts
The Drug Free Sport New Zealand (DFSNZ) reported an anti-doping rule violation against Darren Reiri, the respondent, a member of the New Zealand Rugby League. DFSNZ alleged the respondent for the attempted use of the prohibited substance Anastrozole. Anastrozole is prohibited in-competition and out-of-competition according to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) prohibited list.

History
In May 2013 the respondent had ordered the prohibited substance Anastrozole over the internet from a website in India. The packages were dispatched to him but intercepted by Customs, who referred the interception to Medsafe. The respondent had used protein supplements during training in order to get bigger and more muscular. On advice of a friend he ordered supplements in India. The package didn't arrive and he received a letter from New Zealand Customs telling him the package had been intercepted. After a few months he tried again ordering supplements from india, again the package with supplements was intercepted. He was then contacted on behalf of Drug Free Sport New Zealand for an interview. Although there were two Anti-Doping violations it was regarded as only one violation. The respondent claims he had wanted to use the supplements for cosmetic purposes, to get bigger and stronger. He had not given it a second thought to whether any improvements in the gym he would benefit also from his rugby league abilities.
The tribunal objectively viewed that the explanations are not persuasive especially when the respondent persisted with his attempted acquisition after his first try was foiled by Medsafe. His failure to seek advice or check his position is inexcusable. He appeared to be willing to rely on the say so of a friend who he did not want to identify. While because of his age and new priorities his degree of involvement in rugby league was lessening, the obligations remained even if it was for him more of a hobby than a sport.

Decision
Tribunal concluded the respondent fell short of establishing he did not intend to enhance his sport performance - 2 years ineligibility imposed (commencing from February 1, 2014 to take account of substantial delay in referring matter to Tribunal).

TAS 2001/A/345 M. v. Scheizerischer Radfahrer Bund (Swiss Cycling)

TAS 2001/A/345 Roland Meier v/Swiss Cycling
CAS 2001/A/345 M. / Swiss Cycling

• Cycling
• Doping (rhEPO)
• Procedural defects
• Reliability of the testing method for rhEPO

1. Pursuant to the first paragraph of R57 of the CAS Code, the Panel has full power to review the facts and the law of cases before it. Any procedural defects which occurred in the internal proceedings
of a federation are cured by arbitration proceedings before the CAS.

2. The "direct test method", which tries to directly detect the presence of recombinant (artificial) EPO (rhEPO) in the urine of the person being tested, combines an isoelectrical focussing with a double immunal blotting. The method is based on the finding that artificially produced rhEPO behaves differently in an electrical field than human nEPO and can therefore be distinguished from one another. A second basic assumption of the test method is that, as is the case with many steroids, the production of natural hormones is reduced when an artificial hormone is introduced. The direct method for detecting rEPO is to be considered as being, in principle, sufficiently scientifically proven.

3. The finding of rhEPO in an athlete’s urine means that a doping offence has been committed.

On 27 August 2001 the Swiss Cycling's Doping Tribunal decided to impose a 8 month period of ineligibility and a CHF 4,000 fine on the Athlete after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance EPO Erythropoietin (EPO).

Hereafter in September 2001 the Athlete appealed the decision with the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The Athlete made the following assertions:

• The B-sample was not analysed within the prescribed period of ten working days.
• His request for or access to original documents was not granted.
• The minutes of the hearing were signed by a representative of Swiss Cycling instead of the tribunal.
• The quantity of the B sample was not sufficient for carrying out a test for rhEPO.
• The testing method (direct test method) is questionable for conclusive results.
• The principal of "in dubio pro reo" (in case of doubts the court must decide in favor of the accused) should be applied.
• Appellant request to be fully acquitted.

Swiss Cycling requested the Panel that the original decision to be confirmed:

• There was no doubt that the findings confirm the rhEPO in the urine sample.
• The procedural errors had no effect on the test result. 
• The generally permitted rhEPO test has sufficiently proven in several studies.

On 28 January 2002 the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides:

1.) The appeal is allowed in part.

2.) The decision of the Swiss Cycling's Doping Tribunal of 27 August 2001 is amended as follows:

In application of Article 90(1) no. 1 of the UCI's Anti-Doping Examination Regulations, M. is suspended for 8 months. Taking into account the period for which he could not take part in cycling races because of the doping allegation and the period of inactivity (Article 90(2) and (3) of the UCI's Anti-Doping Examination Regulations), the suspension commenced on 18 June 2001 and shall last until 17 May 2002. In addition, M. is obliged to pay a fine of CHF 2,000 to the Respondent. He is disqualified from the cycling race "Flèche Wallone 2001".

3.) (...)

TAS 2014/A/3639 Amar Muralidharan v. National Anti-Doping Agency of India, National Dope Testing Laboratory, Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports

CAS 2014/A/3639 Amar Muralidharan vs INADA, NDTL, Ministry of Youth Affairs & Sports

• Aquatics (swimming)
• Doping (methylhexaneamine)
• Objection to CAS jurisdiction
• Standing to appeal
• Departures of the international testing standards and/or the anti-doping rules
• Right of the athlete regarding the B sample
• Requirement regarding the transportation of the sample

1. Under Article R39 of the CAS Code, a panel of arbitrators has express authority to confirm (or reject) CAS jurisdiction. Such authority is reiterated in Article R55 of the CAS Code and confirmed by Article 186(1) of the PILA. According to the Swiss Federal Tribunal, a jurisdictional challenge should be filed in a timely manner (i.e. before entering a defence on the merits (included in – or prior to filing – an answer), failing which the parties are deemed to have accepted jurisdiction. In this respect, waiting until the eve of the hearing to consult with FINA to confirm an athlete’s “legal” status as an Indian swimmer on this threshold jurisdictional issue is careless and cannot stand to overcome the explicit requirements of Article R55 of the CAS Code and Article 186 of the PILA. What is more, if not earlier, the moment a party executes the Order of Procedure without observations or objections on jurisdiction, it also undoubtedly loses its right to raise such a procedural objection.

2. Right to appeal and right to be sued are issues linked to and deriving from the merits of a single case. In case parties to an arbitration mutually agree that such rights are given, they agree on a factual basis that binds an arbitrator. As it is not for an arbitrator to question undisputed facts, it is not for arbitrators to come to a different conclusion than that of the parties.

3. In any doping-related procedure, of critical importance to the adjudication of an appeal is the integrity of the athlete’s test results and corresponding evidentiary data, along with the athlete’s right to defence. In this regard, the existence of certain international testing standards (IST) and anti-doping rules are considered to be so fundamental and central to ensuring the integrity in the administration of sample collection that certain departures therefrom could result in the automatic invalidation of the test results. To demonstrate such departure, the consideration of the evidence presented by the parties concerning the circumstances of the doping test, as well as the transportation, storage, and chain of custody of the sample, should show that violations of the IST and/or of the anti-doping rules, if any, could have reasonably caused the prohibited substance to appear in an athlete’s sample. Errors which are merely mistakes such as clerical mistakes in preparing the Laboratory Document Package and unnecessary delays in handling the athlete’s cases before the Anti-Doping panels are not dispositive on the athlete’s test results.

5. It is undisputed that an athlete – at the least – maintains a fundamental right to be notified of, and be given the opportunity to attend, the opening of his B Sample. Such fundamental rights have been laid down in CAS jurisprudence. Nothing contained within the applicable regulations requires that any national federation, national anti-doping organization, etc. appoint an independent observer in the event an athlete is unable to attend the opening of his B Sample. All that is required is that an athlete be given an opportunity to attend such opening, or have his representative attend on his behalf.

6. The IST requirement that the sample be transported “as soon as practicable” is not unreasonable and in the absence of any evidence from the athlete to prove that the sample was tampered with during this period of time (or that there was a physical mix-up of the samples), the time period during which the sample was transported to the Laboratory and the chain of custody that followed do not constitute a reason on which to make a finding that there has been a fundamental violation of the IST.

In September 2010 the India National Anti-Doping Agency (INADA) has reported an anti-doping rule violation against the Athlete Amar Muralidharan after his A and B samples tested positive for the prohibited substance Methylhexaneamine (dimethylpentylamine).

Consequently on 5 November 2012 the Anti-Doping Disciplinary Panel of India (ADDPI) decided to impose a 2 year period of ineligibility on the Athlete.

Thereupon on 3 June 2014 the Anti-Doping Appeal Panel (ADAP) confirmed this sanction. Hereafter in June 2014 the Athlete appealed the ADAP decision wit the Court of Arbitration in Sport (CAS).

In his defence the Athlete made the following assertions:

• The A Sample was not handled correctly, although it was a clerical error it makes the A Sample invalid and a violation of the doping rules can not be made only by the positive findings of the B Sample.
• The B sample analysis was not observed by an independent observer, he was part of the disciplinary committee of the INADA.
• The Athlete has been denied access to justice because he has been deprived the prospect of having his suspension, if any, subject to legal review prior to the expiration of the period of ineligibility.

The Respondents contended that:

• The Athlete has been given sufficient opportunity to present his case and has been provided with all documents requested. The arguments brought forth in this appeal are repetitive and were already adjudicated by the ADAP panel.
• The integrity of the Athlete’s sample was adequately maintained throughout the collection procedure, transportation to the testing laboratory, and throughout the testing procedure.
• The observer was independent because he wasn't a member that precede the athlete's case 9 (same name two different persons).
• The error with the sample codes included only sample positive for MHA.
• The positive findings of MHA are not influenced by the pH of the samples.

The Sole Arbitrator deems that INADA and the Laboratory can be criticized on one hand for the clerical mistakes in preparing the Laboratory Document Package, and on the other hand for the unnecessary delays in handling the Athlete’s cases before the panels.

However the Athlete has not established to the comfortable satisfaction of the Sole Arbitrator that the Athlete’s adverse analytical finding could have been caused by a departure from the International standards of testing or the INADA Anti-Doping rules and not by ingestion. Such errors were merely mistakes which are not dispositive on the Athlete’s test results.

Therefore the Court of Arbitration for Sport decides on 8 April 2015 that:

1.) The appeal filed by Mr. Amar Muralidharan on 17 June 2014 is dismissed.

2.) The decision rendered by the NADA Anti-Doping Appeal Panel on 3 June 2014 is upheld.

3.) (…).

4.) (…).

5.) All other motions or prayers for relief are dismissed.

Facts
The International Swimming Federation (FINA) charged Tae-Hwan Park, the athlete, for a violation of Anti-Doping Rules. On the September 3, 2014 in Incheon Korea, the athlete underwent an out-of-competition doping control test. Analysis of the sample showed the presence of exogenous testosterone which is a prohibited substance according the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) prohibited list.

History
The medical physician or his nurse had injected the athlete with the prohibited substance. The athlete took legal action against his medical physician. This physician had injected him as part of chiropractic treatments and the athlete accepted her explanation that the injections would remedy his cold symptoms.
The athlete clearly failed to uphold his duty to prevent a prohibited substance from entering his body and bears the fault for his positive test. He did however had submitted that it was not his fault as he had trusted his medical physician. For this mitigating circumstances must be considered: reduction of sanction to a period no less than 12 months for "no significant fault or negligence" ; and reduction of sanction where the athlete provides "substantial assistance".

The panel disagrees that the athlete had satisfied fully the provisions for reduction of the period of ineligibility because of mitigating circumstances. Also the outcome of the legal action against the medical physician was not known to the panel, and the panel has no jurisdiction to directly sanction this medical physician. The way the prohibited substance had entered his body, by injection confirmed by the nurse, was accepted by the Panel on a balance of probability.

Decision
- The period of ineligibility will be 18 months commencing on the September 3, 2014 and ending at the conclusion of March 2, 2016, for his first anti-doping rule violation.
- All results obtained by the athlete on or after 3 September 2014 and through and including the date of this decision are disqualified. Any medals, points and prizes achieved during that period shall be forfeited.
- All costs of this case shall be borne by the Korea Swimming
Federation.

CAS 96/150 Scott Alexander Volkers vs FINA

TAS 96/150 Volkers/FINA

CAS 95/150 V. / Fédération Internationale de Natation Amateur (FINA)

• Doping of a swimmer (dextropropoxyphene)
• Suspension of the coach for 2 years
• Strict liability principle
• Consideration of mitigating circumstances

1. Pursuant to the FINA Rules, the strict liability principle is applicable in the case of a coach giving a banned substance to an athlete. The coach's act (in giving the competitor a prohibited substance) is the material and operative cause of the offence. The general ban of doping is wide enough to encompass such acts, even if they lack the subjective element of intent.

2. The Court of Arbitration for Sport has the power to review and to vary a sanction involving suspension taken by the FINA authorities.

3. In deciding the length of a suspension, it is necessary to take into account the circumstances and, in particular, the subjective elements of each case.

On February 20, 1996 the FINA Executive suspended Mr. Scott Alexander Volkers, the appellant, from all swimming activities for a period of two years commencing on December 1, 1995 which upon the appellants' appeal to the FINA Bureau was reduced on April 26, 1996 to one year.

Miss Samantha Riley, a swimmer coached by the appellant, tested positive for the prohibited substance propoxyphene metabolite in a doping test conducted after the World Swimming Short Course Championships held in Rio de Janeiro, in November and December 1995. The suspension was imposed on findings made as to how Miss Riley came to have the prohibited substance in her body. Mr. Volkers admitted having given a di-gesic pill to her in circumstances which the FINA Executive held to amount to negligence.

On May 16, 1996 the appellant appealed FINA's decisions to the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The CAS affirms FINA's findings as to the appellant's guilt and the sanction
imposed taking into account all the circumstances in which he committed the offence. The CAS considers that infractions of the FINA's rules, such as that of the appellant, must be met with adequate sanctions to punish the offender, and to discourage others. The appellants' conduct fell far below the standard of care and vigilance required of him in his professional duty as a swimming coach.

The effect of the appellants' suspension has been to impede him in his career by disqualifying him from taking part in international events for almost seven months.The appellants' negligence has damaged his international reputation and the shadow of the finding will continue to hang over him for the remainder of his career. Not only the appellant damaged his own career by his actions but also endangered the careers of those in his charge. Propoxyphene metabolite is not considered to enhance the performance of athletes and the appellant was found to have administered it to Miss Riley without actual knowledge of what he was doing. The appellant was strictly liable for the offence he committed. Upon being asked to explain the facts of the matter the appellant readily admitted that he had given the banned substance to Miss Riley, albeit mistakenly. Until the FINA's findings the appellant was a man with an impeccable professional reputation.

The CAS considers that the appellant has been properly sanctioned by suspension, however taking into account the special facts of this case, in particular the state of mind FINA found the appellant to have had, and the mitigation which has been put forward on his behalf, it has been decided the suspension shall be commuted to seven months ending on June 30, 1996.

The shortening of the appellants' suspension detracts no liability from him. The appellants' appeal has been successful only in part, as to the sentence, which has been reduced because of very special circumstances.

The Court of Arbitration for Sport decides:

1.) Upholds the decisions of the FINA Executive of February 20, 1996 and the FINA Bureau of April 26, 1996 as to the issue of the Appellant's guilt.

2.) Declares that the Appeal is upheld in part, as to sanction. Accordingly the Appellant's suspension shall be commuted to a period of seven months ending on June 30, 1996.

In November 2014 the Irish Sports Council (ISC) has reported an Anti-Doping Rule violation against the Athlete IS-3061 (the Athlete) after his sample tested positive for the prohibited substance cocaine.

The Athlete prompt admitted the violation and stated that he had used cocaine the night before the competition.

The Panel decides on 19 December 2014 to impose a 2 year period of ineligibliltiy on the Athlete starting on the date of the provisional suspension.

Facts
The Doping Authority (DA) appealed against the decision, dated October 22, 2009, of the Disciplinary Committee of the Royal Dutch Gymnastics Federation (Koninklijke Nederlandse Gymnastiek Unie, KNGU). In this decision the athlete was awarded with a period of ineligibility of one year for the positive finding of cocaine after a doping test.

History
The DA does not object the sanction but appeals against the consideration of the Disciplinary Committee that cocaine is not a sport performance enhancing substance. In the view of the DA this is a wrong interpretation of the doping rules.
The procedure was held without a hearing, the appeal committee agrees with the fact that cocaine is on the prohibited list of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) and it is not relevant if it enhances sport performance because it is prohibited. The decision will be adapted.

Decision
- The decision of the Disciplinary Committee of the KNGU, dated October 22, 2009, will be upheld with the adaptions.

Facts
The Royal Dutch Gymnastics Federation (Koninklijke Nederlandse Gymnastiek Unie, KNGU) alleged athlete 2009035 for a violation of the Anti-Doping Rules. During an in-competition doping control samples were taken for doping control purposes. The analysis of the samples showed the presence of a metabolite of cocaine. Cocaine is a prohibited substance according the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) prohibited list.

History
Shortly after the doping control the athlete told the union physician that he had used cocaine, he admitted the use in a letter to the Doping Authority (DA) before the positive findings were confirmed. When the athlete received the notification about the positive findings he made this known to the media, resulting in loosing his job.
The KNGU did want a punishment for the violation but also they want to support the athlete to return to his top level in his sport. For this they seek mitigating circumstances and emphasis that the prohibited substance wasn't used for enhancing sport performance and the athlete had admitted the use to the DA and the general public. The athlete went to a rehab clinic abroad to show his motivation to deal with his problem.

Also the council of the athlete emphasises that the athlete had confessed the use, before the laboratory results were known, to the DA and he had made a public confession. Cocaine doesn't enhance sport performance and the athlete did suffer from loosing his job, sponsor income, his status as high level athlete, his good name, fame and reputation. For this mitigating circumstances should be considered.

The disciplinary committee does not consider the personal consequences for the athlete as mitigating circumstances. However the fact that cocaine doesn't enhance sport performance and that his confession in the media sets a positive example for top level athletes makes it possible to allow a reduction of the sentence.

Decision
- The sanction is a period of ineligibility of one year with reduction of the period already spent in voluntary suspension.

Related cases:

• CAS 2014_A_2 DFSNZ vs Kris Gemmell
  December 1, 2014
• ST 2013_08 DFSNZ vs Kris Gemmell
  February 12, 2014

Facts
Kris Gemmell, the athlete, appealed against the decision of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), dated December 1, 2014.

History
At first the athlete had not received a sanction for the allegation of a whereabouts violation in a decision from the sport tribunal of New Zealand, dated February 12, 2014. The Drug Free Sport New Zealand appealed against this decision before the CAS. The athlete was sanctioned by the court for a period of ineligibility of 15 months.
In accordance with the new ruling of 2015 the athlete applied for a lower penalty because of a Lex Mitior case.
The panel agrees with the appeal, a violation has been committed and the lowest penalty will be settled.

Decision
- Weighing the factors referred to above, the Tribunal has decided that it would be appropriate to reduce the period of ineligibility to expire at midnight on February 12, 2015, being a 12 month period equivalent to the minimum period that could have been imposed.